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Where the death penalty is still applied for murder, a victim’s family participates in 
the decision-making processes to varying extents depending on the legal system. Under 
Islamic law, the victim’s relatives play a central role in the sentencing of the offender. They 
are the ones who decide whether or not death penalty will be imposed. They may choose to 
have the offender executed. They may also choose to pardon the offender, either for free or in 
exchange for monetary payment. Yet, forgiveness is preferable and more rewarding according 
to the Qur’an, the Holy Book of Islam (5:45). The family also may waive the death penalty, 
but the state maintains an interest in punishing the offender with a discretionary penalty less 
than death.  
In the United States, however, the role of capital murder survivors is relatively limited. 
The only tool that survivors may use to participate in the sentencing processes of a capital 
trial is to provide victim impact evidence, in which they share their victimization experience 
with the sentencing authority. Courts do not allow family members of capital murder victims 
to voice an opinion about the sentence to be imposed. Victim sentencing opinions are deemed 
irrelevant even when the family members do not want the defendant to receive the ultimate 
penalty. 
This Dissertation argues that, inspired by the Islamic approach, the United States 
should extend the role of victims’ relatives in the capital murder sentencing process. Having 
suffered the most, family members should, at the very least, be given the opportunity to weigh 
in on the sentencing process by permitting their views on punishment to be presented to the 
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Two years after his death sentence became final and while awaiting execution in 
Tripoli, Libya, a convicted murderer was forgiven by the widow and two adult offspring of 
his murder victim.1 As a result of the victim’s family’s pardon, the defendant’s case was sent 
back to the court that granted the final judgment of death, and he was sentenced to life 
imprisonment instead.2 Under Islamic law,3 which Libya applies in homicide cases,4 the 
family members of the victim determine whether or not a convicted murderer is to die, and 
may waive the penalty of death at any time before execution is carried out.5  
In the American criminal justice system, there is no similar mechanism for mercy in 
capital murder proceedings--it is the jury’s duty to determine what punishment should be 
administered. In fact, survivors of capital murder are prohibited from even expressing their 
opinions on the proper sentence,6 including cases where they have a desire for forgiveness and 
do not want the defendant to be executed. 
A capital trial in United States is divided into two phases, a guilt phase and a sentencing 
phase. During the first phase, a judge or jury initially determines a defendant’s innocence or 
guilt. If the defendant is found guilty of committing the crime she or he is accused of, the trial 
proceeds to the sentencing phase. At this second phase (the penalty phase), the jury decides 
whether the defendant shall be put to death or receive life imprisonment, taking into account 
                                                          
1 THE DEATH PENALTY IN LIBYA (March 20, 2008), http://www.deathpenaltylibya.org/. 
2 Id. 
3 Whenever the tem “Islamic law” is used, the author refers to the body of Qur’anic verses and collections of 
Prophetic sayings and actions agreed upon by the various legal schools of thought in Islam, not to the law as it is 
interpreted by contemporary states. 
4 In addition to Islamic law, Libyan law will be used to provide an example of a modern society that incorporates 
the classical Islamic doctrine regarding homicides into its penal code. See infra text accompanying notes 528-34. 
5 See infra text accompanying notes 20-23.  
6 The tem “survivors” refers to the family members of a murder victim. 
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both aggravating and mitigating factors. During this stage, the prosecution may introduce 
members of the murder victim’s family to testify about the victim’s personal characteristics 
and the emotional effects that the crime had upon them (victim impact evidence). 
Victim impact evidence includes three types of information: (1) descriptions of the 
victim’s character, (2) the impact of the crime on the victim’s family, and (3) the family 
members’ opinions of the defendant, the crime, and the appropriate punishment (this last 
category is referred to as “victim opinion evidence”). Booth v. Maryland was the first United 
States Supreme Court case to address families’ participation in capital sentencing through 
victim impact evidence.7 The Booth Court barred all three categories of evidence, finding that 
they violate a defendant’s Eighth Amendment right not to be subjected to arbitrary and 
capricious sentencing.8 According to Booth, all such evidence is irrelevant to a defendant’s 
blameworthiness, and would likely elicit an arbitrary imposition of the death penalty based on 
emotion rather than reason.9   
Four years later, in Payne v. Tennessee,10 the Court overruled the ban against evidence 
of a victim’s characteristics and the emotional impact of the crime on the victim’s family, 
considering such evidence relevant to the harm caused by the murder, and thus 
constitutional.11 Although Payne did not directly address the admissibility of the third type of 
information regarding survivors’ opinions or characterizations of the defendant, the crime, 
and the proper sentence to be imposed (victim opinion evidence), the overwhelming majority 
of courts have held that Payne did not end Booth’s prohibition of such evidence.12 Thus, the 
                                                          
7 482 U.S. 496 (1987). 
8 See id. at 502-09. See infra pp. 11-16 (providing a brief review of Booth v. Maryland). 
9 See id. 
10 501 U.S. 808 (1991). 
11 See id. at 825-27. See infra pp. 20-27 (providing a brief review of Payne v. Tennessee). 
12 See infra notes 296-98 and accompanying text. 
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prevailing wisdom is that victim opinion evidence is constitutionally impermissible in the 
penalty phase of a capital trial. 
After Payne, the validity of a family’s opinions regarding the appropriate sentence to be 
imposed (sentencing opinion evidence), in particular, differed depending on whether the 
victim’s family recommended death or life in prison as the proper penalty for the defendant. 
Oklahoma was the only jurisdiction where sentencing opinion was allowed to be included in 
victim impact evidence. Oklahoma court rulings have addressed only recommendations for 
the death penalty, even though the language of the Oklahoma statute allowing sentencing 
opinions provides no such restriction.13 Two years ago, however, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Dodd v. Trammell,14 ruled that the Oklahoma law permitting 
sentencing recommendations as part of victim impact statements violated the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, and the violation was not 
harmless.15 The Tenth Circuit noted that Payne made clear that it was not overruling the 
Booth’s prohibition on evidence concerning a victim’s family members’ opinions about the 
appropriate sentence.16  
As for voicing an opinion against imposing capital punishment (a mercy opinion), the 
Tenth Circuit in Robison v. Maryland17 held that Payne did not expand relevant mitigating 
evidence to cover the evidence of a family’s opposition to the death penalty.18 State courts 
have consistently followed the Robison court, declaring mercy opinions to be constitutionally 
impermissible evidence.19  
                                                          
13 See infra notes 307-13 and accompanying text. 
14 753 F.3d 971(10th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1546 (2014), and cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1548, (2014). 
15 Id. at 994. See infra notes 315-21 and accompanying text. 
16 Id. at 996. 
17 943 F.2d 1216, 1217 (10th Cir. 1991). 
18 Id. at 1217. 
19 See infra notes 409-19 and accompanying text. 
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Under Islamic law or Shari’a,20 murder is a capital offense punishable by death 
following the principle of an “eye for an eye,” or the law of qisas (equality in retribution).21 
What is unique about the Islamic legal system, and distinguishes it from other systems in this 
regard is that, murder is considered an individual wrong. As such, under the law of qisas, the 
heirs of the murdered person are given a choice to demand qisas (death), pardon the murderer 
and accept the payment of “blood money” (diyya) instead,22 or simply choose to forgive him 
or her outright. Further, pardoning the murderer by remitting the penalty of qisas is 
encouraged. Based on Qur’anic text, it is more rewarding to the victim’s family to forgive 
than to put the murderer to death.23 Leaving the decision of the death penalty in murder cases 
to the victim’s family does not mean that the state will play no role regarding the punishment 
process. If the family members choose to waive their right to qisas, in lieu of diyya or for free, 
                                                          
20 Since there is no standard method of transliteration from Arabic to English, there are many ways to spell 
certain key words relevant to a discourse on Islam. For consistency, the Shari’a is herein spelled as such (instead 
of, for instance, “Shari’ah” or “Sharia”). Further, the Qur’an is spelled herein with a “Q,” one “a,” and with 
punctuation (other forms are “Koran,” “Qur’aan,” and “Quran”). Also, Sunnah and Hadith are herein spelled as 
such (instead of “Sunna” and “Hadeeth”). Finally, the term diyya is herein spelled as such (rather than “diya,” 
“diyah,” or “diyeh”). 
21 The author prefers to keep the original term when she refers to qisas. Although “qisas” is usually translated 
into “retaliation,” the term “retaliation” does not reflect the correct meaning of “qisas.” Qisas means retaliation 
in the sense of “returning of like for like,” or “equality in retribution,” but not in the sense of “retuning evil for 
evil” or “an act of revenge,” since the penalty of qisas in Islam came with a strong recommendation of pardon 
(afw). For more details about the concept of qisas, see infra text accompanying notes 652-56. 
Regarding the encouragement of forgiveness under Islamic law, see infra text accompanying notes 731-34. 
Mohamad El-Sheikh does not approve of “retaliation” as the translation for “qisas,” considering the high degree 
of encouragement for mercy in Islam, explaining that “retaliation in English has a broader meaning, often 
equivalent  to “returning evil for evil,” and would be more appropriately applied to “the blood-feuds of the Days 
of Ignorance before the advent of Islam.” MOHAMAD A. EL-SHEIKH, THE APPLICABILITY OF ISLAMIC PENAL 
LAW (QISAS AND DIYAH) IN THE SUDAN 97 (Proquest Dissertations Pub. 1987).  
22 “Blood money” commonly refers to money paid to the family of someone who has been killed. Susan Hascall 
wrote: 
Although diyya is often translated to mean “blood money,” it . . . carries with it a negative 
connotation. It conjures up images of gangsters, contract killers, and those who betray the lives of 
others for money . . . . However, the payment of money to the innocent victims or their families has 
nothing in common with paying the guilty parties for the murder or injury. 
Susan C. Hascall, Restorative Justice in Islam: Should Qisas Be Considered a Form of Restorative Justice?, 4 
BERK. J. MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIC L. 35, 60 (2011). 
23 THE QUR’AN: A NEW TRANSLATION BY M. A. S. ABDEL HALEEM, 5:45 at 72; 3:133-34 at 44; 42:40 at 314. 
(Oxford Univ. Press 2005), https://yassarnalquran.files.wordpress.com/2015/06/the_quran-abdel-haleem.pdf. 
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the state has the power to inflict a discretionary punishment other than death, such as life 
imprisonment, on the grounds that setting murderers free endangers the peace of the whole 
community.24 Further, the victim’s family members pardon the qisas punishment (death) and 
not the crime itself. 
This Dissertation does not advocate that families of capital murder victims take over the 
jury’s duty in deciding whether a defendant should receive a death of life sentence. However, 
this Dissertation suggests that family members of victims should at least be permitted to voice 
an opinion as to whether the defendant should be executed. This becomes more advisable 
when the victim’s family do not want the defendant to be put to death. 
It is contradictory to prohibit the jury from hearing a concise statement recommending 
the death penalty while Payne has allowed them to listen to emotional, tearful, and angry 
victim impact testimony.25 More importantly, if the rationale behind precluding death 
recommendations is to protect capital defendants against prejudicial evidence, it is 
nonsensical to deny the victim’s family the opportunity to inform the jury that they do not 
want the defendant to be executed where such evidence clearly serves the interest of the 
defendant.26 Even if it were possible that the jury could be influenced by the family’s call for 
mercy, the other recommended punishment—life in prison— would still be sufficiently 
serious. Further, permitting mercy opinions would provide a place for mercy in the courtroom 
and would allow survivors to express forgiveness, which helps some to find closure.27  
                                                          
24 See infra text accompanying notes 833-35. 
25 See infra notes 330-32 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra text accompanying notes 429-31. 




 Part II examines the role of murder victims’ families in the capital sentencing phase 
under the United States criminal justice process. It provides an overview of victim impact 
evidence by addressing its constitutionality and states’ varied approaches with regard to what 
information might be included, who and how many may testify, the permissible form of such 
evidence, the timing, and the procedures for admitting it. It focuses on victim sentencing 
opinions calling for death by reviewing their validly after Payne and providing several 
arguments in favor of allowing death recommendation in capital trials. Then, mercy opinion 
will be analyzed, starting with courts’ positions on introducing it into evidence and ending 
with the reasons why a victim’s family members should be authorized to speak in favor of 
mercy in death penalty cases. 
Part III of this Dissertation discusses the victims’ participation in sentencing decisions 
in murder cases under Islamic law, and under Libyan law as a modern penal code that 
implements Islam in homicide offenses. It begins with a brief overview of the sources of 
Islamic law, the Islamic Legal Schools of jurisprudence, the taxonomy of crimes, and 
homicides. It then explores the right of demanding qisas (death) by demonstrating who owns 
such right, whether qisas must be demanded unanimously, and the procedural framework of 
imposing qisas punishment. That Part also addresses the right of pardon by covering the 
timing of pardon, and the alternative retributions when pardon is offered: blood money 
(diyya) and discretionary punishment (ta’zir). 
Part IV proposes allowing families of capital murder victims to voice their opinions on 
sentencing, especially when they advocate mercy, by applying a broader standard of relevance 
in capital murder sentencing. It concludes with a proposed framework for victim sentencing 
opinions. Finally, a brief summary will be presented in Part V.  
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II. THE FAMILIES OF MURDER VICTIMS PLAY A LIMITED ROLE 
IN THE UNITED STATES CAPITAL SENTENCING PROCEEDINGS 
 Even though the family members of a capital murder victim are the actual persons 
harmed by the murder, they were not allowed to have a voice in the sentencing hearing until 
1991 when the case of Payne v. Tennessee was decided.28 The United States Supreme Court 
finally allowed survivors of the murdered person to present victim impact evidence describing 
the victim’s character and the harm they suffered as a result of the defendant’s actions, to be 
heard by the jury during the sentencing phase of a capital trial.29 This holding left the bar 
against such participation set forth in Booth v. Maryland,30 and South Carolina v. Gathers.31 
Unfortunately, the role of victims’ families in capital sentencing ends at offering victim 
impact statements. Most courts have held that Payne only partially overruled Booth, leaving 
undisturbed Booth’s holding that “the admission of a victim’s family members’ 
characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence 
violated the Eighth Amendment.”32 Thus, families of murder victims cannot express their 
opinions with regard to the appropriate sentences the defendants should receive. In addition, 
as for family members who support death penalty, they are allowed to communicate their 
sentencing preference to the jury by expressing their grief and pain through victim impact 
evidence. On the other hand, there is no available means for those families who are not in 
favor of the ultimate penalty to exercise forgiveness. 
                                                          
28 501 U.S. 808 (1991). 
29 See id. at 825-27. 
30 482 U.S. 496 (1987). 
31 490 U.S. 805 (1989). 
32 See Payne, 501 U.S at 830 n. 2 (emphasis added).  
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 Survivors’ involvement in capital sentencing proceeding should exceed the mere 
entitlement of being able to introduce victim impact evidence. A survivor’s view on the 
appropriate punishment for a defendant should matter to the system as well. After allowing 
victim impact evidence, a concise statement by the surviving relatives expressing their desires 
for the penalty of death to be imposed would not be prejudicial to defendant, considering that 
such a desire would be anticipated by most jurors. In fact, the ban on death recommendations 
may motivate family members to try to influence the jury to vote for death by presenting 
heartbreaking and angry victim impact statements. When a family requests leniency, there is 
no way that defendant’s constitutional rights would be harmed if a capital jury hears such 
request. Rather, allowing mercy opinions would be entirely in a capital defendant’s favor. 
 The approach of permitting family members to make sentencing recommendations does 
not replace the role of the jury. Instructions could be given to the jury by the trial judge that 
such recommendations may be taken into account, yet the jurors are the only authority to 
make the ultimate decision of life or death. In addition, a capital defendant can always seek 
relief under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause if a sentencing opinion was 
prejudicial enough to render his or her sentence fundamentally unfair. As for the lack of 
relevance of a family’s recommendations to the determination of a sentence, the rules of 
evidence can be changed to provide the family with a larger role in the criminal justice 
process. 
 Because sentencing recommendations are but one type of victim impact evidence, 
addressing murder survivors’ participation through those recommendations requires a review 
of some foundational information about victim impact evidence as an essential background. 
This Part will start with an overview of victim impact evidence. Then, it discusses the validity 
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of victim sentencing opinions that specifically call for imposing death and why they should be 
allowed in court. The final section examines mercy opinions. 
 An Overview of Victim Impact Evidence 
As a result of the victims’ rights movement, court began to pay increased attention to 
the significance of the harm suffered by victims when determining appropriate sentences for 
defendants. The introduction of victim impact statements into criminal proceedings supports 
that assertion.33 Victim impact statements are statements made by, or on behalf of, crime 
victims at the sentencing stage, to be considered by the sentencing authority, and are the type 
of victim impact evidence used most frequently.34 The statements describe the impact of the 
offenses on the victims, or on their surviving family members in cases of homicide. 
The United States Supreme Court has struggled over the admissibility of victim 
impact evidence in capital trials. First, an Eighth Amendment bar to presenting victim impact 
evidence was created in Booth v. Maryland.35 Then, South Carolina v. Gathers36 extended the 
bar to statements made by the state to a capital sentencing jury regarding the personal 
qualities of the victim. However, in Payne v. Tennessee,37 victim impact evidence was later 
held to permissible in capital sentencing. 
 The rules of admitting victim impact evidence at the penalty stage of a capital trial vary 
among jurisdictions. With regard to the content of such evidence, some states only allow 
                                                          
33 Richard S. Murphy, The Significance of Victim Harm: Booth v. Maryland and the Philosophy of Punishment 
in the Supreme Court, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1303, 1303 (1988). The Payne Court stated that “[c]ourts have always 
taken into consideration the harm done by the defendant in imposing sentence, and the [victim impact] evidence 
adduced in this case was illustrative of the harm caused by [the defendant]’s double murder.” Payne, 501 U.S. at 
825. 
34 Courts have permitted other forms of victim impact evidence. See infra note 241 and accompanying text. 
35 482 U.S. 496 (1987). 
36 490 U.S. 805 (1989). 




information concerning the victim and the impact of the murder on the victim’s family 
members.38 Further, while some states have held that only the victim’s family may present 
impact evidence, other jurisdictions have extended the use of such evidence to allow 
statements from close friends and even co-workers of the victim.39 Different forms of victim 
impact evidence have been permitted in different courts, such as statements, photographs, and 
videos.40 Some state statutes identify the penalty phase of a trial as the proper time to 
introduce victim impact evidence, while few courts have ruled that impact evidence is 
permissible when making determinations of guilt.41 Finally, the procedural rules regarding 
notice, jury instructions, preliminary hearings, and cross-examination of the victim impact 
witnesses also vary by state.42 
 The Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the constitutionality of victim impact 
evidence and the framework shaped by the states for the admission of such evidence will be 
explored next. 
 The Constitutionality of Victim Impact Evidence 
 Three significant cases dealt with the constitutionality of victim impact evidence at 
capital sentencing: Booth v. Maryland (1987),43 South Carolina v. Gathers (1989),44 and 
Payne v. Tennessee (1991).45 Booth was the first occasion, the United States Supreme Court 
ruled directly on the constitutionality of victim impact evidence. The Court held that victim 
impact evidence was constitutionally inadmissible in capital cases because it violated the 
                                                          
38 See discussion infra pp. 29-36  
39 See discussion infra pp. 36-39. 
40 See discussion infra pp. 40-43. 
41 See discussion infra pp. 43-45. 
42 See discussion infra pp. 45-50. 
43 482 U.S. 496. 
44 490 U.S. 805. 
45 501 U.S. 808. 
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Eighth Amendment.46 The Gathers Court extended the Booth ruling to statements made by a 
prosecutor regarding the personal character of and a murder victim positive he had in his 
community.47 In Payne, the Court reversed its holdings in both Booth and Gathers, deciding 
that victim impact evidence is constitutional.48 
 While Booth and Gathers were overruled by Payne,49 both provide the foundation and 
context necessary to fully understand the Payne decision. Thus, before exploring Payne, the 
Court’s two prior decisions will be thoroughly reviewed. 
a. Booth v. Maryland 
 In Booth v. Maryland, the United States Supreme Court first addressed the issue of 
whether the admission of victim impact evidence at the sentencing stage of a capital trial 
violates the Eighth Amendment.50 In a five-to-four decision, the Court held that the Eight 
Amendment prohibits a state from allowing capital sentencing juries to consider victim 
impact evidence.51 
 John Booth was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder for repeatedly stabbing 
his neighbors, an elderly couple, in their chests with a kitchen knife after gagging and 
                                                          
46 Booth, 482 U.S. at 496.  
47 See Gathers, 490 U.S. at 805. 
48 Payne, 501 U.S. at 808. 
49 The combined holdings of Booth and Gathers barred three types of evidence: descriptions of the victim’s 
character, statements concerning the emotional impact of the crime on the victim’s family, and the family 
members’ opinions of the defendant, of the crime, and of the appropriate punishment. Since the Payne Court did 
not address the third type (victim opinion evidence), most courts have interpreted Payne as only partially 
overruling Booth and Gathers, meaning that the portion of Booth and Gathers dealing with victim opinion 
evidence is still valid.  
50 See Booth, 482 U.S. at 501-02. The Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The 
prohibitions of the Eighth Amendment apply to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962). 
51 See Booth, 482 U.S. at 497-98. 
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bounding them.52 He chose to have a jury, rather than a judge, determines his sentence.53 At 
the sentencing phase of Booth’s trial, the state offered a victim impact statement as mandated 
by Maryland statute.54  
 The victim impact statements were based on interviews with the victims’ children, son-
in-law, and granddaughter.55 They included the emotional and psychological impact of the 
crime on the family, descriptions of the victims’ outstanding personal qualities, and the family 
members’ opinions and characterizations of the crime and the defendant.56 For instance, the 
son stated to the jury that he could not sleep and felt very depressed.57 Similarly, the daughter 
said that she suffered from lack of sleep and had become “withdrawn.”58 The family members 
described the victims as loving parents and grandparents whose family was most important to 
them” and “extremely good people who wouldn’t hurt a fly.”59 Regarding the family 
members’ opinions of the crime and the defendant, the victim’s son said that his parents had 
been “butchered like animals” and no one “should be able to do something like that and get 
away with it.”60 The victims’ daughter stated that her parents were stabbed repeatedly and 
viciously.61 She added that she “could never forgive anyone for killing them that way. . .  
                                                          
52 See id. Booth was also convicted of two counts of robbery and one count of conspiracy to commit robbery. Id. 
at 498. 
53 Id. 
54 The Maryland sentencing statue at the time of Booth’s trial, not only permitted, but required, the admission of 
victim impact statement during a capital sentencing. See id. at 498-499 (citing MD. ANN. CODE, Art. 41, § 4-
609(c) (1986)). 
55 Id. at 499. 
56 See id. at 499-500. 
57 Id. at 512. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 514. 
60 Id. at 512. 
61 Id. at 513. 
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animals wouldn’t do this.”62 She concluded that such a murderer could never be 
rehabilitated.63 
 Booth moved to suppress the victim impact statements, contending they were irrelevant 
and unduly inflammatory and, thus, their use would violate his rights under the Eighth 
Amendment.64 The Maryland trial court rejected his motion, holding that the jury may 
consider “any and all evidence which would bear on the [sentencing decision].”65 Booth was 
sentenced to death for the first count of first-degree murder and to life imprisonment for the 
second.66 
 On appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed Booth’s death sentence and stated 
that victim impact evidence furthered an important interest by informing the jury of the “full 
measure of the harm caused by the crime.”67 The court also highlighted that the victim impact 
evidence in Booth’s case contained only a “relatively straight-forward and factual description 
of the effects of [the crime],” and did not cause the jury to base its death sentence on passion 
or emotion.68 
 The Supreme Court disagreed with the Maryland court, and held that state’s statute 
mandating that victim impact statements be considered at the sentencing stage of a capital 
murder did violate the Eighth Amendment rights of the defendant.69 
                                                          
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 See id. at 500-01. 
65 Id. at 501. 
66 Id.  
67 Id. This was not the first time the Maryland Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether to consider 
victim impact evidence during a capital sentencing hearing. In Lodowski v. State, the court of appeals found that 
victim impact evidence was not constitutionally proscribed and was relevant to a capital sentencing 
determination. 490 A.2d 1228, 1259 (1985), vacated by, 475 U.S. 1078 (1986). The Court observed that “there is 
a reasonable nexus between the impact of the offense upon the victim or the victim’s family and the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the crime.” Id. at 1254. 
68 Booth, 482 U.S. at 501. 
69 See id. at 509. 
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 The Court found that the information contained in the victim impact statements was 
“irrelevant to a capital sentencing decision, and that its admission create[d] a constitutionally 
unacceptable risk that the jury may impose the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner.”70 The Court added that imposing a capital sentence by a jury must be “suitably 
directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious 
action.”71  Evidence considered in a capital sentencing, the Court held, must have some 
bearing on the defendant’s “personal responsibility and moral guilt.”72 The Court observed 
that there was no connection between the victim impact evidence, which focused on the 
character of the victim and the impact of the murder on his or her family, and the 
“blameworthiness” of the defendant.73 Put differently, since the harm caused by a defendant is 
not related to the moral blameworthiness of the defendant, imposing a punishment based on 
the harm rather than the crime itself would be inherently arbitrary.  
  Justice Powell expressed that the introduction of information concerning the survivors’ 
grief and their opinions regarding the crime and the defendant could “serve no other purpose 
than to inflame the jury and divert it from deciding the case on the relevant evidence 
concerning the crime and the defendant.”74 
 The majority also noted that the introduction of “victim good character” evidence would 
then necessitate allowing the defendant to rebut that evidence, which would create a “mini-
trial” on the character of the victim.75 Such a “mini-trial” could “distract the sentencing jury 
                                                          
70 Id. at 502-03. The Booth Court pointed out that the kind of information contained in victim impact statements 
might be admissible at capital sentencing if it “related directly to the circumstances of the crime.” See id at 507 
n. 10. 
71 Id. at 502 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 189 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and 
Stevens, JJ.)). 
72 See id. (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)).  
73 See id. at 504. 
74 Id. at 508. 
75 See id. at 506-07. 
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from its constitutionally required task—determining whether the death penalty is appropriate 
in light of the background and record of the accused and the particular circumstances of the 
crime.”76 
 Court further based its decision on the fact that death is different from all other 
punishments.77 Therefore, the Court limited its holding to capital punishment cases only.78 
 Justice White and Justice Scalia focused their separate dissents79 on two main 
arguments. The first one argument relates to the relevance of the harm suffered by the 
survivors. Justice White disagreed with the majority view that only evidence related to the 
defendant’s blameworthiness was relevant to the capital sentencing decision.80 He argued that, 
if a sentence could be enhanced in noncapital cases based on the harm the defendant caused 
regardless of his or her intention to cause such harm, then “why the same approach is 
unconstitutional” in death penalty cases.81  Justice Scalia also stated that “the amount of harm 
[a defendant] causes does bear upon the extent of [his or her] ‘personal responsibility.’”82 
 The second argument concentrates on the use of victim impact evidence to counteract 
the defendant’s mitigating evidence. Justice White’s dissent pointed out that “the State has a 
legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating evidence which the defendant is entitled to 
put in by reminding the sentencer that just as the murderer should be considered as an 
individual, so too the victim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to society 
and in particular to his [or her] family.”83 Justice Scalia concluded that, because the defendant 
                                                          
76 Id. at 507. 
77 Id. at 509 n. 12. 
78 See id (“We imply no opinion as to the use of [victim impact] statements in non-capital cases”). 
79 See id at 515, 519 (Rehnquist, C.J., White, O’Connor, and Scalia, JJ., dissenting). 
80 Id. at 516 (White, J., dissenting). 
81 Id. at 516-17. 
82 Id. at 519 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
83 Id. at 517 (White, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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is allowed to introduce evidence to mitigate his or her blameworthiness, families should be 
allowed to counter that mitigating evidence with victim impact statements showing the 
amount of harm caused by the defendant’s actions.84 
 Only two years after Booth, the Court revisited the issue of using victim impact 
evidence at capital sentencing in South Carolina v. Gathers,85 albeit in a slightly different 
context 
b. South Carolina v. Gathers 
 In Gathers, victim impact statements were made by the prosecutor rather than by the 
victim’s family members.86 This slight difference, however, did not make the Court change its 
approach from Booth. Gathers extended Booth’s holding to bar similar comments made by 
prosecutors.87 
 Gathers had been sentenced to death for committing a first-degree murder.88 He, along 
with three of his friends, beat and kicked a stranger in a park after he refused to speak with 
them.89 Before leaving the park, Gathers beat the victim again with an umbrella and inserted it 
into his anus.90 Gathers returned to the park “some time” later, and stabbed the victim to 
death.91 
 During the sentencing phase of the trial, the prosecutor commented extensively on the 
victim’s personal qualities in his closing argument.92 The prosecutor remarked that the victim 
was a religious man who cared about his community, inferring such from the victim’s 
                                                          
84 Id. at 520-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
85 490 U.S. 805 (1989). 
86 See id. at 808-09. 
87 See id. at 810-11. 
88 Id. at 806. 
89 See id. at 806-07. 
90 Id. at 807. 
91 Id. 
92 See id. at 808-09. 
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possession of religious items and a voter registration card at the time of the murder.93 
Moreover, the prosecutor read to the jury from the religious tract the victim was carrying at 
the time he was killed.94 
 The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the death sentence, relying on Booth and 
stating that the prosecutor’s remarks were “extensive,” “unnecessary to an understanding of 
the circumstances of the crime,” and “conveyed the suggestion [Gathers] deserved a death 
sentence because the victim was a religious man and a registered voter.”95 The U.S. Supreme 
Court affirmed.96 
 Like Booth, Gathers was a five-to-four opinion. In it, the Court reiterated that a penalty 
imposed in a capital case must reflect a defendant’s “personal responsibility and moral 
guilt,”97 holding that the statements presented by the prosecutor were unrelated to the 
blameworthiness of the defendant.98  
 In determining that the rule in Booth applied the facts of Gathers, the Court found that 
the prosecutor’s statements about the victim’s character were “indistinguishable” from the 
                                                          
93 See id. at 808. The prosecutor commented as follows: 
We know from the proof that Reverend Minister Haynes was a religious person. He had his religious 
items out there. This defendant strewn [sic] them across the bike path, thinking nothing of that . . . . 
You will find some other exhibits in this case that tell you more about a just verdict. Again this is 
not easy. No one takes any pleasure from it, but the proof cries out from the grave in this case. 
Among the personal effects that this defendant could care little about when he went through it is 
something that we all treasure. Speaks a lot about Reverend Minister Haynes. Very simple yet very 
profound. Voting. A voter’s registration card. Reverend Haynes believed in this community. He 
took part. And he believed that in Charleston County, in the United States of America, that in this 
country you could go to a public park and sit on a public bench and not be attacked by the likes of 
Demetrius Gathers. 
Id. at 808-10. 
94 See id. at 808-09. 
95 Id. at 810. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 810 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801  (1982)). 
98 See id. (citation omitted). In Lockett v. Ohio, the Court noted that evidence involved a defendant’s character 
and record, and the circumstances of the crime were relevant to his or her blameworthiness. 438 U.S. 586, 604 
(1978). See infra notes 438-440 and accompanying text. 
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statements made by the victim’s family in Booth.99 Thus, permitting the jury to consider such 
statements “could result in imposing the death sentence because of factors about which the 
defendant was unaware, and that were irrelevant to the decision to kill.”100 
 The Court also rejected the State’s argument that the prosecution’s comments were 
related to the circumstances of the crime.101 It clarified that, while victim impact evidence 
relevant to the circumstances of the crime is admissible, the prosecutor’s argument “went well 
beyond that fact.”102 The Court reasoned that, while the victim’s personal papers (the tract and 
the voter card) were admissible as relevant circumstances of the crime, the content of those 
papers was irrelevant because there was no evidence showing that the defendant read them.103 
 In a lengthy dissent, Justice O’Connor argued that Booth covered statements describing 
the impact of the crime on the victims’ family members and should not be interpreted as 
“foreclosing the introduction of all evidence, in whatever form, about a murder victim.”104 In 
her view, the holding in Booth should not have been viewed so as “to preclude prosecutorial 
comment which gives the sentencer a ‘glimpse of the life’ a defendant ‘chose to extinguish.’” 
105 She expressed that there was no violation of the Eighth Amendment in what the prosecutor 
presented in his closing argument.106 
 Justice O’Connor wrote that, “nothing in the Eighth Amendment precludes the 
prosecutor from conveying to the jury a sense of the unique human being whose life the 
defendant has taken.”107 She noted that just as the defendant’s background information was 
                                                          
99 Id. at 811. 
100 Id. (citation omitted). 
101 See id. 
102 See id.  
103 See id at 811-12. 
104 Id. at 814 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
105 Id. at 816 (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 468 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting)).  
106 Id. at 820. 
107 Id. at 817. 
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relevant, the information about the victim was “relevant to the jury’s assessment of the harm 
he had caused and the appropriate penalty.”108 Further, because the death of the victim caused 
harm to society, such harm should be relevant to “society’s moral judgment concerning the 
proper punishment.”109 
 As in Booth, Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion. Booth, he wrote, was wrongly 
decided and should be overruled because it restricted state and federal criminal procedures in 
violation of the Constitution.110 Moreover, he contended that, because the restrictions imposed 
by Booth had no basis in the Constitution, society, common law, or present laws, the harm 
caused by the crime should be taken into consideration to assess the criminal responsibility of 
the defendant in capital cases.111 
 In addition, Justice Scalia argued that the victim’s “admirable” personal characteristics 
were intertwined with the impact of the crime on his or her family members, stating that there 
was “no basis for drawing a distinction for Eighth Amendment purposes between the 
admirable personal characteristics of the particular victim and the particular injury caused to 
the victim’s family and fellow citizens.”112 He added, “Indeed, I would often find it 
impossible to tell which was which.”113 
 The dissenting approach prevailed two years later in Payne v. Tennessee114 where the 
Court reconsidered the constitutionality of victim impact evidence at capital sentencing 
hearings. 
                                                          
108 Id. at 820-21. 
109 Id. at 819. 
110 Id. at 823-24 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
111 Id. at 825. 
112 Id. at 823. 
113 Id. 
114 501 U.S. 808 (1991). 
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c. Payne v. Tennessee 
 In the time that elapsed between the Gathers opinion and Payne, a change had occurred 
in the makeup of the Court, and with it came a change in the Court’s position regarding victim 
impact evidence.115 The Justices that formed the minorities in Booth and Gathers carried the 
day when their views were adopted by the majority of the Payne Court, finding no 
constitutional bar to victim impact evidence in capital sentencing proceedings.116 
 Pervis Payne had spent a Saturday morning and afternoon injecting cocaine and 
drinking alcohol.117 Later that day, he entered the apartment of Ms. Christopher, a twenty-
eight-year-old woman who lived across the hall from his girlfriend, and made sexual advances 
towards her.118 When she resisted, Payne became violent and attacked Ms. Christopher, her 
two-year-old daughter, Lacie, and her three-year-old son, Nicholas.119 Payne took a butcher 
knife from Ms. Christopher’s kitchen and stabbed her forty-one times.120 He also stabbed her 
daughter in the chest, stomach, back, and head, and then stabbed her son several times such 
that the wounds completely penetrated his body.121 As a result of their stab wounds, Ms. 
Christopher and her daughter died, but her son survived.122 Payne was convicted of two 
counts of first-degree murder and one count of assault with intent to commit murder.123 
                                                          
115 By 1991, Justices Powell and Brennan, the authors of each of the opinions in Booth and Gathers, 
respectively, had retired and were replaced by Justices Kennedy and Souter. See Patrick M. Fahey, Payne v. 
Tennessee: An Eye for an Eye and Then Some, 25 CONN. L. REV. 205, 224-25, 225 n. 115 (1992).  
116 Payne, 501 U.S. at 827. 
117 Id. at 811-12. 
118 Id. at 812. 
119 Id. at 811-12. 
120 Id. at 812-13. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 811. 
21 
 
The victim impact evidence presented by the prosecution during the penalty stage of the 
trial included the testimony of the children’s grandmother, who spoke about how the crime 
had affected her surviving grandson: 
He cries for his mom. He doesn’t seem to understand why she doesn’t come home. 
And he cries for his sister Lacie. He comes to me many times during the week and 
asks me, Grandmama, do you miss my Lacie. And I tell him yes. He says, I’m 
worried about my Lacie.124 
 
Additionally, the prosecutor made extensive statements in his closing argument concerning 
the boy’s condition, stating that: 
 Nicholas was alive . . . [h]is eyes were open . . . [h]e was able to hold his 
intestines in as he was carried to the ambulance. So he knew what happened to his 
mother and baby sister. 
 There is nothing you can do to ease the pain of any of the families involved 
in this case . . . . There is obviously nothing you can do for Charisse and Lacie Jo. 
But there is something that you can do for Nicholas. 
 Somewhere down the road Nicholas is going to grow up, hopefully . . . . He 
is going to want to know what type of justice was done. He is going to want to 
know what happened. With your verdict, you will provide the answer.125 
 
In his rebuttal to the defense’s closing argument of the defense, the prosecutor submitted: 
 No one will ever know about Lacie Jo because she never had the chance to 
grow up. Her life was taken from her at the age of two years old . . . . And there won’t 
be anybody there—there won’t be her mother there or Nicholas’ mother there to kiss 
him at night. His mother will never kiss him good night or pat him as he goes off to 
bed, or hold him and sing him a lullaby. 
 [Petitioner’s attorney] wants you to think about a good reputation, people 
who love the defendant and things about him. He doesn't want you to think about the 
people who love Charisse Christopher, her mother and daddy who loved her. The 
people who loved little Lacie Jo, the grandparents who are still here. The brother who 
mourns for her every single day and wants to know where his best little playmate is. 
He doesn’t have anybody to watch cartoons with him, a little one. These are the 
things that go into why it is especially cruel, heinous, and atrocious, the burden that 
that child will carry forever.126 
 
                                                          
124 Id. at 814-15.  
125 Id. at 815. 
126 Id. at 816. 
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Payne received a death sentence on each of the murders.127 He appealed his case to the 
Supreme Court of Tennessee, arguing that the grandmother’s testimony and the prosecutor’s 
comments at the sentencing phase violated Booth and Gathers.128 Nevertheless, the Tennessee 
court rejected the Payne’s argument and affirmed his death sentence.129 The court found that 
the grandmother’s testimony was “technically irrelevant,” but was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and “did not create a constitutionally unacceptable risk of an arbitrary 
imposition of the death penalty.”130 With respect to the statements by the prosecutor, the court 
held that they were related to the defendant’s personal responsibility and “surely relevant” to 
the determination of his blameworthiness.131 Payne then appealed the judgment to the United 
States Supreme Court.  
The Supreme Court overruled its holdings in both Booth and Gathers, declaring that 
victim impact evidence is constitutionally permissible.132 In a six-to-three decision, the Court 
held that the Eighth Amendment does not bar victim impact evidence relating to the victim’s 
personal characteristics or the impact of the murder on the victim’s family, nor does it bar 
prosecutorial statements regarding such evidence, at a capital sentencing hearing.133 
Importantly, however, Payne did not address whether a victim’s opinions of the crime, the 
defendant, and the appropriate sentence would be permissible. In a footnote, the Court 
explained: 
Our holding today is limited to the holdings of Booth v. Maryland and South 
Carolina v. Gathers that evidence and argument relating to the victim and the 
impact of the victim’s death on the victim’s family are inadmissible at a capital 
sentencing hearing. Booth also held that the admission of a victim’s family 
                                                          
127 Id.  
128 Id. at 816-17. 
129 Id. at 816. 
130 Id. at 816-17. 
131 Id. at 817. 
132 Id. at 827, 830. 
133 Id. at 827. 
23 
 
members’ characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the 
appropriate sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. No evidence of the latter sort 
was presented at the trial in this case.134 
 
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist discussed the justification in Booth and 
Gathers that evidence relating to the victim’s character or to the crime’s impact on his or her 
family is immaterial to capital sentencing because it does not reflect on the defendant’s 
blameworthiness.135 He noted that the harm caused by a crime has always been an important 
factor in determining the appropriate sentence, and that “two equally blameworthy criminal 
defendants may be guilty of different offenses solely because their acts cause differing 
amounts of harm.”136 In other words, he argued that the difference in the amount of harm 
determines the harshness of the punishment the defendant might receive, not the level of his 
blameworthiness. According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, victim impact evidence is “simply 
another form or method of informing the sentencing authority about the specific harm caused 
by the crime in question, evidence of a general type long considered by sentencing 
authorities.”137 
 Another justification relied on by the majority in favor of allowing victim impact 
evidence was to “keep the balance true” in the sentencing stage.138 Chief Justice Rehnquist 
argued that Booth “unfairly weighted the scales in a capital trial; while virtually no limits are 
placed on the relevant mitigating evidence a capital defendant may introduce concerning his 
own circumstances, the State is barred from . . . offering ‘a glimpse of the life’ which a 
defendant ‘chose to extinguish.’”139 Therefore, he concluded, the state has “a legitimate 
                                                          
134 Id. at 830 n. 2 (citation omitted). 
135 Id. at 819. 
136 Id.  
137 Id. at 825. 
138 Id. at 827. 
139 Id. at 822 (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting)). 
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interest in counteracting the mitigating evidence which the defendant is entitled to put in, by 
reminding the sentencer that just as the murderer should be considered as an individual, so too 
the victim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to society and in particular to 
his family.”140 
 Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Souter each filed separate concurrences.141 According to 
Justice O’Connor, “there is no strong societal consensus that a jury may not take into account 
the loss suffered by a victim’s family or that a murder victim must remain a faceless stranger 
at the penalty phase of a capital trial.”142 She noted out that some victim impact evidence 
might be “unduly inflammatory,” but that such concern does not justify prohibiting all such 
evidence.143 Justice O’Connor also explained that the majority’s holding did not require or 
advise states to admit victim impact evidence; rather, it merely allowed them to use such 
evidence at capital sentencing proceedings.144 
 In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia disputed the Booth finding that the 
“unanticipated consequences” of a crime are irrelevant and should not influence the decision 
makers.145 He wrote that the Booth rationale conflicted with the public sense of justice as 
expressed in the victims’ rights movement.146 
                                                          
140 Id. at 825 (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 517 (1987) (White, J., dissenting)). Payne presented 
evidence of his mitigating circumstances in the form of testimony from four witnesses, his parents, his girlfriend, 
and a psychologist. This evidence was introduced to show that Payne was a hard worker, and he did not have any 
criminal record nor any history of drug abuse, that he attended church, and that he was a “caring person,” “good 
with children,” and a “good son.” The psychologist testified that Payne was “mentally handicapped,” and that he 
was the politest prisoner he ever met. Id. at 814. 
141 Id. at 830-33 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 833-35 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 835-44 (Souter, J., 
concurring).  
142 Id. at 831(O’Connor, J., concurring). 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 




 In the final concurrence, Justice Souter attacked Booth’s analyses that victim impact 
evidence is disallowed because it includes information of which the defendant is unaware.147 
He explained that every murderer knows that his victim probably has close survivors who will 
be harmed by the victim’s death; therefore, considering those foreseeable consequences of the 
murder in determining the defendant’s blameworthiness is morally defensible.148 Justice 
Souter additionally found that permitting relevant mitigating evidence and while disllowing 
foreseeable victim impact evidence “may be seen as a significantly imbalanced process.”149 
Finally, Justice Souter stated that he supported overruling Booth because it “sets an 
unworkable standard” for defining what constitutes proper penalty phase evidence which 
itself creates a risk of arbitrary results.150   
 Justice Marshall delivered one of the dissents in Payne.151 He stated that Payne resulted 
from “[p]ower, not reason.”152 The Payne’s outcome, Justice Marshall wrote, was only the 
result of a change in the Court’s justices because the reasons set forth by the Payne majority 
were the arguments utilized by the Booth and Gathers dissenters.153 Furthermore, he agreed 
with the majorities’ arguments in both Booth and Gathers that victim impact evidence 
includes information that a defendant was unaware of and, thus, unrelated to his 
blameworthiness.154 With regard to the Justice Souter’s foreseeability notion, Justice Marshall 
responded that “even where the defendant was in a position to foresee the likely impact of his 
conduct, admission of victim-impact evidence creates an unacceptable risk of sentencing 
                                                          
147 Id. at 837-38 (Souter, J., concurring). 
148 Id. at 838-39. 
149 Id. at 839 (citing  Mills v. Maryland, 486 U. S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting)). 
150 Id. at 839-40. 
151 Id. at 844-56 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
152 See id. at 844. 
153 See id.  
154 See id. at 845-46. 
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arbitrariness.”155 Justice Marshall also found that, because victim impact evidence has an 
“inherent capacity to draw the jury’s attention away from the character of the defendant and 
the circumstances of the crime,” the probative value of admitting this evidence is “always” 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.156 
 Justice Stevens who also dissented,157 disputed the harm-based justification, contending 
that the unforeseeable qualities of a victim’s character are irrelevant to the defendant’s 
“personal responsibility and moral guilt.”158 Therefore, he argued, considering it as a factor at 
sentencing would lead to a sentence that did not reflect the defendant’s blameworthiness.159  
According to Stevens, victim impact evidence “serves no purpose other than to encourage 
jurors to decide in favor of death rather than life on the basis of their emotions rather than 
their reason.”160 Justice Stevens noted that, while the dissenters in Booth and Gathers could 
not find any judicial precedents for using evidence that did not relate to the defendant’s 
character or the crime, the Booth holding, on the other hand, was “entirely consistent” with 
sentencing practices that had been established long time ago.161 He also criticized the 
majority’s belief that fairness would require allowing the government to introduce victim 
impact evidence to counter a defendant’s mitigating evidence—evidence that a defendant is 
entitled to offer.162 In Stevens’ view, “[t]he victim is not on trial; her character, whether good 
or bad, cannot therefore constitute either an aggravating or a mitigating circumstance.”163 He 
added that sentencing procedure was, in fact, balanced, and there was no need to allow victim 
                                                          
155 Id. at 846 (emphasis in original). 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 856-67 (Stevens. J., dissenting). 
158 Id. at 860-61(quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)). 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 856. 
161 See id. at 858-59. 




impact evidence to be in order to have a balanced process.164 Just as a defendant is entitled to 
offer any relevant mitigating evidence he or she desires, the state is entitled to counter his or 
her evidence through rebuttal.165 
Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the constitutionality of victim impact evidence 
has laid the groundwork for states to determine how such evidence should be admitted. 
 States’ Framework for the Admission of Victim Impact 
Evidence  
 Payne does not mandate states to allow victim impact evidence; the Court merely 
removed the Eighth Amendment bar to the admission of this evidence during capital 
sentencing.166 Nevertheless, thirty of the thirty-one states that impose the death penalty167 
have incorporated some form of victim impact evidence into their capital sentencing 
proceedings on the basis of either legislative or judicial authority.168 Fourteen states have 
done so by utilizing statutes that address the use of victim impact evidence specifically at the 
penalty phases of capital murder trials.169 The other sixteen jurisdictions have case law that 
                                                          
164 See id. at 860. 
165 See id. 
166 Payne, 501 U.S. at 827 (“We thus hold that if the State chooses to permit the admission of victim impact 
evidence . . . the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar”) (emphasis in original). 
167 See States with and without the Death Penalty as of July 1, 2015, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION 
CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited June 23, 2016). 
168 The thirty-one states that have incorporated some form of victim impact evidence into their capital sentencing 
proceedings are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, 
Washington, and Wyoming. 
169 Those states with victim impact evidence statutes are: Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-752(R) (2012)); 
Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1112 (2012); Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(c)(1) (2007)); 
Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 921.141(7), 921.147 (2004)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-1.2 (2010)); Idaho 
(IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515 (2011)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(e) (2008)); Louisiana (LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 46:1844 (2000)); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.2 (2011)); Missouri (MO. ANN. STAT. § 
565.030 (2012)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-302(1)(a)(iii) (2003)); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 21-M:8-k, 651:4-a (2010)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.150 (2011)); Utah (UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-3-207 (West 2010)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-11.0, 19.2-299.1 (2006)). 
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has either made general victim impact legislation applicable to capital sentencing proceedings 
or has allowed victim impact testimony to be admitted in a capital case as aggravating 
evidence.170 The Supreme Court of Wyoming, on the other hand, has held that existing 
Wyoming statutory law does not allow victim impact evidence in capital cases.171  
 Because Payne does not create a constitutional right for victims to introduce impact 
evidence,172 states are permitted to place limits on the use of such evidence.173 Those states 
that allow victim impact evidence have not integrated Payne into their legislations and court 
rulings similarly. The form and extent of victim impact evidence permitted varies by state 
based upon the fact that Payne provides minimal guidance along with vague standards as to 
what evidence is constitutionally permissible.174 Each jurisdiction has therefore shaped its 
                                                          
170 Those states with case law allowing for victim impact evidence are: Alabama (ALA. CODE § 15-23-74 (1995); 
Gissendanner v. State, 949 So.2d 956 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006)); California (CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 
2003); People v. Pollock, 89 P.3d 353, 370 (Cal. 2004)); Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4.1-302.5 (2012); 
People v. Dunlap, 975 P.2d 723 (Colo. 1999)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6617(c) (2012); State v. Scott, 
183 P.3d 801 (Kan. 2008)); Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 421.520, 532.055 (West 2006); St. Clair v. 
Commonwealth, 319 S.W.3d 300 (Ky. 2010)); Mississippi (MISS. CODE. ANN. §§ 99-19-155(b), 99-43-33 
(2013); Havard v. State, 928 So.2d 771 (Miss. 2006)); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 176.015 (2013); Rippo 
v. State, 946 P.2d 1017 (Nev. 1997)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-833 (2005); State v. Smith, 
532 S.E.2d 773 (N.C. 2000)); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.19, 2947.051 (West 2006); State v. 
Fautenberry, 650 N.E.2d 878 (Ohio 1995)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 142A-1, 142A-8 (1995); 
Williams v. State, 188 P.3d 208 (Okla. Crim. App. 2008)); Pennsylvania (18 PA CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11.201 
(West 2001); Commonwealth v. Means, 773 A.2d 143 (Pa. 2001)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-
1535 (2012); Humphries v. State, 570 S.E.2d 160 (S.C. 2002)); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23A-27-
1.1, 23A-27-1.3 (2014); State v. Rhines, 548 N.W.2d 415 (S.D. 1996)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE. ANN. §§ 40-
38-103, 40-38-205 (2010); State v. McKinney, 74 S.W.3d 291 (Tenn. 2002)); Texas (TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. 
ANN. art. 56.03(b) (West 2010); Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)); Washington (WASH. 
REV. CODE. ANN. §§ 7.69.020(4), 7.69.030 (2011); State v. Gregory, 147 P.3d 1201 (Wash. 2006)). 
171 Olsen v. State, 67 P.3d 536, 597 (Wyo. 2003). But see State v. Rhines, 548 N.W.2d 415, 446 (S.D. 1996) 
(rejecting a capital defendant’s argument that Payne requires a specific state law allowing the sentencer to 
consider victim impact evidence, stating that Payne regarded victim impact evidence as no different from any 
other form of evidence in terms of its admissibility). 
172 The Payne Court merely states that “the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar” to the introduction of victim 
impact evidence. Payne, 501 U.S. at 827. 
173 Interestingly, some jurisdictions have even expanded Payne’s scope as for who may qualify as victim impact 
witnesses. See infra notes 222-28 and accompanying text. 
174 For example, the Court referred to the victim impact evidence as “a quick glimpse” of the victim’s 
life. Payne, 501 U.S. at 822, 830 (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U. S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehnquist, C. J., 
dissenting)). The majority also characterized impact evidence as “simply another form or method of informing 
the sentencing authority about the specific harm caused by the crime in question,” and the test for seeking 




own framework for the admissibility of victim impact evidence. Some examples of different 
approaches will be reviewed with regard to the kinds of information included in victim impact 
evidence, who qualifies as a victim impact witness, the permissible form of the evidence, the 
timing of admitting the evidence, and the procedures for admitting it. 
a. Types of Information Included in Victim Impact 
Evidence 
  Under Payne’s holding, two types of information could be delivered through victim 
impact evidence; information relating to the victim’s personal character and information about 
the impact of the crime on his or her family.175 Payne did not address the third type of 
information which was held unconstitutional by Booth--opinions by the victim’s family about 
the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence (victim opinion evidence).176  
Payne offers some guidance regarding the scope of information allowed, by expressly 
sanctioning evidence relating to the personal character of the victim and the emotional impact 
of the murder on family members,177 and by admonishing that one should avoid evidence that 
“so unduly prejudicial.”178  However, it has been acknowledged that victim impact evidence 
“is the most problematical of all of the aggravating factors and may present the greatest 
difficulty in determining the nature and scope of the ‘information’ to be considered.”179 
 As for the victim’s personal characteristics, inspired by Payne’s language,180 several 
jurisdictions offer guidance on evidence to be allowed by indicating that victim impact 
                                                          
175 Payne, 501 U.S. at 827. 
176 See id. at 830 n. 2, 833 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
177 Payne, 501 U.S. at 817. 
178 See id. at 825. 
179 United States v. McVeigh, 944 F. Supp. 1478, 1491 (D. Colo. 1996). 
180 Victim impact evidence “is designed to show instead each victim’s ‘uniqueness as an individual human 
being,’ whatever the jury might think the loss to the community resulting from his death might be.” Payne, 501 
U.S. at 823 (emphasis in original). 
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evidence “shall be designed to demonstrate the victim’s uniqueness as an individual human 
being . . . .”181 Most state legislation does not specify what kind of information about the 
victim may be presented.182 Yet, wide-ranging evidence about a victim’s specific 
characteristics and background has been permitted based on court rulings. For instance, 
evidence of a victim’s good character has been found to be within the bounds of appropriate 
victim impact testimony.183 Courts also have approved of evidence relating to the victim’s 
intelligence,184 aspirations,185 spirituality,186 and occupation.187  Moreover, the South Carolina 
                                                          
181 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(7) (2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(5)(a) (2011); State v. Nesbit, 
978 S.W.2d 872, 891 (Tenn. 1998) (“[V]ictim impact evidence should be limited to information designed to 
show those unique characteristics which provide a brief glimpse into the life of the individual who has been 
killed.”). 
182 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-752(R) (2012) (“the [murder person’s family] “may present 
information about the murdered person”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.030 (2012) (“evidence concerning the murder 
victim”); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 99-19-155(b) (2013) (“specific information about the victim”). 
183 See, e.g., Le v. State, 947 P.2d 535,551-52 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997) (holding that it was not unduly 
prejudicial for the deceased husband to be described by his wife as a “good man” who loved her and his 
stepdaughter, and as a “talented, hard worker who never complained,” but cooked and helped with chores around 
the home). See also Moore v. State, 701 So. 2d 545, 550-51 (Fla. 1997) (finding no error in allowing the victim’s 
daughter to testify that her father was a “good man” and very free-hearted,” and that he never bothered anyone 
and “loved everybody”); State v. Gray, 887 S.W.2d 369, 389 (Mo. 1994) (allowing testimony that the victims 
were caring, involved in their community, excellent students and “advocates of social change” with “liberal 
political views”); Sullivan v. State, 636 A.2d 931, 940, 942 (Del. 1994) (holding that there was no plain error in 
allowing testimony that victim was a “generous, humble, and gracious man”); Roberts v. Bowersox, 61 F. Supp. 
2d 896, 936 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (held that victim impact evidence, including witnesses’ testimony about the 
victim’s kindness and their close friendship with her, did not render the defendant’s trial unfair); State v. Reeves, 
448 S.E.2d 802, 811-12 (N.C. 1994) (upholding admission of witness testimony that the victim “always went to 
church,” and was a good wife and mother who loved her children and “would do anything for anybody”). 
184 See State v. Frost, 727 So. 2d 417, 431 (La. 1998) (held that statements by the victim’s brother that she was a 
“smart person” and had a higher I.Q. than the witness were allowable as statements intended to show the 
victim’s “uniqueness as an individual human being”). 
185 See State v. Rocheville, 425 S.E.2d 32, 36 (S.C. 1993) (holding that parents’ testimony about their sons’ 
dreams and aspirations was relevant because it “merely portrayed the victims as unique individuals”). But see 
Lockett v. State, 53 P.3d 418, 427 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (citing Phillips v. State, 989 P.2d 1017, 1043 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1999) (“[S]tatements about the victim’s plans for the future may not have been relevant victim 
impact evidence.”).  
186 See Turner v. State, 486 S.E.2d 839, 842 (Ga. 1997) (held that the witnesses’ statements  about that victim 
that he had “new found faith and spirituality” and was a “dedicated member” of his church were allowable and 
did not impermissibly inflame the jury’s emotions based on religion); Lucas v. Evatt, 416 S.E.2d 646, 648 (S.C. 
1992) (allowing  testimony that victims were “good honest hardworking God fearing people”).  
187 See Hyde v. State, 778 So. 2d 199, 213-16 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998) (stating that the prosecutor’s comments 
about the fact that the victim was a police officer were relevant to the court’s determination, and so they were not 
improper). See also Davis v. State, 660 So. 2d 1228, 1249 (Miss. 1995) (“We see no reason to exclude evidence 
of the victim’s occupation simply because . . . the victim was a police officer”). Evidence of work ethic, 
educational background, and standing in the community has been accepted by courts as well. John H. Blume, 
Ten Years of Payne: Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Cases, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 257, 269-70 (2003). 
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Supreme Court held that a seven-minute videotape showing portions of a law enforcement 
officer’s funeral was relevant to demonstrate a victim’s uniqueness. 188 
 In addition to allowing evidence of a victim’s good qualities, various state courts have 
gone further by permitting victim impact statements that contain a comparison between the 
“good” qualities of the victim and the defendant’s “bad” character. In North Carolina, for 
instance, the state’s Supreme Court held that a prosecutor’s comments that the defendant was 
evil person who deserved to die and that the victim was a martyr of good cause were not 
improper simply because the state is allowed to rebut the defendant’s character evidence 
which he chose to place at issue.189 The Supreme Court of South Carolina adopted the same 
approach, but based it on the fact that “Payne does not prohibit character comparisons 
between defendants and victims; it prohibits comparisons that suggest that there are worthy 
and unworthy victims.”190 
 Courts have divided over the comparison between the worth of a defendant’s life and 
the life of his victim. Some have found that such comparisons were beyond the realm of 
                                                          
188 State v. Bixby, 698 S.E.2d 572, 586-87 (S.C. 2010). 
189 See State v. Larry, 481 S.E.2d 907, 925-26 (N.C. 1997) (citing State v. Silhan, 275 S.E.2d 450, 484 
(N.C.1981)). In Larry, the prosecutor states at sentencing proceeding that: 
[The victim] died a hero. He died for you. He gave his life for you . . . . He gave his life so there 
would be no more victims, no more kids would have guns stuck in their face . . . folks, he was 
a martyr to the cause of good. A martyr. Don’t you think it’s fair that this man who has done 
nothing right his whole life, nothing but wrong his whole life, nothing but hurt people, don’t you 
think it’s right he should die a martyr to the cause of evil? 
State v. Larry, 481 S.E.2d at 925-26. See also Powell v. State, 906 P.2d 765, 776-77 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) 
(finding that prosecutor’s remarks describing the victim as “clean-cut,” “active in his church,” “loving,” a 
“decent human being,” and a “good kid,” and describing the defendants as “bad kids” did not deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial).  
190 Humphries v. State, 570 S.E.2d 160, 168 (S.C. 2002).  
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permissible victim impact evidence.191 Other state supreme courts have approved value-of-life 
comparisons in victim impact evidence.192  
 With respect to comparative worth of victims, the majority in Payne emphasized the 
fact that the purpose of victim impact evidence is to show the uniqueness of the victim, not to 
encourage a comparison of victims.193 Utah law translated that sentiment into an explicit 
prohibition against comparing the worth of the victim to that of another victim or person when 
presenting victim impact evidence.194  Similarly, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found 
that victim character evidence is allowed to show the victim’s uniqueness, but “[w]hen the 
focus of the evidence shifts from humanizing the victim and illustrating the harm caused by 
the defendant to measuring the worth of the victim compared to other members of society 
then the State exceeds the bounds of permissible testimony.”195 
                                                          
191 See, e.g., Hall v. Catoe, 601 S.E.2d 335, 339 (S.C. 2004). The solicitor in his closing argument, said “it is a 
question of values. What are the lives of these two girls [victims] worth? Are they worth the life of this man, the 
psychopath, this killer who stabs and stabs and kills, and rapes and kidnaps.” The court held that the solicitor’s 
statement included an impermissible comparison because he asked the jury to compare the worth of the 
defendant’s life with that of his victims’ which was “so emotionally inflammatory.” Id. at 341. See also State v. 
Storey, 901 S.W.2d 886, 902 (Mo. 1995). The State argued that “[t]he right of the innocent completely 
outweighs the right of the guilty not to die, and, so, it comes down to one basic thing. Whose life is more 
important to you? Whose life has more value? The Defendant’s or [the victim]?” The court rejected the 
prosecutor’s argument stating that the “‘State must ensure that the process is neutral and principled so as to 
guard against bias or caprice in the sentencing decision.’”. Id. (quoting Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 114 
(1994)). 
192 See, e.g., State v. Haselden, 577 S.E.2d 594, 610 (N.C. 2003). The prosecutor said to the jury, “If you let this 
murderer walk out of this courtroom with his life then you are saying that his life is worth more than [the 
victim’s] life.” The court noted that the prosecutorial statement “simply reminded the jury that in addition to 
considering defendant’s life, the jury should also consider the life of the victim. Id. See also Jackson v. State, 33 
S.W.3d 828, 834 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The prosecution argued that there was “[n]o reason to give this person 
a life in the penitentiary sentence . . . to say there are mitigating factors...or to say he is not a continuing threat . . 
. mean[s] that his life is more important than [the victims’ lives].” The court held that the prosecutor’s argument 
did not violate the Payne standard because Payne only discourages the use of comparisons between the worth of 
a victim’s life and the lives of other members of society, while the comparison in this case was between the 
value of the lives of the victims and the value of the defendant’s life. Id. (citing Payne, 501 U.S. at 823). 
193 See Payne, 501 U.S. at 823. As an example of comparative judgments, the Court posed the problem that the 
“killer of a hardworking, devoted parent deserves the death penalty, but that the murderer of a reprobate does 
not.” Id. See also Bums v. State, 699 So. 2d 646, 653 (Fla. 1997) (the court rejected an Equal Protection 
claim that victim impact evidence could encourage a jury to give “different weight to the value of different 
victims’ lives.”). 
194 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(2)(a)(iii) (West 2010). 
195 Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) The court further stated: 
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 As for the evidence relating to the impact of the murder on the victim’s family, while 
the Payne decision addressed only the “emotional” impact on the victim’s family,196 most 
states have allowed many more aspects of the crime’s “impact” to be considered. The 
majority of these states have listed into their statutes several forms of “impact” that may be 
presented as victim impact evidence.197 In Florida, for example, the impact statement shall be 
related to “the extent of any harm, including social, psychological, or physical harm, financial 
losses, [or] loss of earnings directly or indirectly resulting from the crime for which the 
defendant is being sentenced.”198 The other jurisdictions provide no specification regarding 
the admissible type of “impact”.199 For instance, Arizona law states that victim impact 
evidence may contain information about “the impact of the murder” on family members.200 
                                                          
Rule 403 limits the admissibility of such evidence when the evidence predominantly encourages 
comparisons based upon the greater or lesser worth or morality of the victim . . . . We recognize that 
this standard does not draw a bright and easy line for determining when evidence concerning the 
victim is admissible and when it is not. Trial judges should exercise their sound discretion in 
permitting some evidence about the victim’s character . . . while limiting the amount and scope of 
such testimony.  
Id. 
196 Payne, 501 U.S. at 808. 
197 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.143(2) (2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.055 (West 2006); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 99-19-155(b) (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-833 (2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2947.051 
(West 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 142A-1 (1995); 18 PA. STAT. ANN. § 11.201(5) (West 2001); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 16-3-1535 (2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23A-27-1.1, 23A-27-1.3 (2014); TENN. CODE ANN. § 
40-38-203(2) (2010); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 56.03 (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. §19.2-299.1 
(2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.69.020(4) (2011). 
198 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.143(2) (2004). See also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.055 (West 2006) (victim impact 
evidence included descriptions of the nature and extent of any physical, psychological, or financial harm the 
victim’s family suffered); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-155(b) (2013) (victim impact evidence includes evidence 
pertaining to the financial, emotional and physical effects of the crime on the victim and his or her family); 18 
PA. STAT. ANN. § 11.201(5) (West 2001) (victim impact evidence includes evidence describing the physical, 
psychological and economic effects of the crime on the victim and his or her family”); VA. CODE ANN. §19.2-
299.1(2006) (victim impact evidence includes any economic loss suffered by the victim, the nature and extent of 
any physical or psychological injury, any change in personal welfare, lifestyle or familial relationships that 
resulted from the offense, and any request for psychological or medical services initiated by the victim or his or 
her family that resulted from the offense”). 
199 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-752(R) (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1112(a)(1) (2012); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 19-2515(2011); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(e) (2008); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.2 
(2011); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.030 (2012); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 176.015 (2013t). 
200 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-752(R). (2012) 
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 Further, in some jurisdictions, the allowable victim impact evidence is not restricted to 
the impact that the crime has had on the victim’s family, alone. Indiana’s statute expressly 
permits evidence that relates to the impact of the murder on the victim’s friends.201 
Additionally, in Missouri, victim impact evidence “may include, within the discretion of the 
court, evidence concerning the murder victim and the impact of the crime upon the family of 
the victim and others.”202 Evidence regarding the impact on the “community” has also been 
allowed by several laws203 and court rulings.204 
 Most used of all forms of impact evidence is that relating to the “emotional” harm that 
results from the killing of a loved one. While some courts have tried to limit victim impact 
evidence, in general, by emphasizing that such evidence should not be “overly emotional,”205 
the Tennessee Supreme Court acknowledged the fact that emotional impact evidence, in 
particular, has no clear limit.206 “[T]here is no bright-line test,” the court stated, “and the 
                                                          
201 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (2008). See also LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.2(A) (2011) (“The 
sentencing hearing shall focus on the circumstances of the offense, the character and propensities of the offender, 
and the victim, and the impact that the crime has had on the victim, family members, friends, and associates.”). 
202 MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.030 (2012). 
203 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(7) (2004) (impact evidence is intended to demonstrate the “resultant 
loss” to the victim’s death caused the members of his or her community); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(5)(a) 
(2011) (same); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-1.2(a)(1) (2010) (“[T]he court shall allow evidence from the family of 
the victim, or such other witness having personal knowledge of . . . the emotional impact of the crime on the 
victim, the victim’s family, or the community.”); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42 § 9721(b) (West 2001) (allowing 
evidence regarding the “gravity of the offense” as it relates to the impact on the victim’s community); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(2)(a)(iii) (West 2010) (evidence may be introduced on the impact of the offense upon the 
victim’s family and his or her community). 
204 See, e.g., State v. Bixby, 698 S.E.2d 572, 587 (S.C. 2010) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee,  501 U.S. 808, 822 
(1991)) (holding that a videotape showing actual mourners and the traditional trappings of a law enforcement 
officer’s funeral was relevant to show “the general loss suffered by society,” considering that victim impact 
evidence, according to Payne, “demonstrates ‘the loss to the victim’s family and to society” that resulted from 
the victim’s homicide); Hyde v. State, 778 So. 2d 199, 215 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998) (upholding evidence related 
to the impact of the victim’s murder on the “law enforcement community”); State v. Burns, 979 S.W.2d 276, 
282-83 (Tenn. 1998) (finding that testimony offered to show the effects of the crimes on the community--that 
people felt scared after the two murders in the neighborhood, and began locking their doors--did not render the 
defendant’s trial unfair). 
205 State v. Hartman, 754 N.E.2d 1150, 1172 (Ohio 2001) (citing State v. Reynolds, 687 N.E.2d 1358, 1369 
(1998)). See also Malone v. State, 168 P.3d 185, 211(Okla. Crim. App. 2007) (concluding that victim impact 
evidence was “too emotional”). 
206 State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872, 891 (Tenn. 1998). 
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admissibility of specific types of victim impact evidence must be determined on a case-by-
case basis.”207  
 Various jurisdictions have also approved evidence relating to unpredictable or indirect 
consequences of the murder. For example, in Tennessee, the state court upheld testimony 
from a victim’s mother that she was so affected by the killing of her son that she divorced her 
husband.208 Impact evidence relating to heart attacks,209 negative health effects,210 and other 
traumatic experiences211 has been allowed as well.  
 In most cases, in order to be held admissible, evidence must be related to the impact of 
the murder for which the defendant is being sentenced, ant not related to the impact of other 
offenses.212 According to the Supreme Court of Nevada, evidence concerning the impact of a 
prior homicide was inadmissible because it was irrelevant to the murder on trial.213 The Texas 
Court of Criminal of Appeals adopted the same approach on the basis that the admitting 
impact evidence from a previous crime “would open the door to admission of victim impact 
evidence arising from any extraneous offense committed by a defendant.”214 Nevertheless, the 
North Carolina Supreme Court has allowed survivors of prior homicides—the court has 
approved of testimony from the daughter of a woman killed by a defendant many years 
                                                          
207 Id. 
208 See State v. Burns, 979 S.W.2d 276, 282 (Tenn. 1998); McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 620 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1997) (approving of testimony from a victim’s sister that her marriage ended because of the impact the 
murder had on her). 
209 See, e.g., Young v. State, 992 P.2d 332, 342 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (upholding admission of testimony that 
the victim’s aunt suffered a fatal heart attack as a result of hearing the news of the murder). 
210 See, e.g., Griffith v. State, 983 S.W.2d 282, 289 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (allowing the victim’s brother to 
testify that, after his sister’s murder, their father stopped fighting cancer).  
211 See, e.g., Lee v. State, 942 S.W.2d 231, 236 (Ark. 1997) (allowing testimony from victim’s sister about how 
painful it was selecting a wig for her murdered sister to wear at her funeral). 
212 See, e.g., State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872, 903 (Tenn. 1998) (citing State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 812 
(Tenn. 1994)) (“[V]ictim impact evidence of another homicide, even one committed by the defendant on trial, is 
not admissible.”); Gilbert v. State, 951 P.2d 98, 116-17 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997).  
213 Sherman v. State, 965 P.2d 903, 914 (Nev. 1998); People v. Dunlap, 975 P.2d 723, 745 (Colo. 1999). 
214 Cantu v. State, 939 S.W.2d 627, 637 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (emphasis in original).  
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before.215 In Ohio, the state supreme court has held that the introduction of evidence from 
noncapital survivors in a capital case was a statutory violation, considering that there is no 
provision in the statute that allows for the presentation of such evidence.216 Yet, the same 
court added that there was no constitutional violation in permitting evidence related to 
noncapital crimes in capital cases because “Payne does not limit the ‘evidence of the specific 
harm’ caused by the defendant to the capital victim’s family only.”217  
b. Who Qualifies as a Victim Impact Witness and How 
Many Witnesses May Testify 
 States have addressed victim impact witnesses differently on the subject of who may 
present victim impact evidence and how many of those witnesses are allowed to testify. 
Regarding the first issue, the Payne Court approved of evidence concerning the impact of the 
murder on the “victim’s family.”218 Yet, the Court did not clarify whether victim impact 
evidence is restricted to family members of the victim, or whether other persons affected by 
the crime may testify as well. Accordingly, states have taken different approaches. In many 
jurisdictions, a victim impact witness should be a family member of the deceased.219 The 
Idaho Supreme Court signaled that the state’s legislature had intended to limit victim impact 
                                                          
215 See State v. Robinson, 451 S.E.2d 196, 204-05 (N.C. 1994). 
216 See State v. White, 709 N.E.2d 140, 155 (Ohio 1999). 
217 Id. at 154-55 (citation omitted). But see Tong v. State, 25 S.W.3d 707, 713 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (noting 
that impact evidence regarding unrelated crimes was different from the victim impact evidence addressed by 
Payne). 
218 Payne, 501 U.S. at 817. 
219 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-5306 (2011) (the right to present victim impact statements “shall apply 
equally” to the homicide victims’ immediate families); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.500 (West 2006) (“If the 
victim is deceased . . .  the following relations shall be designated as ‘victims’ for the purpose of presenting 
victim impact testimony . . . 1. A spouse; 2. An adult child; 3. A parent; 4. A sibling; and 5. A grandparent”); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1844 (2000) (“[V]ictim’s family members shall have the right to make a written and oral 
victim impact statement”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-M:8-k (2010) (victim includes a homicide victim’s 
immediate family); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-830 (2005) (“If the victim is deceased, then the next of kin . . . 
is entitled to the victim’s rights under this Article.”). 
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witnesses to the “immediate family members” of a homicide victim, considering that they are 
the ones who experience “direct harm” resulting from the defendant’s crime.220 Additionally, 
in several jurisdictions, a legal guardian of the murdered person is allowed to give victim 
impact testimony.221 Some states also permit a lawful representative to testify in addition to 
family members.222 The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, however, held that testimony from a 
family designee or representative when the family members had already testified was 
inadmissible, explaining that the “purpose behind a family designee is to give a voice to 
family members unable to testify in court,” not to “provide an opportunity for those family 
members not listed in the statute and other interested persons to give victim impact 
testimony.”223 Further, if the victim had no surviving family members, his or her estate would 
qualify as an impact witness.224 
 Other jurisdictions give “victim impact witness” a much broader definition. For 
instance, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that “distantly related family members, 
close friends, or coworkers may, in a given case, provide legitimate testimony”.225 Under 
South Dakota statute, the term “victim” encompasses “the parent, spouse, next of kin, legal or 
                                                          
220 See State v. Payne, 199 P.3d 123, 150 (Idaho 2008). 
221 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-11.01 (2006) (“victim” means “a spouse, parent, sibling or legal guardian of 
such a person who . . . was the victim of a homicide”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.69.020(2) (2011) (defining 
the victim’s “survivors” as the “spouse or domestic partner, child, parent, legal guardian, sibling, or 
grandparent”). 
222 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-752(R) (2012) (defining “victim” as “the murdered person’s spouse, 
parent, child, grandparent or sibling, any other person related to the murdered person by consanguinity or affinity 
to the second degree or any other lawful representative of the murdered person”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-
1510(1) (2012) (victim “includes any individual’s spouse, parent, child, or the lawful representative” of the 
deceased). 
223 Lott v. State, 98 P.3d 318, 347-48 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004). 
224 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 142A-1 (1995). 
225 Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). See also People v. Pollock, 89 P.3d 353, 372 
(Cal. 2004) (allowing testimony from the victims’ friends, explaining that harm resulting from a murder is not 
limited to the effect of the victims’ deaths on the members of their immediate family members, but extends 
further to the effects of the death on the victims’ close personal friends); State v. Byram, 485 S.E.2d 360, 365-66 
(S.C. 1997) (holding as admissible testimony of the victim’s co-worker). 
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physical custodian, guardian, foster parent, case worker, victim advocate, or mental health 
counselor of any actual victim . . . who is deceased”.226 Moreover, a victim’s neighbors have 
been permitted to testify regarding the impact that the defendant’s crime had upon them.227 
Even more broadly, the Georgia Supreme Court found that testimony from a listener of a 
radio call-in talk show concerning the effect of the murder on the community was not so 
prejudicial as to render the defendant’s trial unfair.228 
 In another approach, no limitations are placed regarding the relationship between the 
victim and a witness who may present victim impact evidence.229 According to the Oregon 
Supreme Court, any person can be a victim impact witness, as long as the evidence he or she 
presents is relevant to the sentencing decision.230 Likewise, the Supreme Court of Virginia 
held that the Virginia Code does not limit victim impact evidence to that given by the family 
members of the victim.231 “Rather, the circumstances of the individual case will dictate what 
evidence will be necessary and relevant, and from what sources it may be drawn.”232 
 Statutory limitations have not always been enforced by courts. Although the Nebraska 
law states that “[i]n the case of a homicide, victim means the nearest surviving relative,”233 
the state supreme court found no error in allowing testimony from relatives who were not the 
                                                          
226 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27-1.1(2014). 
227 See, e.g., Sullivan v. State, 636 A.2d 931, 939-40 (Del. 1994); Wesley v. State 916 P.2d 793, 804 (Nev. 
1996). 
228 McClain v. State, 477 S.E.2d 814, 824-25 (Ga. 1996).  
229 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-1.2(a)(1) (2010) (emphasis added) (“In all cases in which the death penalty 
may be imposed, . . .  the court shall allow evidence from the family of the victim, or such other witness having 
personal knowledge of the victim’s personal characteristics and the emotional impact of the crime on the victim, 
the victim’s family, or the community.”)  
230 See State v. Sparks, 83 P.3d 304, 317 (Or. 2004). 
231 Beck v. Commonwealth, 484 S.E.2d 898, 905 (Va. 1997). 
232 Id. Similarly, in Kansas, the state supreme court stated that “[n]either the Kansas Constitution Victims’ Rights 
Amendment nor the statutory bill of rights for victims of crime restrict the ability of . . . nonfamily members to 
testify and submit statements during the sentencing phase of criminal proceedings.”. State v. Parks, 962 P.2d 
486, 490 (Kan. 1998). 
233 NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-119(b) (2006). 
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nearest surviving relatives.234 The court, reasoned that the given definition of the victim 
“merely provides for a baseline right” to present a victim impact statement.235  
 With respect to how many witnesses may offer victim impact statements, Payne 
provides no guidance.236 As for the states, some have chosen to limit the number of impact 
witnesses who should be allowed to testify. In Kentucky, only one witness may testify, and 
that witness selected from a certain order of family members specified by the legislator.237 In 
many jurisdictions, statutes expressly state that it within the court’s discretion to decide how 
many impact witness are permitted to testify. Georgia statute provides that “the number of 
witnesses other than immediate family who may testify shall be in the sole discretion of the 
judge and in any event shall be permitted only in such a manner and to such a degree as not to 
inflame or unduly prejudice the jury.”238 Alternatively, other states have placed no limit on 
the number of impact witnesses that are entitled to testify. The California Supreme Court, for 
example, rejected a defendant’s argument that victim impact testimony should be received 
from a single witness.239 
                                                          
234 State v. Galindo, 774 N.W.2d 190, 245 (Neb. 2009). 
235 Id. 
236 The Payne case involved testimony from a single victim impact witness. See Payne, v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 
808, 814-15 (1991). 
237 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.500(1)(a) (West 2006). See also Terry v. Commonwealth, 153 S.W.3d 794, 805 
(Ky. 2005) (holding that a trial court erred in permitting both murder victim’s daughter and his sister to present 
victim impact evidence during penalty phase of murder trial; pursuant to statutes governing victim impact 
evidence, only one “victim” was permitted to give victim impact evidence. Thus, when victim’s widow declined 
to testify, adult daughter became secondary victim who was entitled to present victim impact evidence, and, had 
she declined to testify, then victim’s sister would have become secondary victim). 
238 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-1.2 (2010); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1844 (2000) (“In any case where the 
number of victim’s family members exceeds three, the court may limit the in-court statements it receives from 
them to a fewer number of statements. The court may otherwise reasonably restrict the oral statement in order to 
maintain courtroom decorum.”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-157(2)(b) (2013) (“[W]here there are multiple 
victims, the court may limit the number of oral victim impact statements.”). 
239 People v. Pollock, 89 P.3d 353, 372 (Cal. 2004). 
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c. Form of Victim Impact Evidence 
 In Payne, the permissible form of victim impact evidence was left wide open. The 
Supreme Court only emphasized that such evidence should be demonstrating the victim’s 
individuality and the impact of the murder on his family.240 Accordingly, various forms of 
evidence have been considered by states such as testimony, photographs, videos, and several 
types of writings.241 Statements from a victim’s survivors are the most used type of impact 
evidence. Many jurisdictions have addressed victim impact statement in their legislation and 
indicated that victim impact witnesses are entitled to present such statement orally or in 
writing.242 
 In addition to testimony from witnesses, courts have permitted photographs of the 
victim while he or she was still alive as victim impact evidence in an effort to show his or her 
uniqueness as a human being.243 Georgia law, expressly allows photographs of the victim to 
                                                          
240 See Payne, 501 U.S. at 817, 827. 
241 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-1.2(4) (2010) (“[Victim impact evidence] may be in the form of, but not 
limited to, a written statement or a prerecorded audio or video statement.”). 
242 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1844(K)(1)(b) (2000) (“The . . . victim’s family members shall have the 
right to make a written and oral victim impact statement.”); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1112 (2012); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.143 (2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(e) (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. § 21-M:8-k(II)(p) 
(2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-157 (2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 142A-8(A) (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-3-1535(A)(4) (2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23A-27-1.1, 23A-27-1.3 (2014). 
243 See, e.g., Harris v. State, 632 So. 2d 503, 531 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992)(citation omitted) (finding no error in 
admission of a pre-death photograph of the victim, stating that it was not necessary for a sentencing decision to 
be made in a context in which the victim is a “mere abstraction”); State v. Garza, 163 P.3d 1006, 1019 (Ariz. 
2007) (finding no abuse of discretion in allowing the display of victims’ photographs by their mothers during 
their impact statements); People v. Edwards, 819 P.2d 436, 464-65 (Cal. 1991) (citation omitted) (held that a 
victim’s photo taken the night before the murder was admissible to assist the jury in determining the victim’s 
“size, age and vulnerability”); State v. Middleton, 995 S.W.2d 443, 464 (Mo. 1999) (concluding that the trial 
court did not err in admitting a photo of the victim with his daughter, offered by his mother as victim impact 
evidence); State v. Hill, 595 N.E.2d 884, 895-96 (Ohio 1992) (approving of the introduction of  a pre-death 
photograph of the victim); State v. Tucker, 478 S.E.2d 260, 267 (S.C. 1996) (allowing photographs of the victim 
at different places on vacation, Christmas decorations in her yard, holding her godchild, and fishing); State v. 
Berget, 826 N.W.2d 1, 26-27 (S.D. 2013) (holding that pictures of the victim were proper victim impact 
evidence since they demonstrated the consequences of the defendant’s actions); Darks v. State, 954 P.2d 152, 
164 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (ruling that it was harmless error to admit evidence consisting of photographs 
showing the victim smiling broadly and holding her young son). But see Cargle v. State, 909 P.2d 806, 830 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (holding that it was error to admit photographs that depicted one of the victims holding 
his art work and the two victims together, by reasoning that the first photograph’s probative value was 
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be included in victim impact evidence.244The Supreme Court of California found no undue 
prejudice in admitting five childhood photographs of a victim because “they simply 
humanized the victim, as victim impact evidence is designed to do.”245 
 Some jurisdictions have gone even further with regard to the content of a photograph 
itself. In one capital case, in addition to the victim’s photo, the state was allowed to introduce 
photographs related to events and structures created after the victim’s death.246 The state court 
explained that the photographs of a victim with her first handicapped students, a memorial 
garden that was built in her memory, and a balloon release ceremony dedicated to her 
demonstrated her “value to the community and the impact of her death upon her friends and 
co-workers,” and “help[ed] the jury to see the victim as something other than a ‘faceless 
stranger.’”247 In another case, photographs depicting a victim’s children and the victim 
swimming with his children were held admissible because those pictures humanized the 
victim and his family by showing “the family members as being more than just names,” and 
the court found that their probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice.248 It has further been found that the prosecutor’s introduction of a picture of 
four-year-old victim’s toy was irrelevant, but was also harmless error.249 
 A third form of evidence is victim impact videos. In light of Payne’s authorization of 
providing “quick glimpse” of the victim’s life,250 many state courts have allowed the 
                                                          
substantially outweighed by its prejudice, and that the second photograph was irrelevant because it did not show 
either information about the victims or the impact of the murder on their survivors).  
244 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-1.2(4) (2010). 
245 People v. Nelson, 246 P.3d 301, 317 (Cal. 2011). 
246 State v. Storey, 40 S.W.3d 898, 908-09 (Mo. 2001). 
247 Id. (citing State v. Gray, 887 S.W.2d 369, 389 (Mo. 1994)). The Storey court found a photo of the victim’s 
tombstone irrelevant, yet found that it did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Id. at 909. 
248 Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 365-67 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). 
249 Long v. State, 883 P.2d 167, 173 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994). 
250 See Payne, 501 U.S. at 822, 830 (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U. S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting)).   
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prosecution to present videotapes showing victims while they were still alive.251 Regarding 
the permissible bounds of such evidence, the Supreme Court of California has emphasized the 
fact that there is no bright-line rule concerning the admissibility of videotape evidence.252 Yet, 
the court noted that: 
[c]ourts must exercise great caution in permitting the prosecution to present victim 
impact evidence in the form of a lengthy videotaped or filmed tribute to the victim. 
Particularly if the presentation lasts beyond a few moments, or emphasizes the 
childhood of an adult victim, or is accompanied by stirring music, the medium itself 
may assist in creating an emotional impact upon the jury that goes beyond what the 
jury might experience by viewing still photographs of the victim or listening to the 
victim’s bereaved parents.253 
 
 Courts have also permitted videos capturing a victim’s funeral services and gravesite as 
victim impact evidence.254 In South Carolina, the state court approved of the admission of a 
seven-minute videotape showing portions of a law enforcement officer’s funeral, on grounds 
that the tape demonstrated the victim’s uniqueness, displayed for the jury the impact of the 
                                                          
Recently, the Supreme Court in Kelly v. California, 129 S. Ct. 564 (2008), and Kelly v. California, 129 S. Ct. 
567 (2008), denied review of two capital cases, People v. Kelly, 171 P.3d 548 (Cal. 2007) and People v. 
Zamudio, 181 P.3d 105 (Cal. 2008), where the introduction of victim impact videos was challenged. 
251 See, e.g., Hicks v. State, 940 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Ark. 1997) (affirming the admission of a videotape containing 
footage of the victim, his family, and friends with narration by his brother); People v. Bramit, 210 P.3d 1171, 
1187 (Cal. 2009) (finding no undue prejudice in allowing a three-minute photomontage, “unenhanced by any 
soundtrack or commentary,” that showed the victim at a young age, his family, his hometown in Mexico, and his 
family’s residence); People v. Dykes, 209 P.3d 1, 47-48 (Cal. 2009) (approving the admission of an eight-minute 
videotape of a nine-year-old victim and family members on a trip to Disneyland, on grounds that it “was relevant 
to humanize the victim and provide some sense of the loss suffered by his family and society,” and the video did 
not contain any “memorial,” “tribute,” “eulogy,” “staged or contrived elements,” “music,” “visual techniques 
designed to generate emotion,” “or background narration”); State v. Gray, 887 S.W.2d 369, 389 (Mo. 1994) 
(concluding that a video of victim’s family at Christmas was proper victim impact evidence). But see Salazar v. 
State (Salazar), 90 S.W.3d 330, 337-38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (rejecting a seventeen-minute video montage 
emphasizing the childhood of an adult victim because it “was very lengthy, highly emotional, and barely 
probative of the victim’s life at the time of his death”); Salazar v. State (Salazar), 118 S.W.3d 880, 885 (Tex. 
App. 2003) (holding on remand, that the defendant was entitled to a new hearing since the admission of the 
memorial videotape of the victim’s life was a harmful error). 
252 People v. Prince, 156 P.3d 1015, 1092 (Cal. 2007). The court in this case affirmed the introduction of a video 
that comprised a twenty-five-minute interview with the victim. Id. at 1091-93. 
253 Id. at 1093. 
254 See, e.g., People v. Brady, 236 P.3d 312, 338-39 (Cal. 2010) (finding no abuse of discretion in allowing a six-
minute videotape consisting of a deceased police officer’s memorial and funeral services); People v. Zamudio, 
181 P.3d 105, 134-37 (Cal. 2008) (allowing a fourteen-minute videotaped montage included three photographs 
of victims’ grave markers); People v. Kelly, 171 P.3d 548, 570-72 (Cal. 2007) (allowing a videotape which 
ended with a brief view of the victim’s grave marker). 
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victim’s death on his survivors and the community, and showed footages of the victim’s 
actual funeral.255 
 Some non-common forms of victim impact evidence have been approved by courts as 
well. For instance, in many jurisdictions, evidence in the form of letters,256 poems,257 and 
eulogy statements258 has been deemed admissible. In Missouri, the state was permitted to 
present handcrafted items made by the victim as a part of victim impact evidence.259 
Additionally, the Supreme Court of California found no error in allowing songs performed by 
victim to be played from a cassette tape for the jury.260 
d. Timing of Admitting Victim Impact Evidence  
 By stating that the Eighth Amendment does not bar “a capital sentencing jury from 
considering victim impact evidence . . . at a capital sentencing hearing,” Payne suggests that 
the proper time to introduce victim impact evidence is during the sentencing phase of the 
proceedings.261 As for the states, the vast majority of their statutes express that the right to 
                                                          
255 State v. Bixby, 698 S.E.2d 572, 586-87 (S.C. 2010). 
256 See, e.g., Kills On Top v. State, 15 P.3d 422, 437-38 (Mont. 2000) (citation omitted) (concluding that a letter 
from the victim’s widow describing her thoughts about the impact the murder of her husband had upon her and 
her children was permissible as nontestimonial victim impact evidence); State v. Berget, 826 N.W.2d 1, 26-27 
(S.D. 2013) (ruling that evidence consisting of letters from family members, friends, and co-workers “was 
appropriately offered to illustrate consequences of [defendant]’s actions”).  
257 See, e.g., Noel v. State, 960 S.W.2d 439, 446-47 (Ark. 1998) (holding that a poem written by the victims’ 
mother about her three deceased children and read to the jury was relevant to “show the human cost of the 
murders” on the victims’ mother); State v. Basile, 942 S.W.2d 342, 358-59 (Mo. 1997) (finding a poem read by 
the victim’s sister proper impact evidence because it “was directed at defendant’s moral culpability in causing 
harm to the victim and her family”). 
258 See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 246 P.3d 301, 317-18 (Cal. 2011) (concluding that admission of victim impact 
evidence of a eulogy statement written by two of victim's friends who did not testify at trial was a 
harmless error); State v. Storey, 40 S.W.3d 898, 908-09 (Mo. 2001) (held that eulogy about murder victim was 
properly admitted since it described the victim’s uniqueness and her contributions to society, and the eulogy was 
read to jury by its author who could not have testified without the aid of her writing). 
259 State v. Roberts, 948 S.W.2d 577, 604 (Mo. 1997). 
260 People v. Verdugo, 236 P.3d 1035, 1064 (Cal. 2010). 
261Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 808 (1991) (emphasis added). See also id. at 827 (emphasis added) (noting 
that victim impact evidence is “relevant to the jury’s decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be 
imposed); id. at 825 (emphasis added) (“Victim impact evidence is simply another form or method of informing 
the sentencing authority about the specific harm caused by the crime in question”); id. (emphasis added) (“[A] 
State may properly conclude that for the jury to assess meaningfully the defendant’s moral culpability and 
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present victim impact evidence applies at the penalty stage of the defendant’s trial.262 Further, 
many courts have limited impact evidence to sentencing and emphasized that such evidence is 
not permissible at the guilt phase of death penalty cases.263  
 At the same time, a few courts have approved of some guilt stage impact evidence for 
its relevance. In State v. Fautenberry, the Supreme Court of Ohio found that “evidence which 
depicts both the circumstances surrounding the commission of the murder and also the impact 
of the murder on the victim’s family may be admissible during both the guilt and the 
sentencing phases.”264 Similarly, in Wyoming, the state supreme court held that a guilt phase 
impact statement may not be relevant to prove the impact that the murder had on the victim’s 
family, but might be relevant “if offered for another proper purpose.”265 According to the 
                                                          
blameworthiness, it should have before it at the sentencing phase evidence of the specific harm caused by the 
defendant.”). 
262 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-752(R) (2012) (“At the penalty phase, the victim may present 
information about the murdered person and the impact of the murder on the victim and other family members 
and may submit a victim impact statement in any format to the trier of fact.”); ALA. CODE § 15-23-74 (1995); 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1112(a)(1), (2) (2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.143(1) (2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-
10-1.2(a)(1) (2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(5)(a) (2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.055(2)(a)(7) (West 
2006);  MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.030 (2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 142A-8(A) (1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 15A-833(a) (2005); N.H. REV. STAT. § 21-M:8-k(II)(p); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.150(1)(a) 2011); 18 
PA. STAT. ANN. § 11.201(5) West 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23A-27-1.1, 23A-27-1.3 (2014); TENN. 
CODE. ANN. § 40-38-103(a)(2) (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(2)(a)(iii) (West 2010); WASH. REV. CODE. 
ANN. § 7.69.030(14) (2011). 
263 See, e.g., Havard v. State, 928 So. 2d 771, 792 (Miss. 2006) (citing Payne, 501 U.S. at 808) (“[Victim impact 
evidence] is admissible at sentencing, though not at the culpability phase of trial.”); Powell v. State, 906 P.2d 
765, 777 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (citing Payne, 501 U.S. at 827) (“[w]hile victim impact evidence may be 
appropriate in the sentencing phase of trial, it is error to introduce victim impact evidence in the guilt/innocence 
phase.”); Weeks v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 379, 389-90 (Va. 1994) (citation omitted) (noting that 
introduction of victim impact evidence in the guilt stage of capital trials was impermissible because such 
evidence does not assist in “determining either the guilt or the innocence” of the defendant); Armstrong v. State, 
826 P.2d 1106, 1116 (Wyo. 1992) (“Consideration of victim-impact testimony or argument remains 
inappropriate during proceedings determining the guilt of an accused.”).  
264 State v. Fautenberry, 650 N.E.2d 878, 883 (Ohio 1995) (emphasis in original). See also State v. Taylor, 669 
So. 2d 364, 373 (La. 1996) (holding that the guilt phase impact testimony which proves an element of first 
degree murder “falls within the bounds of admissibility” for testimony in both the guilt and sentencing phase). 
265 Barnes v. State, 858 P.2d 522, 534 (Wyo. 1993). See also State v. Hayward, 963 P.2d 667, 676 (Or. 1998) 
(stating that based on Oregon Statute, “evidence that may be used as victim impact evidence during the penalty 
phase may have been introduced for some other purpose during the guilt phase of a capital trial”). 
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Fourth Circuit, Payne266 itself supports the possible admission of “limited victim background 
evidence” at the guilt stage of the proceedings since “the Court noted that various pieces of 
evidence regarding the victim’s background probably would get presented during the guilt 
phase of the trial.”267  
 Finally, in numerous capital cases, introduction of victim impact evidence at the guilt 
phase is deemed harmless error.268 In Florida, the state supreme court held that that the 
admission of impact testimony from the victim’s supervisor about victim’s character and 
background as a law enforcement officer, at the guilt phase, was harmless error.   
e.  Procedures for Admitting Victim Impact Evidence 
 States have taken varying positions on procedures designed to prevent undue prejudice 
which may result from using victim impact evidence. These procedures include, for example, 
notifying the defendant of what evidence the state intends to introduce as impact evidence, 
holding a preliminary hearing for the admission of victim impact evidence, providing the jury 
with limiting instructions regarding the use of such evidence, and allowing cross-examination 
of the victim impact witness. Each procedure is discussed in more depth below. 
                                                          
266 See Payne, 501 U.S. at 823 (“[E]vidence relating to the victim is already before the jury at least in part 
because of its relevance at the guilt phase of the trial.”). 
267 Bennett v. Angelone, 92 F.3d 1336, 1348 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Payne, 501 U.S. at 823, 840-41). 
268 Burns v. State, 609 So. 2d 600, 605-06 (Fla. 1992); see also Powell v. State, 906 P.2d 765, 777 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1995) (regarding the prosecutor’s victim impact remarks during the guilt phase as harmless error); State v. 
Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 808 (Tenn. 1994) (finding harmless error in admission of impact testimony by the 




In a few states, notice of  the victim impact evidence that the state seeks to present must 
be given to the defendant prior to trial.269 According to the Supreme Court of Georgia, 
providing the defendant with a copy of the victim impact statement before the sentencing 
stage would give him or her “an opportunity to challenge the content of the statements to 
remove language that might inflame passion or prejudice.”270 In Oklahoma, however, a 
pretrial notice to the defense is only preferable not mandated.271 In other jurisdictions, courts 
affirmed that the state gave an adequate notice for its use of victim impact evidence without 
explicit preference to such notice as a procedural requirement.272 Some courts require a 
pretrial notice to the trial court as well. The Tennessee Supreme Court noted that an advanced 
notice is required to allow the trial court to “adequately supervise” the admission of victim 
impact evidence.273 
ii. Pre-Admissibility Hearing 
 Several jurisdictions require a preliminary hearing to determine the admissibility of 
victim impact evidence.274 For example, the Supreme Court of Georgia held “that the trial 
                                                          
269 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-299.1 (2006) (“[A copy of victim impact statement] shall be made available 
to the defendant or counsel for the defendant without court order at least five days prior to the sentencing 
hearing.”); Livingston v. State, 444 S.E.2d 748, 752 (Ga. 1994) (ruling that the defense is entitled to notice of the 
particular victim impact evidence sought to be introduced by the prosecution at least ten days before trial); State 
v. Bernard, 608 So. 2d 966, 972-73 (La. 1992) (holding that the state must notify the defendant of its intent to 
produce victim impact evidence prior to the sentencing phase); but see Humphries v. Ozmint, 397 F.3d 206, 227 
(4th Cir. 2005) (“[T]here is no law that clearly requires timely, specific, and express notice of victim-impact 
evidence.”).  
270 Turner v. State, 486 S.E.2d 839, 841-42 (Ga. 1997). 
271 See, e.g., Cargle v. State, 909 P.2d 806, 828 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (emphasis added) (stating that the State 
should file a Notice of Intent to Produce Victim Impact Evidence, detailing the evidence sought to be 
introduced”). 
272 See, e.g., People v. Mitcham, 824 P.2d 1277, 1302 (Cal. 1992); Bowling v. Commonwealth, 942 S.W.2d 293, 
302 (Ky. 1997); State v. Bucklew, 973 S.W.2d 83, 97 (Mo. 1998); State v. Gentry, 888 P.2d 1105, 1136 (Wash. 
1995). 
273 State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872, 891 (Tenn. 1998); see also Turner, 486 S.E.2d at 841-42. 
274 See, e.g., Livingston v. State, 444 S.E.2d 748, 752 (Ga. 1994) (finding that the trial court must hold a hearing 
to make a preliminary determination as to the admissibility of victim impact evidence that intended to be 
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court must hear and rule prior to trial on the admissibility of victim impact evidence sought to 
be offered,” reasoning that holding a pre-admissibility hearing would “help ensure that victim 
impact evidence does not result in the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.”275 The vast 
majority of states, on the other hand, have no such requirement. In California, for instance, the 
state court expressly ruled that the trial court is not required to conduct a hearing with live 
witnesses prior to admitting victim impact evidence at the sentencing stage of a capital 
murder trial.276 
iii. Jury Instructions 
 Some jurisdictions require the trial judge to instruct the jury regarding the purpose of 
victim impact evidence.277 The Georgia Supreme Court justified mandatory limiting 
instructions by noting that “because of the importance of the jury’s decision, it is imperative 
that the jury be guided by proper legal principles.”278 The Court of Criminal Appeals of 
Oklahoma has held that the following instruction shall be used in every capital murder trial 
where victim impact evidence has been introduced: 
The prosecution has introduced what is known as victim impact evidence. This 
evidence has been introduced to show the financial, emotional, psychological, or 
physical effects of the victim’s death on the members of the victim's immediate 
family. It is intended to remind you as the sentencer that just as the defendant should 
be considered as an individual, so too the victim is an individual whose death may 
represent a unique loss to society and the family. This evidence is simply another 
method of informing you about the specific harm caused by the crime in 
                                                          
introduced); State v. Bernard, 608 So. 2d 966, 972-73 (La. 1992) (ruling that the use of victim impact evidence 
requires, on request, a pretrial determination of its admissibility); Malone v. State, 168 P.3d 185, 212 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 2007) (finding plain error in the trial court’s failure to conduct a hearing on the admissibility of 
victim impact evidence offered by the State); State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872, 891 (Tenn. 1998) (asserting that 
the trial court must hold a preliminary hearing after receiving notification from the State regarding its intent to 
present victim impact evidence). 
275 Livingston, 444 S.E.2d at 752. 
276 People v. Montes, 320 P.3d 729, 784 (Cal. 2014). 
277 See, e.g., Turner v. State, 486 S.E.2d 839, 842-43 (Ga. 1997); Cargle v. State, 909 P.2d 806, 828-29 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1995); Commonwealth. v. Means, 773 A.2d 143, 158-59 (Pa. 2001). 
278 Turner, 486 S.E.2d at 842. 
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question. You may consider this evidence in determining an appropriate 
punishment. However, your consideration must be limited to a moral inquiry into 
the culpability of the defendant, not an emotional response to the evidence. 
 
As it relates to the death penalty: Victim impact evidence is not the same as an 
aggravating circumstance. Proof of an adverse impact on the victim's family is not 
proof of an aggravating circumstance. Introduction of this victim impact evidence 
in no way relieves the State of its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt at 
least one aggravating circumstance which has been alleged. You may consider this 
evidence in determining an appropriate punishment. However, your consideration 
must be limited to a moral inquiry into the culpability of the defendant, not an 
emotional response to the evidence.279  
 
In Florida, there are no apparent mandatory instructions, and yet, the courts have approved of 
the use of limiting instructions in numerous capital cases.280 The California Supreme Court 
has found that the trial court is not required to instruct the jurors as to how they may consider 
victim impact evidence.281  
iv. Cross-Examination of Victim Impact 
Witness 
 A handful of states provide capital defendants the right to cross-examine impact 
witnesses by either statute or court rulings.282 In Oklahoma, the defense is allowed to show 
                                                          
279 Cargle v. State, 909 P.2d 806, 828-29 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995). See also Turner, 486 S.E.2d at 842-43; 
Commonwealth v. Williams, 854 A.2d 440, 447 (Pa. 2004). 
280 See, e.g., Rimmer v. State, 825 So. 2d 304, 330-31 (Fla. 2002); Farina v. State, 801 So. 2d 44, 53 (Fla. 2001). 
281 People v. Valencia, 180 P.3d 351, 386 (Cal. 2008). In Valencia, the defendant argued that the trial judge had a 
duty to give the following requested instruction on victim impact evidence: 
[V]ictim impact evidence] had been introduced for the specific and limited purpose of showing the 
specific harm caused by the [defendant’s] actions or the nature of the unique loss felt by each 
witness, and that the victim, like the defendant, was a unique individual; that it would be improper 
for the jurors to assess the comparable worth of [defendant] and [the victim] and his survivors; that 
their deliberations on the victim impact evidence must be limited to an unemotional, rational inquiry 
into [defendant’s] moral culpability; and that it would be improper for [defendant’s] sentence to be 
solely based upon the victim impact evidence. 
Id. The court rejected the defendant’s argument, stating that the “standard instructions adequately inform the jury 
of its duty,” and the court was not obligated to give specific instruction regarding how the jury should consider 
“any particular type of penalty phase evidence.” Id. 
282 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b) (emphasis added) (“Victims of crime or their lawful representatives, including the 
next of kin of homicide victims, are entitled to the right to be informed, to be present, and to be heard when 
relevant, at all crucial stages of criminal proceedings, to the extent that these rights do not interfere with the 
constitutional rights of the accused.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-1.2(a)(1) (2010) (“[Victim impact evidence] 
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the victim’s “bad” character on cross-examination. The Court of Criminal Appeals found 
plain error in refusing to allow cross-examination of a victim’s family concerning the victim’s 
drug use because being involved in such illegal activity “was relevant in giving the jury a 
complete picture of the entire crime and the uniqueness of the victim as a human being, 
providing a ‘quick glimpse of the life’ the defendant ‘chose to extinguish’”.283 Yet, in 
California, the capital defendant is not “entitled to disparage the character of the victims on 
cross-examination.”284 
 On the contrary, in other jurisdictions, victim impact testimony presented at capital 
sentencing proceedings is not subject to cross-examination.285 The Supreme Court of 
Nebraska, for example, announced that a defendant was not entitled to cross-examine an 
impact witness because the right to confrontation is inapplicable to sentencing proceedings.286 
The court based its decision on the following reasoning: 
                                                          
shall be given in the presence of the defendant and of the jury and shall be subject to cross-examination.”); LA. 
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.2 (2011) (“The victim or his family members, friends, and associates . . . , after 
testifying for the state, shall be subject to cross-examination.”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 142A-8 (1995) 
(“Any victim or any member of the immediate family or person designated by the victim or by family members 
of a victim who appears personally at the formal sentence proceeding shall not be cross-examined by opposing 
counsel; provided, however, such cross-examination shall not be prohibited in a proceeding before a jury or a 
judge acting as a finder of fact.”); Truehitt v. State, 916 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex. App. 1996) (“[W]e find nothing 
in [Texas statute] that prohibits appellant from exercising his right to confrontation and cross-examination by 
calling any victim impact statement author as a witness.”). See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-602(4)(A) (2012) 
(emphasis added) (“If the defendant and the state are accorded an opportunity to rebut the evidence, in 
determining the sentence evidence may be presented to the jury as to any: . . .  [o]ther matter relevant to 
punishment, including, but not limited to, victim impact evidence.”). 
283 Conover v. State, 933 P.2d 904, 922-23(Okla. Crim. App. 1997) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 
822 (1991)). 
284 People v. Boyette, 58 P.3d 391, 432 (Cal. 2002). 
285 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4426.01 (2012) (“[T]he victim’s right to be heard is exercised not as a witness, . 
. . and the victim is not subject to cross-examination”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-M:8-k (2010) (“[No witness] 
shall be subject to questioning by counsel when giving an impact statement.”); State v. Johnson, 284 S.W.3d 
561, 584 (Mo. 2009) (quoting United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 326 (5th Cir.2007)) (concluding that victim 
impact statements are not subject to cross-examination on the grounds that the Confrontation Clause does not 
“operate to bar the admission of testimony relevant only to a capital sentencing authority’s selection decisions” ); 
State v. Galindo, 774 N.W.2d 190, 244 (Neb. 2009) (precluding cross-examination of victim impact statements); 
Summers v. State, 148 P.3d 778, 782-83 (Nev. 2006) (held that the defendant had no right to cross-examine 
victim impact testimony because “neither the Confrontation Clause nor Crawford” apply to evidence admitted in 
a capital penalty hearing). 
286 State v. Galindo, 774 N.W.2d 190, 244 (Neb. 2009). 
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The Court in Crawford287 did not address in what stage of the trial proceedings 
confrontation rights apply. It only considered to what type of evidence that right 
applies. As such, Crawford did not abrogate precedent that the right is inapplicable 
to sentencing proceedings. Indeed, as the Court in Crawford discussed, the concern 
of the Confrontation Clause is the right to confront one’s “accusers.” A defendant 
cannot be found guilty based on accusations of witnesses whom the defendant has 
not been able to cross-examine. In our bifurcated system of guilt and sentencing, 
however, there are no longer “accusers” at the sentencing stage. At the sentencing 
stage, the accusations have been resolved by the trier of fact against the defendant. 
The defendant is no longer the accused, but the convicted.288 
  
As set forth above, Booth’s prohibition of victim impact evidence included survivors’ 
sentencing opinions which the Court did not address in Payne. A victim’s family members 
should be allowed to voice an opinion in favor or against imposing the death penalty in the 
sentencing proceeding. Survivors’ opinions requesting that the defendant be sentenced to 
death will be analyzed first in the next portion of this Study.   
 Victim Sentencing Opinions Calling for Death Penalty (Death 
Recommendations) 
In Booth,289 since victim’s family did not make specific recommendations on the proper 
sentence, the facts of the case “make it unclear whether the Court considered the effect of the 
Eighth Amendment on opinions regarding sentencing.”290 In Payne, however, the Court 
viewed Booth as prohibiting not only family members’ opinions and characterizations, but 
also recommendations of the appropriate sentence.291 Therefore, most jurisdictions prohibited 
victim’s survivors from making death recommendations during capital sentencing 
                                                          
287 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
288 Galindo, 774 N.W.2d at 244. 
289 Booth v. Maryland 482 U.S. 469 (1987). 
290 Lynn v. Reinstein, 68 P.3d 412, 416 n. 4 (Ariz. 2003) (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 830 n. 2 
(1991)). 
291 Payne, 501 U.S. at 830 n. 2. See also Brian L. Vander Pol, Relevance and Reconciliation: A Proposal 
Regarding the Admissibility of Mercy Opinions in Capital Sentencing, 88 IOWA L. REV. 707, 719 n. 55 (2003) 
(noting that even though the only evidence mentioned in Booth were a family’s opinions about the crime and the 
defendant, Payne’s interpretation of Booth indicated that opinions on sentencing are also covered by Booth). 
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proceedings.292 Oklahoma, on the other hand, stood alone in allowing families’ 
recommendations of death to be presented to capital juries,293 until Tenth Circuit held that 
Oklahoma law permitting such recommendations at capital sentencing violated the Eighth 
Amendment.294  
This section will begin with exploring the validity of family members’ opinions 
requesting the death penalty during capital sentencing proceedings after Payne. Then it will 
explain why death recommendations should be permitted.  
 The Validity of Death Recommendations after Payne 
 Payne limited its holding to evidence concerning the victim’s character and the impact 
of the crime on family members, and did not directly address victim opinion evidence.295 
Several states explicitly preclude the introduction of victim opinion evidence including 
sentencing recommendations in their statutes.296 Other jurisdictions have precluded victim 
sentencing evidence through case law that discusses recommendations of death penalty, in 
                                                          
292 See infra notes 296-303 and accompanying text.  
293 Oklahoma statute explicitly provides that a victim impact statement may contain an “opinion of the victim of 
a recommended sentence.” OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 142A-1(8) (1995). See infra notes 307-13 and 
accompanying text. 
294 Dodd v. Trammell, 753 F.3d 971, 994 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1546 (2014), and cert. denied, 
134 S. Ct. 1548, (2014). See infra notes 315-21 and accompanying text. 
295 Payne, 501 U.S. at 830 n. 2 (citation omitted). The Payne Court states in a footnote that, 
Our holding today is limited to the holdings of Booth v. Maryland and South Carolina v. Gathers 
that evidence and argument relating to the victim and the impact of the victim’s death on the victim’s 
family are inadmissible at a capital sentencing hearing. Booth also held that the admission of a 
victim’s family members’ characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the 
appropriate sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. No evidence of the latter sort was presented 
at the trial in this case. 
Id. 
296 See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 19.1(d)(3) (“The victim’s survivors may make a statement relating to the 
characteristics of the victim and the impact of the crime on the victim’s family, but may not offer any opinion 
regarding the appropriate sentence to be imposed.”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(7) (2004) (“Characterizations 
and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence shall not be permitted as a part of 
victim impact evidence.”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(5)(a) (2011) (“Characterizations and opinions about the 




particular,297 on the ground that Payne partially overruled Booth, but the portion of Booth that 
prohibited victim opinion testimony remains valid.298 In Ex parte Washington,299 for instance, 
the Supreme Court of Alabama concluded that it was plain error to admit the testimony of a 
victim’s parents in which they recommended death as the proper punishment.300 In that case, 
the victim’s father stated, “[m]y son’s life was taken from him in a brutal, evil, terrible way, 
by someone without a conscience. I think if you take a life, you should pay with a life and I 
ask the jury to sentence [the defendant] to death. I think it is the fair thing to do.”301 Similarly, 
the victim’s mother testified that “[m]y son felt a fear that no person on this earth should feel, 
and he had a death that no person should have to go through, and I think that [the defendant] 
should have to suffer death as my son has suffered death.”302 
 Importantly, several state courts disallowing opinions of the appropriate sentence have 
highlighted that in order for sentencing opinion evidence to be held improper, it should 
                                                          
297 Courts also confronted the validity of victim opinion statements in a number of cases where the family 
wanted the defendant to receive mercy instead of a death sentence. See infra notes 409-19 and accompanying 
text.  
298 See, e.g., Ex parte McWilliams, 640 So. 2d 1015, 1017 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (finding that considering 
family’s opinions requesting death by the trial court would have violated the defendant’s Eighth Amendment 
rights). The court relied on the fact that “[t]he victim impact statements in Payne did not contain 
characterizations or opinions about the defendant, the crime, or the appropriate punishment. That portion of 
Booth that proscribed the trial court’s consideration of that type of statement was, therefore, left intact by 
Payne.” Id. See also People v. Taylor, 229 P.3d 12, 71 (Cal. 2010); Farina v. State, 680 So. 2d 392, 399 (Fla. 
1996); Bryant v. State, 708 S.E.2d 362, 381-82 (Ga. 2011); State v. Payne, 199 P.3d 123, 148 (Idaho 2008); 
State v. Taylor, 669 So. 2d 364, 370 (La. 1996); State v. Goodwin, 703 N.E.2d 1251, 1262 (Ohio 1999); Juniper 
v. Commonwealth, 626 S.E.2d 383, 421 (Va. 2006). Accord State v. Bocharski, 22 P.3d 43, 56 (Ariz. 2001) 
(“Crime victims and/or their families have the constitutional right to be heard at sentencing. . . . [H]owever, the 
sentencing recommendation of a victim’s family member is not relevant in a capital case.”); State v. Gideon, 894 
P.2d 850, 862-63, 864 (Kan. 1995) (noting that the trail judge should exercise control over a family’s statements 
when presented to a jury, and that the statements should be directly related to the victim and the impact the crime 
had on the victim and the victim’s family, as they may otherwise “range far afield” and result in “reversible 
error”); Rippo v. State, 946 P.2d 1017, 1031 (Nev. 1997) (citation omitted) (pointing out that victim’s opinion as 
to the appropriate sentence to be imposed is only permissible in non-capital cases); State v. Stenson, 940 P.2d 
1239, 1279 n.19 (Wash. 1997) (“It is clear neither the Defendant’s family nor the victim’s family may tell the 
jury what sentence should be imposed.”). 
299 106 So. 3d 441 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011). 
300 Id. at 447. 




initially constitute an “opinion” as to what sentence the defendant should receive. In Missouri, 
for example, the state court found that a witness’s testimony requesting justice in sentencing 
was admissible.303 The court concluded that the following statement did not “recommend a 
specific sentence”: “I believe this man has caused enough chaos and I ask he be fairly 
punished for what he has done.”304 The Supreme Court of Ohio has also rejected a 
defendant’s claim that the testimony of victim’s mother amounted to a recommendation of 
death.305 The court noted that the witness “never specifically stated her opinion as to the 
appropriate punishment” in her statement in which she testified that, “‘now we feel that the 
time has come for [the defendant] to be punished according to the law of Ohio.’”306 
 The state of Oklahoma, however, took an opposite position concerning the validity of 
victim opinion evidence recommending death penalty. Only one year after Payne, the 
Oklahoma legislature specifically allowed the admission of a family’s sentencing 
recommendation, by defining victim impact statements to include “the opinion of the victim 
of a recommended sentence.”307 Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma 
held that the following witness sentencing recommendation did not violate the defendant’s 
                                                          
303 See State v. Worthington, 8 S.W.3d 83, 89 n. 2 (Mo. 1999). 
304 Id.  
305 See State v. Chinn, 709 N.E.2d 1166, 1188 (Ohio 1999). 
306 Id.  
307 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 142A-1(8) (1995). Victim impact evidence is defined as follows:  
“Victim impact statements” means information about the financial, emotional, psychological, and 
physical effects of a violent crime on each victim and members of their immediate family, or person 
designated by the victim or by family members of the victim and includes information about the 
victim, circumstances surrounding the crime, the manner in which the crime was perpetrated, and 
the opinion of the victim of a recommended sentence. 
Id. “[V]ictim,” in cases of homicide, means “a surviving family member.” Id. § 142A-1(1). 
Interestingly, only death recommendations were held admissible by Oklahoma courts, even though the language 
of the statute stated above indicates that all sentencing opinions are permitted, regardless of whether they 
recommend death or life. See e.g., Rebecca T. Engel, “An Existential Moment of Moral Perception”: 
Declarations of Life and the Capital Jury Re-Imagined, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 303, 331 n. 152 (2013) 
(Oklahoma permits all opinion evidence “by statute”); Robert P. Mosteller, Victim Impact Evidence: Hard to 
Find the Real Rules, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 543, 554 (2003) (“Given that Oklahoma permits opinions by victims 
that death is the appropriate sentence, . . . it would logically follow that opinions in opposition to death should 
also be admissible.”). 
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Eighth Amendment rights: “Yea, I can tell them the penalty I think is the only penalty that’s 
appropriate would be the death penalty.”308 In Conover v. State,309 the court found that, in 
addition to overruling Booth’s prohibition on evidence concerning the victim and the impact 
of the crime on his family, “Payne also implicitly overruled that portion of Booth regarding 
characterizations of the defendant and opinions of the sentence.”310 However, the same court 
in Ledbetter v. State,311 set several limits to the use of opinion evidence by noting that such 
evidence would be viewed with a “heightened degree of scrutiny” as the court applied  the 
“probative-value-versus-prejudicial-effect analysis.”312 Also, the court added that victim 
sentencing opinion, in particular, “should be given as a straightforward, concise response to a 
question asking what the recommendation is; or a short statement of recommendation in a 
written statement, without amplification.”313 
 Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in Dodd v. 
Trammell,314 held that Oklahoma statute allowing sentencing recommendations violated the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, and such constitutional 
violation was not harmless.315 At the sentencing stage, the trial court found admissible 
statements of seven victim’s relatives recommending the death penalty as the appropriate 
                                                          
308 DeLozier v. State, 991 P.2d 22, 31 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (citation omitted). 
309 933 P.2d 904 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997). 
310 Id. at 920. Prior to Conover, the court in Ledbetter discussed the issue of victim opinion evidence and 
concluded that, although Payne did not approach the admissibility of the “characterizations and opinions about 
the crime, the defendant and the appropriate punishment,” a fair reading of Payne’s opinion indicates that the 
Eighth Amendment does not bar such evidence. See Ledbetter v. State, 933 P.2d 880, 890-91 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1997). See also Lockett v. State, 53 P.3d 418, 427 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002). 
311 933 P.2d 880 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997). 
312 Id. at 891. 
313 Id.  
314 753 F.3d 971(10th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1546 (2014), and cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1548 (2014). 
315 Id. at 994. In several cases prior to Dodd, the Tenth Circuit declared a family’s recommendations of the death 
penalty harmless. See, e.g., Lott v. Trammell, 705 F.3d 1167, 1219 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 176 




sentence for the defendant.316 On appeal, the defendant argued that admitting such statements 
was in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals 
affirmed the death sentences.317 The federal district court denied defendant’s petition, finding 
error in permitting death penalty recommendations, but further holding that the error was 
harmless.318 According to the Tenth Circuit, however, the error was found to be not 
harmless.319 The court stated that “‘Payne and our own post-Payne cases clearly establish that 
it is a violation of the Eighth Amendment to allow a victim or a victim’s family member to 
comment, during second-stage proceedings, on the appropriate sentence for a capital 
defendant.’”320 The Tenth Circuit concluded that the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma 
by ruling otherwise, had “reached ‘a decision that was contrary to . . . clearly established 
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’”321 
 Additionally, sentence opinion testimony is very often regarded as harmless error when 
it is heard before a trial judge, rather than a jury.322 In one recent Ohio case, the state court 
held that “the trial court improperly permitted statements about punishment for the crime, 
specifically, statements recommending that capital punishment be imposed; however, these 
statements were presented to a three-judge panel, not a jury, and we have recognized that 
when an improper victim-impact statement is conveyed only to judges, ‘it is not reversible 
                                                          




320 Id. at 996 (quoting Selsor v. Workman, 644 F.3d 984, 1026-27 (10th Cir.2011)).  
321 Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1)).  
322 See, e.g., Lockhart v. State, 163 So. 3d 1088, 1138-39 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013); State v. Mann, 934 P.2d 784, 
792 (Ariz. 1997); Smith v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1264, 1278 (Ind. 1997); State v. Taylor, 944 S.W.2d 925, 938 (Mo. 
1997); Beck v. Commonwealth, 484 S.E.2d 898, 906 (Va. 1997). 
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error unless there is some indication that the judge actually considered it in sentencing the 
defendant to death.’”323 
 Finally, courts have also found that the prosecutor’s reference to the opinion of the 
victim’s family about the appropriate sentence during the penalty phase of a capital case, 
although improper, was harmless or not prejudicial.324 In State v. Scales,325 the prosecutor, in 
his closing argument, stated that the victim’s survivors requested the death penalty. 
Nevertheless, the court held that, although such comment was improper, it was harmless 
considering the fact that the victim’s family themselves gave no opinion about imposing the 
death penalty and the comment itself was brief.326 
Next, it will be explained why a victim’s family members should be allowed to 
communicate their death recommendations to the sentencing authority. 
 Arguments for Permitting Death Recommendations  
This section argues that the surviving family members of a murder victim deserve 
greater involvement during the sentencing stage, by permitting them to communicate their 
desires that the sentencing authority impose the death penalty. Three arguments can be made 
                                                          
323 State v. Wesson, 999 N.E.2d 557, 576 (Ohio 2013) (quoting State v. Franklin,776 N.E.2d 26, 48 (Ohio 
2002)).  
324 In Payne, during closing argument, the prosecutor made the following comments regarding the family’s view 
on the appropriate sentence: “[Nicholas, a survivor of the murders of his mother and sister,] is going to want to 
know what type of justice was done . . . . With your verdict you will provide the answer.” See Payne v. 
Tenseness, 501 U.S. 808, 815.  The Tenseness Supreme Court rejected Payne’s contention that the State’s 
closing comments violated Booth. State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 18 (Tenn. 1990). The United States Supreme 
Court in Payne condoned the State’s comments even though they implied that Nicholas wished to see the 
defendant to be sentenced to death. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 815-16. One commentator has noted that “the Court 
has sent an ambiguous message that a victim statement of opinion introduced by a prosecutor may be 
admissible.” Kathryn E. Bartolo, Payne v. Tennessee: The Future Role of Victim Statements of Opinion in 
Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1217, 1239 (1992). 
325 655 So. 2d 1326 (La. 1995). 
326 Id. at 1336. See also State v. Middlebrooks, 995 S.W.2d 550, 558 (Tenn. 1999) (regarding the prosecutor’s 
remark, “[The victim’s] family asks [the jury] to impose the death penalty,” as error because it expressed 




in favor of allowing death recommendations in capital murder cases. First, the potential risk 
of prejudice resulting from introducing death recommendations is reduced by Payne’s holding 
that victim impact evidence permissible in capital sentencing proceedings.327 Second, 
recommendations as to the proper sentences are not prohibited in non-death penalty cases.328 
Finally, allowing sentencing opinion evidence, in general, provides a number of benefits in 
different aspects.329 
a. Allowing Victim Impact Evidence Reduces the 
Prejudicial Effect of Death Recommendations  
 Allowing the jury to hear a concise statement by the victim’s family recommending 
death sentence would not be overly prejudicial to the defendant, after the jury has heard the 
emotional testimony that describes a victim’s good character and the harm suffered by his 
survivors.330 Such a recommendation would not be a surprise to most jurors. The Oklahoma 
court found that a victim’s wife’s recommendation of the death penalty was proper because “a 
jury expects such a statement from the victim’s family.”331 In an Alabama case, a similar 
notion was expressed by the court, stating that “[t]he jury surely recognized the testimony of 
the victim-impact witnesses as a normal, human reaction to the death of a loved one. That 
these witnesses wanted [defendant] to receive the death penalty would come as no surprise to 
the members of the jury.”332 Opponents of victim sentencing opinions argue that, if death 
                                                          
327 See discussion infra pp. 57-62. 
328 See discussion infra pp. 63-65. 
329 See discussion infra pp. 66-67. 
330 See supra notes 184-88, 246-49, 254-60 and accompanying text. 
331 Wood v. State, 959 P.2d 1, 12 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998). 
332 Whitehead v. State, 777 So. 2d 781, 849 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999). See also State v. Taylor, 93-2201 (La. 
2/28/96), 669 So. 2d 364, 371(“[S]urely the jury regarded the testimony of these victim impact witnesses as 
normal human reactions to the death of a loved one. That the victim’s survivors might have little or no sympathy 
for the defendant certainly would come as no surprise to a member of the jury”). 
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recommendations could be expected by the jury, there would be no point in permitting them 
in the first instance.333 The point, however, has to do with cases in which the family members 
do not want the defendant to be executed.334 A victim’s family should be allowed to voice a 
simple opinion as to whether or not the defendant should be sentenced to death. Otherwise, 
after hearing victim impact evidence, the jury may assume that the victim’s family was in 
favor of putting the defendant to death.335 In State v. Glassel,336 the victim’s husband 
recommended a life sentence for the defendant,337 even though he had given emotional and 
tearful victim impact testimony at the sentencing phase of the trial.338 
 It is inconsistent to prohibit family members from making a death recommendation 
during sentencing when the floodgate of emotions has been already opened by Payne, in the 
form of victim’s character and crime impact evidence.339 For example, on the basis of 
                                                          
333 Wayne A. Logan, Opining on Death: Witness Sentence Recommendations in Capital Trials, 41 B.C. L. REV. 
517, 545 (2000). 
334 Mercy opinion will be discussed at length. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
335 Allowing family members who do not want the death penalty to be imposed, to present victim impact 
evidence without allowing their life recommendations at the sentencing hearing does not serve the desires of the 
family because it “essentially endorses the State’s effort to obtain the death penalty.” Douglas E. Beloof, 
Constitutional Implications of Crime Victims as Participants, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 282, 296 (2003). 
336 116 P.3d 1193 (Ariz. 2005). 
337 Id. at 1215.  
338 The victim’s husband said that: 
he had the privilege and honor to be married to [the victim] for nearly fifty years. He described how 
his children had been secretly planning an anniversary party but ended up using the money that they 
had saved for [victim]’s casket. He then told the jury how much he loved his wife and how much he 
missed her. He also told the jury about the day of the murder, when [the victim] begged him to help 
her as she lay dying. [The victim’s husband] said that he had always been able to help her but was 
powerless to do anything that day.  
Id. at 1213. 
339 See Payne 501 U.S. at 856 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that victim impact statements likely increase 
the chance of a death sentence by inflaming the jury). Also, in United States v. Johnson, a federal district court 
judge said that: 
I cannot help but wonder if Payne . . . would have been decided the same way if the Supreme Court 
Justices in the majority had ever sat as trial court judges in a federal death penalty case and had 
observed first hand, rather than through review of a cold record, the unsurpassed emotional power 
of victim impact testimony on a jury. It has now been over four months since I heard this testimony 
in the Honken trial and the juror’s sobbing during the victim impact testimony still rings in my ears. 
362 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1107 (N.D. Iowa 2005) aff’d in part, 495 F.3d 951 (8th Cir. 2007). Even the prosecution, 
according to the Seven Circuit, “should not be required to present victim impact evidence . . . that [is] devoid of 
all passion.” Williams v. Chrans, 945 F.2d 926, 947 (7th Cir. 1991). 
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showing a victim’s uniqueness, courts held as proper evidence videotapes of the murder 
victim before his or her death,340 a cassette tape of songs performed by the victim played for 
the jury,341 and a eulogy statement about the victim read to the jurors.342 videos of a victim’s 
funeral services and gravesite,343 photographs of a memorial garden built in the victim 
memory,344 and poems written about the deceased read to the jury345 have also been found 
admissible for demonstrating the impact of a murder on the victim’s survivors. 
 If victim sentencing opinion evidence was allowed under Payne, instead of victim 
impact evidence, the jury would hear testimony with less prejudicial effect than what is 
presently held permissible in courts.346 In United States v. McVeigh,347 the Tenth Circuit 
approved the following “emotional” testimony of a mother describing the loss of her fourteen-
month-old child: 
I think that my fears of her dying when she was first born being—confirmed was 
the very worst thing for me. When we drove home that night, the highway 
overlooked the Murrah Building; and by that time, it was very dark and it was 
raining and it was cold. And I truly, truly believed that my daughter was alive. You 
know, you don’t ever think-you don’t ever think that your own child is dead. And 
at this point, I thought that maybe she was in fact still in the building. And I think 
my biggest fear at that point was that she sat there in this building and she’d been 
there for 12 hours, she was in a dirty diaper, she didn’t have a bottle, she didn’t 
have me to hold her, and she was afraid. And I could picture her just saying 
“Momma,” and I felt so guilty leaving this place.348 
 
                                                          
340 See cases cited supra note 251. 
341 See People v. Verdugo, 236 P.3d 1035, 1064 (Cal. 2010). 
342 See, e.g., State v. Storey, 40 S.W.3d 898, 908-09 (Mo. 2001). 
343 See cases cited supra note 254. 
344 See Storey, 40 S.W.3d at 908-09. 
345 See cases cited supra note 257. 
346 Similarly, it has been suggested that, while survivor opinion evidence should be allowed during the 
sentencing hearing, victim impact evidence should not be permitted until after the sentencing authority has 
already reached its decision. See Joseph L. Hoffmann, Revenge or Mercy? Some Thoughts About Survivor 
Opinion Evidence in Death Penalty Cases, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 530, 535-37 (2003). According to Indiana law, 
only “[a]fter a court pronounces sentence,” victim impact statement may be presented. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-
2-9(e) (2008). 
347 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 1998), disapproved of by Hooks v. Ward, 184 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 1999). 
348 Id. at 1220-21. 
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In fact, disallowing opinion evidence has persuaded family members in some cases to use 
victim impact evidence as a tool to influence the jury to vote for death by invoking 
heartbreaking and angry statements.349  Sentencing  recommendations should be permissible, 
so that the survivors could voice their opinions as to what punishment should be imposed 
clearly, directly, and separately from victim impact evidence. In short, allowing victim impact 
evidence under Payne calls for reconsidering the validity of victim sentencing opinions. 
 Nevertheless, others may contend that, contrary to victim impact evidence, sentencing 
opinions violate the Eighth Amendment because they are irrelevant to capital sentencing 
decisions.350 Death recommendations made by a victim’s family during sentencing hearings 
should be treated like the prosecutor’s recommendation which is considered permissible 
despite its lack of relevance to the aggravating factors. Further, no one would argue that the 
prosecutor’s recommendation of death is unconstitutional. Similarly, there should be no such 
concern when it comes to allowing survivors to recommend a sentence of death. The 
relevance of capital hearing evidence in murder cases could and should be extended beyond 
                                                          
349 Joseph L. Hoffmann argues that:  
[A]dmitting survivor opinion evidence would avoid the current hypocrisy that allows many 
survivors to deliver victim impact statements that are thinly disguised efforts to sway the jury’s 
sentence without violating the letter of Payne. The current situation encourages survivors to conflate 
two separate goals: achieving personal catharsis by expressing their feelings about the victim and 
the crime to the defendant, and exercising some control over the defendant’s fate by seeking to 
influence the jury. It would be preferable to keep these two goals truly separate by allowing the 
second one to be pursued directly, and in a less emotionally charged manner, while delaying pursuit 
of the first (if such pursuit is desirable at all) to a time when it would not produce the serious negative 
effects described above. Moreover, even if the practical benefits are small, intellectual honesty about 
such matters would seem to be an inherently worthwhile goal. 
Hoffmann, Revenge or Mercy, supra note 346, at 539-40. 
350 Several scholars have pointed out that survivors’ opinions are irrelevant to whether the offender deserves to 
be executed. See, e.g., Joshua D. Greenberg, Is Payne Defensible?: The Constitutionality of Admitting Victim-
Impact Evidence at Capital Sentencing Hearings, 75 IND. L.J. 1349, 1355 n. 38 (2000) (noting that the victim’s 
views on the proper penalty are irrelevant because “[t]he adversaries in the criminal process” are the State and 
the defendant, and not the victim and the defendant, stating “ours is not a system of private prosecution”); 
Logan, supra note 333, at 539 (“A witness’s opinion—even when the witness is a loved one of the murder 
victim—that a defendant deserves death in no way serves to aggravate a murder to death-worthiness. An opinion 
does not relate to the nature of the offense or the offender, the cornerstones of death penalty decision making.”).  
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the blameworthiness of the defendant, so that the survivors’ opinions could be permissible. 
Under Payne, for instance, information regarding the victim’s character was deemed relevant 
to the capital sentencing proceedings even though such information does not reflect in any 
way the defendant’s blameworthiness.351  
Douglas E. Beloof, a proponent of victims’ sentencing recommendations, has argued 
that the Payne case has changed the status of the crime victim from a witness giving 
information and opinion evidence to an active “participant” who has standing to make 
sentencing recommendations352 and, thus, such recommendations are constitutional in death 
penalty cases.353 He explained that: 
[a]rguments that the content of victims’ sentencing recommendations violates the 
Eighth Amendment are unpersuasive. As long as the death penalty is constitutional, 
one cannot credibly argue that a public prosecutor’s recommendation of death is 
cruel and unusual. The state is permitted to make a sentencing recommendation 
because the state is harmed by the criminal act. Ultimately, the propriety of a 
sentencing recommendation is determined by the recommender’s status. Because 
the victim, like the state, is harmed by crime, the victim’s status as an aggrieved 
person with participant rights to give a recommendation . . . obviates any Eighth 
Amendment concern.354 
 
                                                          
351 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827. The Court based its decision on the ground that such information 
would prevent tuning the murdered person into a “faceless stranger” during a capital trial, which provides the 
jury with “all the information necessary to determine the proper punishment for a first-degree murder.” Id. at 825 
(internal citation omitted). 
352 See Beloof, supra note 335, at 285.  For more details about Beloof’s theory, see id. at 283-87. 
353 Id. at 287. 
354 Id. at 293. Professor Beloof added: 
One could also argue that the content of a victim’s sentencing recommendation is cruel and unusual 
because it is the recommendation of an individual person rather than of a state official. One could 
make a similar argument against victim sentencing recommendation using a due process analysis: 
victim recommendation is fundamentally unfair and arbitrary because it comes from a harmed 
individual rather than the harmed state. These arguments presume that only the collective harm of 
an entire state justifies any right of participation in the criminal process. However, to maintain the 
argument that individual victim harm is an illegitimate basis for participation rights would require 
the repeal of laws in all fifty states that grant participation rights to victims. Furthermore, defining 
crime victim harm as illegitimate is so profoundly contrary to the common human experience--that 
victims are actually harmed by criminal acts--that such a fragile fiction will ultimately fail. 
Id. at 293-94.  
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Although murder is a crime against the state, it affects individuals as well. Capital juries 
should be permitted to hear survivors’ recommendations because no one represents the 
murder victim other than the survivors. The public prosecution represents the state rather than 
the victim or the family of the victim, and the prosecutor’s recommendation on the propriety 
of the death penalty may, or may not, agree with the recommendation of the victim’s family 
members.355  
 Permitting opinion evidence, like permitting victim impact evidence, does not mean that 
it must be admitted—the evidence will be considered by a judge, and may or may not be 
deemed admissible.356 Also, in addition to the tools provided by the current legal system to 
protect the defendant’s constitutional rights, “[t]he States remain free, in capital cases, as well 
as others, to devise new procedures and new remedies to meet felt needs.”357 Therefore, there 
are multiple avenues to ensure that the use of victim opinion evidence does not unduly 
prejudice defendants.358 
                                                          
355 The report of the President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime stated that: 
The prosecutor can begin to present the other side, but he was not personally affected by the crime 
or its aftermath, and may not be fully aware of the price the victim has paid. It is as unfair to require 
that the victim depend solely on the intercession of the prosecutor as it would be to require that the 
defendant rely solely on his counsel. 
President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime, Final Report, 78 (1982), 
http://ojp.gov/ovc/publications/presdntstskforcrprt/87299.pdf. 
356 Payne noted, “[w]e do not hold today that victim impact evidence must be admitted, or even that it should be 
admitted. We hold merely that if a State decides to permit consideration of this evidence, the Eighth Amendment 
erects no per se bar.” Payne, 501 U.S. at 831. 
357 Payne, 501 U.S. at 824-25. 




b.  Sentencing Recommendations Are Already 
Admissible in Non-Capital Cases 
 In many jurisdictions that authorize death sentences, a victim of a non-capital crime can 
voice an opinion regarding the defendant’s sentence,359  and such approach should be 
applicable to capital trials. In homicide cases, all survivors suffer the loss of a loved one. 
Depriving only capital survivors from presenting a limited form of opinion evidence creates 
an unfair distinction between those survivors and families of other victims. What 
distinguishes a capital from a non-capital case has nothing to do with the victim’s family—
rather, the distinctions are the defendant’s actions and the rules of law, such as the 
aggravating and mitigating factors.   
 Booth based its holding on the fact that victim impact evidence should be disallowed on 
the grounds that death penalty sentencing is different from other criminal sentencing, “and 
that therefore the considerations that inform the sentencing decision may be different from 
those that” apply to other punishments.360 Nevertheless, Payne later allowed victim impact 
evidence in “capital” sentencing proceedings,361 the reasoning of “death is different” used to 
justify the bar of sentence recommendations in capital cases no longer seems powerful or 
                                                          
359 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-8(b) (2008) (“A victim present at sentencing in a felony or misdemeanor 
case shall be advised by the court of a victim’s right to make a statement concerning the crime and the 
sentence.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.520(3) (West 2006) (“[A victim] impact statement may contain … the 
victim’s recommendation for an appropriate sentence.”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-115(4)(a) (2003) (“The 
court shall permit the victim to present a statement concerning . . . the victim’s opinion regarding appropriate 
sentence.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23A-27-1.1, 23A-27-1.3 (2014) (Before sentencing the defendant, the 
victim has the right to present an oral/ written victim impact statement, and may comment on the sentence that 
may be imposed on the defendant). See also State v. Grant, 297 P.3d 244, 249 (Idaho 2013) (“[B]ecause Idaho 
Code . . . does not include any limitations that would prevent a victim of a non-capital crime from sharing his or 
her sentencing recommendation with the trial court, such a statement is permissible”); Rippo v. State, 946 P.2d 
1017, 1031 (Nev. 1997) (noting that victim’s recommendation for an appropriate sentence is only allowed in 
non-capital trials). 
360 Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 509 n. 12 (1987) (citation omitted). 
361 See Payne, 501 U.S. at 827. 
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persuasive.362 One could respond that permitting death recommendation will lead jurors to 
make an arbitrary sentencing determination,363 which is contrary to the Supreme 
Court’s capital punishment jurisprudence.364 However, it is not accurate that capital jurors 
reach their decision with no emotions involved.365 For instance, in death penalty cases, when 
mitigating evidence is introduced, the determination of a sentencing judgment relies in part on 
whether the defendant has earned the empathy of the jury members.366 The jurors’ emotional 
and rational reactions are intertwined and cannot be easily separated. In addition, “[e]motions 
are not inimical to the reasoning process, particularly in a contextual decision-making 
                                                          
362 See, e.g., Jeffrey Abramson, Death-Is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the Capital Jury, 2 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 117, 133 (2004) (“[I]t is not going too far to say that Payne gave up on the notion that death 
deliberation can or even ought to be a matter for reasoned deliberation.”); Engel, supra note 307, at 308 (“[In the 
wake of Payne,] the potential danger of creating arbitrary capital sentences has become acceptable once again in 
exchange for giving the jury a wider deliberative range for deciding life or death.”); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan 
M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital 
Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 397 (1995) (“The Court echoed the ‘death is different’ principle in a 
number of subsequent cases, but close examination of the Court’s decisions over the past twenty years reveals 
that the procedural safeguards in death cases are not as different as one might suspect.”). See also Bartolo, supra 
note 324, at 1246 (“Payne’s open gate for admissibility of victim impact evidence invites more attempts to 
include victim statements of opinion.”); Michael Ira Oberlander, The Payne of Allowing Victim Impact 
Statements at Capital Sentencing Hearings, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1621, 1656-57 (1992) (Payne provided state 
courts the opportunity to allow the introduction of survivors’ opinion as to the defendant’s appropriate 
punishment). 
The reasoning of “death is different” has been weakened by some the approaches of appellate courts, in which 
they have condoned families’ characterizations of the murders and murderers in capital sentencing proceedings. 
For example, in a Mississippi case, the state court explicitly allowed “opinions of the victim’s family members 
as to the crimes and the defendant as permissible victim impact testimony.” Havard v. State, 928 So. 2d 771, 792 
(Miss. 2006) (citing Wells v. State, 698 So.2d 497, 512 (Miss.1997)). But see State v. Grant, 297 P.3d 244, 249 
(Idaho 2013) (citing State v. Payne, 199 P.3d 123, 148 (Idaho 2008)) (finding survivors’ characterizations and 
opinions regarding the crime and the defendant inadmissible in a capital sentencing hearing); Bryant v. State, 
708 S.E.2d 362, 382 (Ga. 2011) (same). 
363 See, e.g., Logan, supra note 333, at 540-43 (arguing that sentence opinion testimony should be barred because 
it causes the jury to impose arbitrary sentencing decisions). 
364 See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (“It is of vital importance to the defendant and to the 
community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than 
caprice or emotion.”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (“[W]here discretion is afforded a sentencing 
body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion 
must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.”). 
365 See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 350, at 1367 (emphasis in original) (“Capital sentencing juries’ decisions are 
never unaffected by emotion.”); Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal 
Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 655, 710 (1989) (pointing out that capital sentencing decisions always have 
some emotional grounds).  
366 See Paul Gewirtz, Victims and Voyeurs at the Criminal Trial, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 863, 878 (1996). 
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situation. Rather, emotions, being partly cognitive, are partly intellectual and can serve as 
guides to reasoned decision making.”367 
 It is undeniable that a death recommendation made by the victim’s family members at 
capital sentencing would speak to one’s emotions. The solution, however, is not to simply 
prohibit opinion testimony in death penalty cases. The emotional influence on the jury’s 
judgment could be always diminished by requiring that such a recommendation be presented in 
concise and unemotional legal language.368 Also, the trial judge could instruct the jurors that 
they may consider family sentencing opinions regarding the death penalty, but that it is 
ultimately the jurors who must make the decision of life or death.369 Finally, as the defendant 
can seek relief under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause when victim impact 
evidence is prejudicial enough to render the trial fundamentally unfair,370 the same safeguard 
can be applied to cases of unduly prejudicial sentencing opinion evidence. 371 
                                                          
367 Angela P. Harris, The Jurisprudence of Victimhood, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 92. See also Gewirtz, supra note 
366, at 878 (“[E]motions can open up ways of knowing and seeing, and can therefore contribute to reasoning . . . 
. Indeed, reasons are constituted in part by emotion, and are modifiable by emotion . . . . And emotions are often 
essential to the completion of a rational response.”). 
368 For example, the Oklahoma court placed the following test: “Any opinion as to the recommended sentence 
should be given as a straightforward, concise response to a question asking what the recommendation is; or a 
short statement of recommendation in a written statement, without amplification”. Ledbetter v. State, 933 P.2d 
880, 891 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997).  
369 Joseph L. Hoffmann proposes that at the close of the penalty phase, the trial court should be obligated to 
inquire each member of the victim’s immediate family about his or her opinion regarding the penalty to be 
imposed on the defendant. In the case of recommending death, the judge should then give the jury the following 
instructions:  
At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the victim’s _______, Mr./ Ms. ___________, was 
given the opportunity to make a gesture of mercy toward the defendant by asking that you, the jury, 
not sentence the defendant to death. Mr./Ms. ___________ chose not to make such a gesture of 
mercy, and instead expressed support for sentencing the defendant to death. You may take the 
opinion of Mr./Ms. ________________ into consideration in reaching your sentencing decision. 
Ultimately, however, the final decision concerning the defendant’s punishment is up to you, the 
jury, and you must make whatever sentencing decision you believe is correct. 
Hoffmann, Revenge or Mercy? supra note 346, at 536. 
370 Payne, 501 U.S. at 825 (citation omitted). 
371 See, e.g., Malone v. State, 168 P.3d 185, 209 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007) (finding that the trial judge committed 
plain error at sentencing phase in allowing a victim’s wife to present unduly prejudicial sentencing 
recommendation of death, in which she asked the jurors to show no mercy to the defendant and invoked the 
Bible suggesting that they had a religious obligation to give him a death sentence). 
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c. Permitting Sentencing Recommendations Serves 
Significant Interests 
 There are benefits that can be gleaned from giving family members of murder victims 
greater weight at the sentencing phase by allowing them to express their views on the proper 
penalty that the defendant should receive. First, this proposed approach would ensure 
adequate respect for those who are affected the most by the crime,372 and would reduce their 
feelings of powerlessness in the justice system, which would fulfill one of the goals of the 
victims’ rights movement.373 Further, allowing surviving family members’ voices to be heard 
may matter more to them than the outcome of the case itself, as it shows that the system cares 
enough to listen to them.374 Such involvement also would reinforce citizens’ reliance on the 
criminal justice process, about which the Supreme Court has expressed concern in a number 
of cases.375 In Gregg v. Georgia,376 the Court noted that capital punishment is “essential in an 
ordered society that asks its citizens to rely on legal processes rather than self-help to 
vindicate their wrongs.”377  
                                                          
372 See Susan C. Hascall, Shari’ah and Choice: What the United States Should Learn from Islamic Law About the 
Role of Victims' Families in Death Penalty Cases, 44 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV.1, 2 (2010). See also Stephanos 
Bibas, Forgiveness in Criminal Procedure, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 329, 338 (2007) (Having suffered the most, 
[victims] have the most immediate and concrete interests in the outcomes of their cases . . . . Of course, the state 
and society are interested as well, but it is odd to deny the victim even a share of the punishment.”) 
373 See, e.g., Edna Erez, Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Victim? Victim Impact Statements as Victim Empowerment 
and Enhancement of Justice, CRIM. L. REV. 545, 553 (1999) (“One of the major aims of the victim movement, 
and the driving force behind it, was to help victims overcome their sense of powerlessness and reduce their 
feelings that the system is uncaring.”); Hascall, Shari’ah and Choice, supra note 372, at 2 (noting that giving 
victim’s family the opportunity to provide their views about the appropriate sentence goes in line with the victim 
movement).  
374 See Hoffmann, Revenge or Mercy, supra note 346, at 537 (arguing that admitting survivor opinion evidence 
has “potential therapeutic effect” on the survivors). 
375 Logan, supra note 333, at 537 (pointing that advocates of victim sentencing opinion would likely make this 
argument). 
376 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
377 Id. at 183.  
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 One could argue that the purpose of the criminal justice process is to serve the interests 
of the society as a whole, and that it is not obligated to meet all the needs of crime victims or 
their survivors.378 However, “the victims’ rights movement has reminded us that crime 
victims are not like the rest of us; instead, they rightfully occupy a special place within the 
criminal justice system. Their opinions about . . . sentences should matter to the system, even 
if similar opinions expressed by the rest of us do not.”379 Additionally, permitting survivors’ 
death recommendations to be heard during sentencing phase does not usurp the sentencer’s 
duty to determine what penalty should be administered.380 This approach only suggests that 
the jury may take survivors’ views into consideration, but it will always bear the 
responsibility of making the final decision.381 At the same time, it should be explained to the 
family members that their sentencing opinions are only recommendations and the jury may 
not agree.382 
                                                          
378 See, e.g., Susan Bandes, When Victims Seek Closure: Forgiveness, Vengeance and the Role of Government, 
27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1599, 1606 (2000) (“Sometimes the legal system may be able to provide a punishment, 
or a result, that meets the individual’s needs for vengeance, forgiveness, closure . . . . But the legal system cannot 
and ought not meet such needs on a case by case basis.”); Hoffmann, Revenge or Mercy, supra note 346, at 541 
(One objection can be made against opinion evidence on the ground that, because the justice system is supposed 
to “serve the interests of society as a whole,” not the specific interests of victims or survivors, introducing victim 
opinion evidence during the penalty phase would not be proper).   
379 Hoffmann, Revenge or Mercy, supra note 346, at 541. 
380 See, e.g., Hascall, Shari’ah and Choice, supra note 372, at 7-8 (pointing out that permitting victim opinion 
testimony is not intended to replace the state, courts, or jurors’ authority--rather, it is intended to give survivors 
at least some say in the sentencing process by permitting their sentencing recommendations to be presented to 
the jury). But see Harris, supra note 344, at 93 (“[A]llowing the jury to hear families’ opinions, 
characterizations, and recommendations might impermissibly encourage the jury to shirk its ultimate 
responsibility for the death decision and simply act as the agent of the grieving family.”); Logan, supra note 333, 
at 544-45 (arguing that sentence recommendations in capital cases take over the role of the sentencing authority). 
381 Susan Hascall wrote:  
Even though murder is considered an offense against the state and juries have the power to recommend life in 
prison or death as the punishment for this crime, victims should not be prevented from at least advising the jury as 
to the punishment they believe is warranted. The jury still decides, guided by a host of factors. 
Hascall, Shari’ah and Choice, supra note 372 at 39 n. 232. 
382 Joseph L. Hoffmann stated that one objection to admitting survivor opinion evidence is that such evidence 
may “further victimize” the victim’ family when the sentencing jury ignores their expressed view about the 
proper sentence. Yet, mitigating such victimization is partially possible by “requiring the trial judge to inform 
the survivors--both before and after they express their opinions about the sentence--that even if their opinions do 
not produce the desired sentencing outcome, they have nevertheless played an important role in the sentencing 
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 While some families may want the defendant to be executed, others may be in favor of 
leniency. The next portion of the Dissertation focuses on mercy opinions in capital sentencing. 
 Victim Sentencing Opinions Calling for Life (Mercy Opinions) 
 Although families of capital murder victims know a common grief and pain, their views 
regarding the death penalty are not identical. Typically, survivors of murder victims want the 
person responsible for the death of their loved one to be executed. However, a significant 
number of surviving families are opposed to capital punishment for moral, religious, or 
personal reasons. According to the Tenth Circuit in Robison v. Maryland,383 Payne did not 
broaden the scope of relevant mitigating evidence to include evidence of a family’s opposition 
to the death penalty.384 Courts in most jurisdictions have also refused to admit survivors’ 
opinions advocating mercy towards capital defendants.385 
This portion will first examine the validity of victim sentencing opinions that 
specifically call for leniency. Then, it discusses why such opinions should be allowed in 
capital trials.  
 The Validity of Mercy Opinions after Payne 
 The leading case addressing mercy opinions was Robison v. Maynard (Robison I), 
decided in 1987.386 At that time, Payne had not been decided yet, and Booth was the 
controlling case law concerning the issue of victim impact evidence. In Robison I, an 
Oklahoma jury had convicted Olan Randle Robison of three counts of first-degree murder and 
                                                          
process by contributing their unique perspectives to that process.” Hoffmann, Revenge or Mercy, supra note 346, 
at 541. 
383 943 F.2d 1216, 1217 (10th Cir. 1991). 
384 See infra text accompanying notes 404-08. 
385 See infra notes 409-14 and accompanying text. 
386 829 F. 2d 1501 (10th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Romano v. Gibson, 239 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 
2001) (hereinafter Robison I). 
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sentenced him to death.387 The trial judge held an in camera discussion with the prosecutor 
and the defense counsel prior to the sentencing stage of the trial.388 The district attorney asked 
the court for an order instructing the victim impact witnesses not to “express any kind of an 
opinion, to be asked any kind of question or express any kind of opinion as to whether or not 
they feel the death penalty should be imposed.”389 In response, the defense attorney asserted 
that he had intended to call certain relatives of two victims who had “expressed to [him] a 
desire to ask the jury not to impose the death penalty in this case.”390 The defense claimed that 
such testimony would be proper evidence in mitigation of the death penalty.391 The trial judge, 
however, denied his request for the reason that permitting this testimony “would be no more 
proper than allowing the State to put on testimony that the penalty should be invoked.”392 
 Robison filed an appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 
challenging Oklahoma’s denial of state habeas relief for his three death sentences.393 He 
contended that the trial court deprived him of the right to present mitigating evidence, by 
disallowing a victim’s sister to testify that she did not wish the death sentence to be imposed 
upon him.394 Robison argued that, because retribution is one justification for capital 
punishment, the testimony of a victim’s relative opposing the death penalty would be a 
“strong” mitigating factor.395  
                                                          
387 Robison I, 829 F.2d at 1502. 
388 Id. at 1503-04. 




393 Id. at 1502. 




 The Tenth Circuit found that the testimony in question was irrelevant mitigating 
evidence and thus was properly excluded.396 The Tenth Circuit explained that under Lockett v. 
Ohio,397 mitigating evidence is limited to factors that focus on the defendant’s character or 
record, or any of the circumstances of the crime, and found that the proffered testimony 
related to neither.398 The testimony offered by the defense, according to the Tenth Circuit, 
“would be a gossamer veil which would blur the jury’s focus on the issue it must decide,”399 
and “was calculated to incite arbitrary response” from the jury.400 The court also pointed out 
that even under Booth v. Maryland, where evidence unrelated to the culpability of the 
defendant is prohibited, victim opinion testimony would not be permitted.401 
 Four years later, after the Supreme Court reversed its position on victim impact 
evidence in Payne,402 Robison decided to appeal his case again to the Tenth Circuit.403 Yet, 
even in Robison II, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s refusal to allow the evidence of 
family members’ opposition to the death penalty, by upholding the Robison I court’s denial of 
habeas corpus relief.404 The Robison II court held that Payne did not extend relevant 
mitigating evidence to opinions of victim’s relatives that the defendant should not be 
executed.405 The Robison II court observed that the Court in Payne allowed evidence 
concerning the harm resulting from the murder,406 yet “the desire of the victim’s relative in no 
                                                          
396 Id. at 1504-05. 
397 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978). 
398 Robison I, 829 F.2d at 1504-05. 
399 Id. at 1505. Robison I also pointed out that the admission of victim opinion evidence “would interfere with 
the jury’s performance of its duty to exercise the conscience of the community. Because the offense was 
committed not against the victim but against the community as a whole, . . . only the community, speaking 
through the jury, has the right to determine what punishment should be administered.” Id. 
400 Id.  
401 Id. 
402 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808. 
403 Robison v. Maynard, 943 F.2d 1216 (10th Cir. 1991) (hereinafter Robison II). 
404 Id. at 1216. 




way constitute[d] relevant evidence because it [did] not relate to the harm caused by the 
defendant.”407 Contrary to what the petitioner had implied, the Tenth Circuit indicated that 
Robison I was not decided in reliance on Booth; Booth only “supported [the Tenth Circuit’s] 
conclusion.”408 
 In the twenty five years that have elapsed since Robison II was decided, many courts 
have followed Robison I and Robison II and precluded capital defendants from introducing 
evidence of a survivor’s opposition to the death penalty during the sentencing proceeding.409 
For example, in Kaczmarek v. State,410 at the penalty stage, the victim’s daughter, Amanda, 
testified about her father’s character and the emotional effect his death had upon her,411 and 
intended to testify that she did not want the defendant to be sentenced to death.412 Yet, the 
trial judge held that Amanda’s opposition to the death penalty would be excluded.413 On 
appeal, Kaczmarek claimed that he was denied the right to present evidence relevant to his 
defense.414 The Supreme Court of Nevada disagreed, ruling that the trial court did not err in 
excluding the victim’s daughter’s opinion on sentencing.415 In response to Kaczmarek’s 
contention, the court noted that Amanda’s opinion regarding the proper punishment could not 
                                                          
407 Id. at 1218. 
408 Id. at 1217. 
409 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1351 n. 8 (11th Cir. 2006) (‘[I]t is immaterial that a family 
member’s opinion would have been offered in opposition to the death penalty, just as it would be improper if the 
expressed opinion supported the application of the death penalty.”); Ortiz v. State, 869 A.2d 285, 303 (Del. 
2005) (finding inadmissible the victim’s daughter’s direct opinion regarding her opposition to the execution 
of her father’s murderer); State v. Glassel, 116 P.3d 1193, 1213, 1215 (Ariz. 2005) (holding that the trial court 
did not err in precluding the victim’s husband from testifying that he did not want the defendant to be put to 
death even after the husband was allowed to present an emotional victim impact statement at the penalty phase 
of the trial); Perez v. State, 919 So. 2d 347, 376 (Fla. 2005) (finding no error in disallowing the victim’s family 
to testify that they opposed the capital punishment); Barbour v. State, 673 So. 2d 461, 468-69 (Ala. Crim. App. 
1994) (upholding the exclusion of a letter written by the victim’s brother requesting that the jury spare the 
defendant’s life). 
410 91 P.3d 16 (Nev. 2004). 
411 Id. at 22. 
412 Id. at 30-31. 
413 Id. at 31. 
414 Id. 
415 Id. at 31-32. 
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be admissible as mitigating evidence because it had no bearing on the defendant’s character, 
his record, or any of the circumstances of her father’s death.416 The court added that, giving 
victim’s family’s views on sentencing continued to be barred under Booth, the trial court 
could not admit the proffered testimony as victim impact evidence, either.417 
 Similarly, in an Arkansas case, the state court refused to allow the defense to present a 
letter from the victim’s wife expressing her desire to spare defendant’s life.418 In its analysis, 
the court stated: 
[I]f this court permitted forgiveness and penalty recommendations as victim-impact 
evidence, then it stands to reason that it must also allow any evidence of 
nonforgiveness by the victim’s family and any recommendation of a harsher 
sentence such as death. We cannot condone either brand of testimony as both would 
interfere with and be irrelevant to a jury’s decision on punishment. Indeed, such 
testimony would have the potential or reducing a trial to “a contest of irrelevant 
opinions.”419  
 
 In addition to prohibiting evidence of family members’ opposition to the death penalty, 
courts have also denied capital defendants’ requests to introduce evidence relating to the 
murder victims’ views against capital punishment, as related by their survivors.420 In People 
                                                          
416 Id. at 32.  
417 Id. at 32-34. “We join our sister courts in rejecting the proposition that opinions in opposition to the death 
penalty fall within the parameters of admissible victim impact testimony or rebuttal thereto.” Id. at 34. See also 
Engel, supra note 307, at 314 (noting that, in disallowing mercy opinions, courts have distinguished between 
victim impact evidence that “expresses ‘fact,’ on one hand,” and victim impact evidence that “expresses 
‘opinion,’ on the other”). 
418 Greene v. State, 37 S.W.3d 579, 583, 586 (Ark. 2001). 
419 Id. at 586 (quoting Robison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d at 1504). 
420 See, e.g., State v. Barone, 969 P.2d 1013, 1032 (Or. 1998) (holding that evidence of the victim’s opposition to 
the death penalty was properly excluded during sentencing phase); Campbell v. State, 679 So. 2d 720, 725 (Fla. 
1996) (ruling that the trial court did not err in excluding the testimony of the victim’s daughter that the victim 
was opposed to the death penalty); State v. Pirtle, 904 P.2d 245, 269 (Wash. 1995) (finding inadmissible the 
victim’s essay indicating her opposition to the death penalty because it did not qualify as mitigating evidence. 
nor as a victim impact statement). 
Some scholars argue that a Declaration of Life (a document signed by a death penalty abolitionist requesting, in 
case he or she is murdered, that the killer not be put to death, and that the document be made available to the 
jury) is relevant evidence at the penalty phase and, thus, should be permitted under Payne. See Engel, supra note 
307. The issue of whether the victim’s own opposition to the death penalty should be admissible is beyond the 
scope of this Dissertation. 
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v. Lancaster,421  the California Supreme Court precluded a murder victim’s friend from 
testifying about the victim’s own opposition to the death penalty.422 The defendant contended 
that the victim’s opinion on capital punishment should be admissible to rebut  victim impact 
testimony provided by his mother, brother, and daughter describing the effects his death had 
upon them as family members.423 The court, however, pointed out that rebuttal evidence must 
pertain to the content of the prosecutor’s evidence.424 “[T]here  is no material, logical, or 
moral connection,” the court stated, “between the effects of [the] defendant’s crime on the 
victim’s family and the victim’s views on capital punishment, whatever they may have 
been.”425 
  The next portion provides several arguments in favor of allowing mercy opinions in the 
sentencing phase of a capital trial. 
  Arguments for Permitting Mercy Opinions 
This section proposes that mercy opinions should be allowed in court based on several 
grounds. First, a defendant’s Eighth Amendment rights would not be harmed by granting a 
victim’s family members a chance to express their views against death penalty.426 Second, 
precluding a recommendation for a life sentence constitutes discrimination within the penal 
system against anti-death survivors in favor of pro- death survivors.427 Third, calling for 
mercy before the jury can be a family member’s best vehicle for achieving closure.428 
                                                          
421 158 P.3d 157 (Cal. 2007). 
422 Id. at 191-92. 
423 Id. at 191. 
424 Id. (citation omitted). 
425 Id. (citation omitted). 
426 See discussion infra pp. 74-79. 
427 See discussion infra pp. 79-84. 
428 See discussion infra pp. 85-90. 
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a. Mercy Opinions Do Not Harm the Defendant’s 
Constitutional Rights 
 If the Eighth Amendment, by forbidding cruel and unusual punishments,429  prohibits 
imposing the penalty of death in an arbitrary manner,430 then it is clearly meant to protect the 
interest of capital defendants in the criminal justice system. And, because mercy opinions 
obviously work in their favor, it contradicts common sense to believe that admitting such 
evidence would violate their Eighth Amendment rights. The Court itself states that “nothing 
in any of our cases suggests that the decision to afford an individual defendant mercy violates 
the Constitution.”431 In State v. Glassel,432 the defendant wanted the jury to hear the victim’s 
husband testifying that he did wish the defendant to be executed, claiming that even though 
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits death sentence recommendation “when the defendant 
objects to that recommendation,” it “cannot bar a recommendation of leniency when the 
defendant affirmatively wishes the jury to hear it.”433 Glassel also noted that “rights under the 
Eighth Amendment are the defendant’s to raise or waive, not for the trial court to impose 
against his will.”434 However, the Arizona Supreme Court did not find any difference between 
mercy opinions and those seeking death sentences, holding that “a victim’s recommendation 
of what sentence should be imposed in a capital case, whether for or against the death penalty, 
                                                          
429 “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
430 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).  
430 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972).  
431 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199. 
432 116 P.3d 1193 (Ariz. 2005). The Glassel court found no error in disallowing the testimony of the victim’s 
husband in which he asked the jury to spare the defendant’s life in a capital case. Id. at 1215. 
433 Id.  
434 Id.  
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is simply not relevant,”435 and “the Eighth Amendment prohibits a victim from making a 
sentencing recommendation to the jury in a capital case.”436 
 In capital cases, allowing the jury to rely on irrelevant evidence would inject an 
arbitrary factor into the sentencing decision.437 Hence, the lack of relevance to the sentencing 
process might be the main obstacle that stands in the way of permitting mercy opinions in 
court. It is well settled that a death sentence must be based on factors that have some 
relevancy to the defendant’s “personal responsibility and moral guilt,”438 and the factors that a 
jury may take into consideration in determining that culpability involve his character and 
record,439 the circumstances of the crime,440 and the amount of harm done to the victim’s 
family by his or her actions.441 With respect to mercy opinion, it has been determined that 
such testimony has no relevancy to the harm caused by the defendant’s crime and thus cannot 
be admitted as victim impact evidence.442 It has also been held that opinions in opposition to 
death do not fit Lockett’s definition of permissible mitigating evidence, either.443 A mitigating 
                                                          
435 Id.  
436 Id.  
437 See, e. g., Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502-03 (1987) (“[Victim opinion evidence] “is irrelevant to a 
capital sentencing decision, and . . . its admission creates a constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury may 
impose the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner.”) 
438 See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800-01 (1982). 
439 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978). 
440 Id.  
441 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (holding that evidence relating to the impact the murder 
had on the victim’s family is relevant to the jury’s sentencing determination); id. at 825 (‘[A] State may properly 
conclude that for the jury to assess meaningfully the defendant’s moral culpability and blameworthiness, it 
should have before it at the sentencing phase evidence of the specific harm caused by the defendant.”). It is 
important to note that, evidence of the victim’s character is relevant under Payne even though it is unrelated to 
the blameworthiness of the defendant. See id. at 827. 
442 Robison v. Maynard, 943 F.2d 1216, 1218 (10th Cir. 1991). 
443 Robinson v. Maynard, 829 F. 2d 1501, 1504-05 (10th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Romano v. 
Gibson, 239 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2001). Brian L. Vander Pol argues that:  
the exclusion of mercy opinions is not required by the rules of evidence regarding relevance. While 
the Court in Lockett did recognize the power of courts to exclude as irrelevant any evidence not 
relating to the character of the defendant or the circumstances of the offense, that courts possess this 
power does not answer the question whether they must exercise it. Simply because a court is not 
constitutionally required to admit mercy opinions does not mean that they may never be admissible. 
Vander Pol, supra note 291, at 725-26.  
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factor, according to Lockett,  is “any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the 
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than 
death.”444 
 In order to overcome the irrelevance obstacle, the definition of relevance should be 
expanded in capital sentencing proceedings. Many years ago, Justice O’Connor proposed a 
broader scope of relevance stating that “evidence, even if not relate[d] specifically to 
[defendant’s] culpability for the crime he committed, must be treated as relevant mitigating 
evidence if it serves as a basis for a sentence less than death.”445 Accordingly, because the 
introduction of mercy opinion may provide a chance of a life sentence instead of death which 
obviously does not compromise the defendant’s constitutional safeguards, such evidence 
should be considered relevant in capital trials.446 The rules of evidence are not sacred and can 
                                                          
It should be noted that testimony from a victim’s relative, who had a significant relationship with the defendant 
asking the jury to spare his life might find its way to court as mitigating evidence reflecting upon the character 
of the defendant. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 68 P.3d 302, 330 (Cal. 2003) (internal quotation marks citations 
omitted) (“[T]estimony from somebody with whom defendant assertedly had a significant relationship, that 
defendant deserves to live, is proper mitigating evidence as indirect evidence of the defendant’s character. This 
evidence is admitted, not because the person’s opinion is itself significant, but because it provides insights into 
the defendant’s character.”).  
444 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604. 
445 Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 381 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
446 One scholar suggests that the defense counsel might argue that victim’s family’s forgiveness is relevant under 
Virginia law as either mitigating or rebuttal evidence, as:  
[m]itigation evidence is “any evidence presented of circumstances which do not justify or excuse 
the offense but which in fairness or mercy may extenuate or reduce the degree of moral culpability 
and punishment.” In Virginia, evidence of victim impact is relevant mitigating evidence. Section 
19.2-299.1 of the Virginia Code states that the victim impact statement “may be considered by the 
court in determining the appropriate sentence.” Evidence that the family of a murder victim has 
forgiven the defendant is evidence which may extenuate or reduce the degree of punishment. Thus, 
under Lockett and Eddings, such evidence is admissible. 
Section 19.2-11.01 begins as follows: “In recognition of the Commonwealth’s concern for 
the victims and witnesses of crime, it is the purpose of this chapter to ensure that the full impact of 
crime is brought to the attention of the courts of the Commonwealth.” Although an understanding 
of “the full impact” of one crime might be had by means of testimony of the great impact the crime 
had on a family member of the victim, in another case such understanding might only be had by 
means of testimony of mitigation of impact as the result of forgiveness. The forgiveness of a family 
member is relevant to an understanding of “the full impact” of the crime, and thus defense counsel 
should seek to have it admitted as rebuttal evidence at the penalty phase of a capital case. 
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be revised. The Court itself has stated that, “when governing decisions are unworkable or are 
badly reasoned, ‘this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent.’”447 The standard 
of relevance that excludes mercy opinions could be reexamined,448 just as the Court 
reexamined and opted to change its position on the relevancy of victim impact statements to 
the sentencing phase in Payne.449 
 It is unquestionable that the risk of arbitrariness the Constitution intends to prevent in 
capital decisions arises when the evidence introduced is too prejudicial to the defendant. 
However, the risk of prejudice cannot exist with the testimony of a victim’s family that calls 
for mercy. It makes no sense to surmise that when a victim’s survivors testify that they do not 
wish to for the defendant to be executed, their testimony would likely encourage the jury to 
sentence him to death. Further, the absence of the element of prejudice calls into question 
courts’ reliance on Booth in support of banning mercy opinions.450 According to the Booth 
Court, victim opinion evidence is inadmissible because it “serve[s] no other purpose than to 
inflame the jury . . . .”451 Nevertheless, such rationale applies only to opinions recommending 
death, not those that call for leniency. Further, courts seem to ignore the fact that Booth dealt 
with victim opinion evidence in favor of sentencing the defendant to death,452 and that the 
                                                          
Paige Mcthenia, The Role of Forgiveness in Capital Murder Cases, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 325, 340-42 (2000) 
(footnotes omitted). 
447 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944)). 
448 See Vander Pol, supra note 291, at 726 n. 103 (suggesting a “lesser standard of relevance” to be applied by 
trail court in death penalty cases). 
449 See Payne, 501 U.S. at 817. Justice Stevens in his dissent to Payne’s holding, asserted that “the Court 
abandons rules of relevance that are older than the Nation itself . . . .” Id. at 858-59. 
450 See, e.g., Lynn v. Reinstein, 68 P.3d 412, 416 (Ariz. 2003) (citing Payne, 505 U.S. at 830 n. 2) (“Payne did 
not overrule and indeed left intact that portion of Booth that the Court itself has characterized as prohibiting 
victims from recommending a sentence in a capital case.”); People v. Smith, 68 P.3d 302, 330 (Cal. 2003) 
(same). 
451 Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 508 (1987) (emphasis added). 
452 In Booth, the victims’ children did not make specific recommendations regarding sentencing. Yet, they 
indirectly hinted at the punishment the defendant should receive. The victims’ son noted in his statement that he 
did not “‘think anyone should be able to do something like [the murders at issue] and get away with it.’” The 
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Court’s main concern was to avoid the “unacceptable risk that the jury may impose the death 
penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner.”453 Thus, instead of creating a special rule for 
the “uncommon” case of a victim’s family seeking forgiveness, jurisdictions have chosen to 
apply Booth’s ban to all sentencing opinions. 
  One could argue that perhaps mercy opinions cannot be inflammatory by logic, but it 
still can influence the jurors to make sentencing decisions on the basis of their emotions rather 
than their reasons, which would be inconsistent with the Court’s requirement in capital 
cases.454 Yet, the reasoned decision-making requirement is created to safeguard the defendant 
by precluding the jury from sentencing him to death based on emotion. Thus, if the jury 
decided to spare the defendant’s life instead, he would not need obviously such protection. 
The Court itself has noted that “[i]t is of vital importance to the defendant . . . that any 
decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than 
caprice or emotion.”455 Moreover, as long as the defendant’s constitutional rights are 
protected, a jury’s emotional reactions to a family’s recommendation of a life sentence should 
be considered reasonable, especially when the Court asserted that “‘sympathy’ is an important 
ingredient in the Eighth Amendment’s requirement of an individualized sentencing 
determination.”456 In State v. Glassel, the Arizona Supreme Court found no unconstitutional 
prejudice in subjecting the jury to powerful and emotional victim impact statements provided 
by the victim’s family who were “‘weeping during their presentations’” which made “‘at least 
half of the jurors come to tears,’” stating that it is not “unreasonable to expect that some jurors 
                                                          
victims’ daughter stated that she did not “‘feel that the people who did this could [n]ever be rehabilitated and she 
[did not] want them to be able to do this again or put another family through this.’” Id. at 508. 
453 Id. at 503 (emphasis added). 
454 See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987).  
455 Gardner, 430 U.S. at 358 (emphasis added). 
456 Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 513 (1990). 
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will . . . have emotional reactions when hearing the victims’ families’ accounts of the loss 
they have suffered.”457 Thus, if a jury’s emotions are understandable and not “harmful” in 
cases involving victim impact statements that could implicitly favor a death sentence, the 
jury’s emotions certainly would not be considered harmful when a capital defendant 
introduces evidence that a victim’s family is calling for leniency. 
b. Allowing Mercy Opinions Eliminates Discrimination 
Against Anti-Death Penalty Survivors  
 A victim’s family members who oppose the imposition of the death penalty on a 
murderer are not given the same space in the criminal justice system as the family members 
who support it. First, while anti-death penalty survivors are prohibited from conveying their 
desire for mercy to the jury,458 survivors who seek vengeance may use victim impact 
statements, which are intended to be another “method of informing the sentencing authority 
about the specific harm caused by the crime,”459 to express implicit opinions in favor of the 
death penalty.460 For instance, a victim’s wife’s impact statement in which she “demanded 
that the jury show no mercy to the defendant, and . . .  informed the jury that she intended to 
do everything in her power to see that [the defendant] received no mercy” has been deemed 
admissible.461 Also, in Payne, the State was allowed to make the following remarks about the 
                                                          
457 116 P.3d 1193, 1214 (Ariz. 2005). See also Bryan Myers & Edith Greene, The Prejudicial Nature of Victim 
Impact Statements Implications for Capital Sentencing Policy, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 492, 504 (2004) 
(“Jurors may become emotionally aroused in the presence of [victim impact statement] but nevertheless remain 
capable of rendering judgments that are not influenced by these emotions.”). 
458 See supra notes 409-19 and accompanying text. 
459 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991). 
460 See Engel, supra note 307, at 330 (noting that courts’ refusal to allow mercy opinion indicates to victims’ 
families that their desires for mercy “means nothing” to the court, even if their desires for vengeance would). 
461 See Witter v. State, 921 P.2d 886, 895-96 (Nev. 1996). See also State v. Worthington, 8 S.W.3d 83, 89 n.2 
(Mo. 1999) (approving the following victim impact testimony about the defendant: “I believe this man has 
caused enough chaos and I ask he be fairly punished for what he has done”). 
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double murders’ impact on Nicholas, the three-year-old survivor who lost a mother and a 
sister, during the closing argument, stating that: 
[t]here is nothing you can do to ease the pain of any of the families involved in this 
case . . . . They will have to live with it the rest of their lives . . . . But there is 
something that you can do for Nicholas. 
Somewhere down the road Nicholas is going to grow up, hopefully. He’s 
going to want to know what happened. And he is going to know what happened to 
his baby sister and his mother. He is going to want to know what type of justice 
was done. He is going to want to know what happened. With your verdict, you will 
provide the answer.462 
 
 Depriving anti-death penalty survivors of voicing their opinions before the jury forces 
them into several hard choices.463 They may provide victim impact information during the 
sentencing phase, to show the uniqueness of the victim and the how the murder of the 
deceased affected them, but without mentioning their opposition to capital punishment. Such 
participation, however, is almost always seen by the jurors as a way to support a death 
sentence, especially since the victim’s family members are, after all, the state’s witnesses.464 
Even a state supreme court has acknowledged this notion by stating that “[w]e are mindful of 
the possibility that some jurors will assume that a victim-impact witness prefers the death 
penalty when otherwise silent on that question.”465 Thus, despite the survivors’ desire for 
leniency, their involvement through the use of victim impact evidence would aid the 
prosecution’s effort to persuade the jury to vote for the death penalty.  
 Another hard choice that anti-death penalty relatives may be forced to make is whether 
to refrain from testifying during the sentencing hearing as victim impact witnesses. Yet, the 
                                                          
462 Payne, 501 U.S. at 815. 
463 A number of commentators have addressed how victims’ families have few good options with regard to their 
desires for leniency. See e. g., Beloof, supra note 335, at 295-97; Blume, supra note 187, at 279-80 (2003); 
Vander Pol, supra note 291, at 725. 
464 See Engel, supra note 307, at 324 (“[T]he entire structure of the victim impact stage creates a presumption in 
the jury’s mind that the victim prefers the death penalty.”). 
465 State v. Koskovich, 776 A.2d 144, 177 (N.J. 2001). 
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surviving relatives’ silence could make them feel disloyal to their loved one’s memory by not 
exercising their responsibility toward the deceased, and could deprive them of their chances 
for healing which could be obtained from testifying and confronting the accused in court. 
Additionally, the family’s silence also may be interpreted by the jury as in support for putting 
the defendant to death. One commentator has noted that “[a] procedure which inherently 
encourages one type of victim (who would recommend no death) to waive the right to 
participate in sentencing but not another (who would recommend death) is far from ideal.”466 
 A third choice for the survivors is to take the stand and use their victim impact 
testimony to covertly convey their desires for mercy to the sentencing authority.467 For 
example, to communicate her recommendation against death, one victim’s daughter related 
the murder in a way that was devoid of all emotions, referring to the accused as a 
“gentleman,” and mentioned her work as an advocate against capital punishment in response 
to a prosecutor’s question regarding her job.468 Although survivors who prefer to extend 
mercy to the defendant do suffer the same degree of pain for having lost a loved one as those 
who desire execution, according to the current system, they have to suppress their emotions in 
order to express their opposing view of the death penalty. On the other hand, family members 
favoring death do not experience the same difficulty in conveying their opinion because they 
do not need to hide their feelings of pain and suffering.469 In fact, the more they express such 
feelings, the easier it is for them to communicate their desire for vengeance. Thus, it seems 
that “the constitutional exclusion of victim sentencing recommendations merely screen[s] out 
                                                          
466 Beloof, supra note 335, at 296.   
467 See id. at 296; see also Vander Pol, supra note 291, at 725. 
468 See Beloof, supra note 335, at 296-97. 
469 Id. at 297. 
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those victims who are less capable of communicating their sentencing recommendations 
obliquely.”470 
 Second, many jurisdictions that ban opinion evidence seem to tolerate views that 
explicitly support execution.471 For example, in a case of a murdered police officer, the 
Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals found no plain error in the introduction of the following 
statements of the victim’s relatives: 
When asked by the prosecutor whether [the victim’s brother] was asking for the 
jury to recommend the death penalty for [the defendant], he stated that he was 
begging the jury—for himself, for his father, and for every police officer—to 
recommend a death sentence for [the defendant]. The victim’s father . . . also 
testified at the sentencing hearing and also asked the jury to recommend a death 
sentence, not only to vindicate his son, but to vindicate every law enforcement 
officer in the country.472 
 
 In another case, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the prosecution’s statement to 
the jury that the victim’s survivors “ask[] you to impose the death penalty” was improper, but 
further held that the statements had no prejudicial impact.473  
 Such tolerance toward death recommendations could be based on the fact that the jury 
expects a victim’s family to advocate for a death sentence.474 However, it should be 
imaginable that some family members may be against capital punishment and would not want 
the defendant to be executed. It is unfair to discriminate against anti-death penalty survivors 
experience in court and disallow their testimony on the basis of an assumption that all 
victims’ families desire vengeance. 
                                                          
470 Id.  
471 For states that prohibit victim opinion evidence, see supra notes 296-96 and accompanying text. 
472 Whitehead v. State, 777 So. 2d 781, 845-46 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999). 
473 State v. Middlebrooks, 995 S.W.2d 550, 558 (Tenn. 1999). 
474 See supra notes 330-32 and accompanying text. 
83 
 
 Third, victims’ survivors who advocate leniency may face discrimination even before 
taking the stand as witnesses. The state often favors relatives seeking execution over those 
who want to spare the defendant’s life.475 Victims’ families are not parties to the case, but are 
solely witnesses presented by the prosecution, meaning that the decision as to which family 
member will testify lies only in the hands of the prosecutor. Accordingly, while survivors who 
do not want the capital punishment imposed may be silenced or ignored because their 
interests are in conflict with the precaution’s goal,476 those who support execution will most 
likely be called to give victim impact statement.477 For instance, Oklahoma bombing victims’ 
families who opposed Timothy McVeigh’s execution were excluded from his sentencing 
hearing, and only pro-death penalty survivors were allowed to testify because “the 
prosecution wanted an execution.”478 In another case, a prosecutor filed a motion to prevent 
the mother of a murdered six-year-old boy from presenting a victim impact statement, and 
even from taking the stand at all, because of her opposition to death penalty, but at the same 
time, while simultaneously calling the mother’s bother, a death penalty supporter, to testify 
before the jury.479 The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the victim’s mother should not be 
                                                          
475 See, e.g., Charles F. Baird & Elizabeth E. McGinn, Re-Victimizing the Victim: How Prosecutorial and 
Judicial Discretion Are Being Exercised to Silence Victims Who Oppose Capital Punishment, 15 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 447, 465 (2004); Robert Renny Cushing & Susannah Sheffer, Dignity Denied: The Experience of 
Murder Victims’ Family Members Who Oppose the Death Penalty, MURDER VICTIMS’ FAMILIES FOR 
RECONCILIATION, 8 (2002); Megan A. Mullett, Fulfilling the Promise of Payne: Creating Participatory 
Opportunities for Survivors in Capital Cases, 86 IND. L.J. 1617, 1639 (2011). 
476 Brian L. Vander Pol noted that: 
[w]ith prosecutors under acute (and ever intensifying) political pressure to seek the death penalty,  
the families of murder victims who oppose capital punishment are being ignored. Despite the recent 
emergence of the victim’s rights movement, it appears such rights are recognized only when doing 
so would lead to harsher punishment for the capital defendant. 
Vander Pol, supra note 291, at 709 (footnotes omitted).  
477 “Without question, the powerful effect of victim impact evidence is an important tool for prosecutors to 
counterbalance mitigating evidence offered by the defense.” Baird & McGinn, supra note 475, at 464. 
478 See Bruce Shapiro, Victims’ Rights-and Wrongs, SALON.COM, (June 13, 1997), 
http://www.salon.com/june97/news/news970613.html. 
479 See Baird & McGinn, supra note 475, at 466-67 (2004) (footnotes omitted).  
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barred from testifying, but that her view of the appropriate sentence could not be allowed.480 
In a Texas case, the district attorney’s office cut off communication with the mother of a 
murdered twenty-year old girl and withheld information from her concerning upcoming 
hearings after learning about her view against putting the defendant to death.481  
 Because of the fact that anti-death penalty families are in conflict with the prosecution’s 
agenda, one commentator states that, “[i]t is too easy for such families to be relegated to the 
status of second-class victims. It is too easy for prosecutors to decide that such families are 
not really victims at all in the eyes of the law,” which strips them of all rights victims should 
possess.482 Accordingly, anti-death penalty survivors are being re-victimized—they are first 
victimized by the murderer, and later victimized by prosecutors and the criminal justice 
system.483 This discriminatory treatment by the state is not solely based upon the fact that 
mercy opinions contradict the prosecution’s typical agenda; it relies also on the courts’ current 
position of disallowing such opinions to come before the jury. The state could have never 
ignored or “silenced” anti-death penalty survivors, but for the fact that they were precluded 
from voicing their opinions in court. Thus, considering mercy opinions as admissible 
evidence in capital cases would empower anti-death penalty survivors and strengthen their 
position before prosecutors.484 
                                                          
480 Id.  
481 See Cushing & Sheffer, supra note 475, at 11-12.  
482 Id. at 8. “In fact, some states explicitly grant prosecutors the right to determine who shall be considered a 
victim of a crime. In Maine, for example, the Victim’s Bill of Rights states, ‘A person who is certified by the 
prosecutor to be a victim shall be considered a victim.’ In Oregon, the state Constitution defines ‘victim’ as ‘any 
person determined by the prosecuting attorney . . . . ’”  Id. at 8 n. 2. 
483 See, e.g., Baird & McGinn, supra note 475, at 447 (arguing that victim survivors who do not support capital 
punishment are being victimized again at the hands of the state and judges). 
484 See Bibas, supra note 372, at 338 (arguing that, even if the state holds the exclusive right to punish, it should 
take a victim’s interest in forgiveness into consideration). 
85 
 
c. Permitting Mercy Opinions Helps Meet the Need for 
Closure 
 Allowing mercy opinions to come before capital juries is beneficial to victims’ families 
with regard to the concept of closure.485 Helping survivors achieve closure has been used as a 
rationale for imposing the penalty of death,486 but not all families find healing in 
vengeance.487 Some survivors may seek recovery through forgiveness and the opportunity to 
forgive the murderer by calling for mercy in the sentencing stage.488 SueZann Bosler’s father 
was killed in front of her.489 Yet, she described the day she forgave her father’s murderer as 
“the happiest day of [her] life,” and added “I call that my day of victory. I pointed to [the 
defendant] and said, ‘I forgive you.’ I felt a sense of relief, and peace overcame me inside.”490 
Similarly, Bud Welch, a father of a twenty-three-year-old victim, who was killed in the 
Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, has forgiven the defendant Timothy McVeigh.491 Welch 
said that “I’m not going to find any healing by taking Tim McVeigh out of his cage to kill 
                                                          
485 Allowing murder survivors to make sentencing recommendations calling either for life or death provides 
several benefits in various aspects. See supra pp. 66-67. 
486 See, e.g., Vik Kanwar, Capital Punishment As “Closure”: The Limits of A Victim-Centered Jurisprudence, 27 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 215, 216 (2002) (“[T]he cultural production of a feeling of closure for the 
secondary victims has become, at least implicitly, an independent justification for the retention and enforcement 
of the death penalty in the United States.”); Marilyn Peterson Armour & Mark S. Umbreit, The Ultimate Penal 
Sanction and “Closure” for Survivors of Homicide Victims, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 381, 383 (2007) (“[T]he death 
penalty, though rarely implemented, is touted as bringing ‘closure’ to family members of homicide victims.”). 
See also Mullett, supra note 475, at 1627 n. 75 (“[Payne quoted a] prosecutor’s closing argument which 
specifically invoked the future needs of the surviving victim as a justification for imposition of a death 
sentence.”). 
487 See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 378, at 1599-1601 (noting that closure may be sought in different ways); 
Kanwar, supra note 486, at 245 (“[T]here is in practice no real distinction between families demanding 
execution so they can have closure and families demanding a different sentence so they can have closure.”). 
488 See, e.g., Hoffmann, Revenge or Mercy, supra note 346, at 539 (arguing that if it is accurate that “responding 
mercifully or forgivingly might be more conducive to the crime victim’s psychological recovery than continuing 
to harbor feelings of vengeance and anger,” then the family’s choice of forgiveness should be given “some 
weight” by the sentencer at the penalty stage). 
489 David Pallister, ‘Spare the Life of My Loved One’s Killer’: Murder Victims’ Families Speak Out Against U.S. 
Death Penalty, THE GUARDIAN, (Oct. 9, 1999), http://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/oct/09/davidpallister. 
490 Id. 




him. It will not bring my little girl back.”492 For other family members, merely advocating for 
mercy could bring them closure even with no forgiveness involved.493 The parents of a 
murder victim, Matthew Shepard, made a request that the prosecutor give the defendant, 
Aaron McKinney, two life terms in prison rather than pursue a death sentence if McKinney 
relinquished his right to appeal.494After sentencing, the victim’s father made the following 
statement to the court addressing the defendant:495 
I would like nothing better than to see you die, Mr. McKinney. However, this is the 
time to begin the healing process. To show mercy to someone who refused to show 
any mercy. To use this as the first step in my own closure about losing Matt . . . . 
Mr. McKinney, I’m going to grant you life, as hard as it is for me to do so, because 
of Matthew . . . . You robbed me of something very precious and I will never forgive 
you for that. Mr. McKinney, I give you life in the memory of one who no longer 
lives. May you have a long life and may you thank Matthew every day for it.496 
 
It seems contradictory to deny anti-death survivors their chance to find healing by precluding 
them from communicating their desire of leniency to the sentencing authority, then trotting 
                                                          
492 Id. 
493 According to some scholars, forgiveness and mercy are two different concepts in terms of “feeling” verses 
“treating”. See, e.g., JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY, 167 (1988), quoted in 
Mcthenia, supra note 446, at 330-31. Murphy and Hampton wrote: 
Mercy, though related to forgiveness, is clearly different in at least these two respects. First, to be 
merciful to a person requires not merely that one change how one feels about that person but also a 
specific kind of action (or omission)-namely, treating that person less harshly than, in the absence 
of mercy, one would have treated him. Second, it is not a requirement of my showing mercy that I 
be an injured party. All that is required is that I stand in a certain relation to the potential 
beneficiary of mercy. This relation-typically established by legal or other institutional rules-makes 
it appropriate that I impose some hardship upon the potential beneficiary of mercy. 
Id. 
494 Michael Janofsky, Wyoming Man Get Life Term in Gay’s Death, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 5, 1999), 
http://www.nytimes.com/learning/students/pop/articles/matthew-shepard.html. 
495 Id.  
496 JUDY SHEPARD, THE MEANING OF MATTHEW: MY SON’S MURDER IN LARAMIE, AND A WORLD 
TRANSFORMED 133 (Hudson Street Press 2009). In another case of leniency without forgiveness, a victim’s 
mother asked the prosecutor not to push for death penalty because she and the rest of the survivors did want a 
“sensational and lengthy capital murder trial. Instead, they wanted ‘closure and to get on with [their] lives.’” 
Stephen Hunt, Slain Son ‘Deserves More Dignity’; Mother Says Killer Should Die, But Agrees to Life-Sentence 
Deal; Mother Accepts Life Sentence for Murderer, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 16, 1997, at B1, quoted in Mcthenia, 
supra note 446, at 339. 
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out a family’s closure as one ground to justify the penalty of death. Some survivors renounce 
this reasoning by stating, “Do not kill in our names.”497 
 Scholars have refused the closure argument by contending that the “purpose of a 
criminal prosecution is not to heal the wounds of the victim, but to punish the offender. 
Oftentimes the two may coincide, but that cannot be the sole mission of justice.”498 
Interestingly, the legal system has recognized a family’s need for closure when they desire 
vengeance, by permitting the family to witness the execution of the offender.499 Yet, if the 
justification for such practice is that it delivers a sense of closure to the victims’ families,500 
the same need should be considered in cases where families seek mercy, as well. In other 
words, if surviving families’ relief is important, it should be important for all families, 
regardless of their stance on the death penalty. Accordingly, if voicing an opinion against 
imposing capital punishment is some survivors’ route towards experiencing closure and 
moving on with their lives, they should be given the right to voice those opinions within the 
justice system. 
                                                          
497 See, e.g., Thomas J. Mowen & Ryan D. Schroeder, Not In My Name: An Investigation of Victims’ Family 
Clemency Movements and Court Appointed Closure, WESTERN CRIMINOLOGY REV. 12(1), 65 (2011), 
http://www.westerncriminology.org/documents/WCR/v12n1/Mowen.pdf; RACHEL KING, DON’T KILL IN OUR 
NAMES: FAMILIES OF MURDER VICTIMS SPEAK OUT AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY (Rutgers University Press 
2003); Not in Our Name: Murder Victims’ Families Speak Out Against the Death Penalty, MURDER VICTIMS’ 
FAMILIES FOR RECONCILIATION, http://www.mvfr.org/no-not-in-our-names. 
498 Beth E. Sullivan, Harnessing Payne: Controlling the Admission of Victim Impact Statements to Safeguard 
Capital Sentencing Hearings from Passion and Prejudice, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 601, 639 n.15 (1998). But see 
Governor Mario M. Cuomo, The Crime Victim in a System of Criminal Justice, 8 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL 
COMMENT. 1, 20 (1992) (concluding that criminal justice system should aim to deliver closure to victims). 
499 “[I]ndividual vengeance is the ‘desire to punish a criminal because the individual gains satisfaction from 
seeing or knowing that the person receives punishment.’ This is the kind of satisfaction that a victim is supposed 
to experience when she is allowed to view an execution . . . .” Kanwar, supra note 486, at 240 (quoting Paul 
Boudreaux, Booth v. Maryland and the Individual Vengeance Rationale for Criminal Punishment, 80 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 177, 184 (1989)). In the Oklahoma City bombing case, more than 240 victims’ survivors 
watched the exaction of McVeigh. See id. at 245. 
500 See, e.g., Judy Eaton & Tony Christensen, Closure and Its Myths: Victims’ Families, the Death Penalty, and 
the Closure Argument, INT’L REV. OF VICTIMOLOGY, 20(3), 327 (2014) (noting that the “common justification” 
for allowing surviving relatives to view the execution is to bring them closure); Kanwar, supra note 486, at 242 
(arguing that witnessing executions are one of the most common routes that “courts and legislators, propelled by 
the Victims’ Rights Movement, have formulated ever more elaborate[ly]” to give victims a sense of closure). 
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The closure argument becomes even stronger in cases where the offender and the 
deceased victim are related, where the relatives of both are one and the same. Cases involved 
children of parents who kill one another may be the best example.501 Murder survivors in 
these types of case have already lost a loved one, and some of them may feel that the 
execution of another family member would make them suffer twice.502 In such situations, it is 
not unusual for some family members to be against imposing death, and allowing them to, at 
the very least, express their desire to extend mercy to their “related” defendant might reduce 
their grief and bring them a degree of closure. 
The possibility that survivors of one-victim crime or multi-victim crimes may be 
divided as to what sentence could give them closure is not a fatal objection to the approach of 
permitting mercy opinions.503 Survivors do not need to agree on the same sentence, rather, 
everyone should be able to voice their own opinions regardless of the others’ choices. At the 
                                                          
501 For instance, 
Felicia Floyd was [eleven] when her father murdered her mother in a drunken rage. Felicia’s father 
was on death row in Georgia for [twenty-one] years, during which time the family was able to find 
some reconciliation. Felicia and her brother pleaded with the state not to execute their father, but 
were ignored. The execution left them orphans. 
The Closure Myth, EQUAL JUSTICE USA, http://ejusa.org/learn/victims-families/. See also Ortiz v. State, 869 
A.2d 285, 302-03 (Del. 2005). The victim’s daughter wrote a mitigation letter to the trial judge for Ortiz, the 
killer of her mother, stating that “she would be in more pain if, in fact, he was put to death, and that taking 
another parent from her is not going to help her . . . . [H]e has been part of her life and, more or less, has been a 
father figure to her.” The court, however, affirmed the trial judge’s excluding of the daughter’s opposition to 
capital punishment from her statement. Id. 
502 See, e.g., Hascall, Shari’ah and Choice, supra note 372, at 44 (“Where the victim is killed by a family 
member, the negative consequences of the death penalty on the rest of the family are readily apparent.”). 
503 See, e.g., State v. Williams, 904 P.2d 437, 454 (Ariz. 1995) (involving murder survivors with conflicting 
recommendations on the appropriate sentence.) The victim’s sister recommended a sentence of life in prison 
because “she did not want defendant’s family to suffer the way her family had suffered.” Yet, the victim’s father 
and another sister requested death. See id. 
Another possible objection to authorizing mercy opinion is that the survivors’ need to heal is not always the 
reason behind requesting mercy. The survivors could have been influenced or even coerced by the defendant 
prior to sentencing. See, e.g., Hoffmann, Revenge or Mercy, supra note 346, at 542 (“[Allowing survivors’ 
opinion evidence] might provide a motive for the defendant (or a friend, family member, or the defendant’s 
lawyer) to contact the survivors, either before or during the trial, in an effort to influence their opinions.”). 
Capital defendants should be precluded from making any contact with the victim’s family regarding their views 
on the proper sentence. Id. Further, the court has the authority to determine whether the survivor’s testimony was 
voluntary or made under coercion. Vander Pol, supra note 291, at 729. 
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same time, it should not matter to the sentencer to hear survivors’ conflicting views because 
they are, after all, only recommendations. Additionally, the dangers of presenting the jury 
with conflicting recommendations could be mitigated by instructing the jury that the evidence 
of survivors’ opinions about the appropriate punishment should be taken into consideration, 
just as other evidence, and the jurors are the ones who are ultimately charged with making the 
final judgment.504  
 The criminal justice system should provide a place for mercy in the courtroom, and 
does not need to be “so cold, abstract, and impersonal.”505 In his dissent in California v. 
Brown,506 Justice Blackmun embraced the element of mercy in the imposition of capital 
punishment by the sentencing authority, stating that “sentencers should have the opportunity 
to spare a capital defendant’s life on account of compassion for the individual because, 
recognizing that the capital sentencing decision must be made in the context of contemporary 
values, we see in the sentencer’s expression of mercy a distinctive feature of our society that 
we deeply value.”507 In any event, even if capital jurors were prejudiced by the surviving 
family’s desire for leniency, the defendant would still be receiving a sentence of life 
imprisonment, which is inarguably a severe punishment as well. 
 Survivors of capital murder crimes deserve a stronger voice in the criminal system. One 
means toward accomplishing that end is to allow victim sentencing opinion evidence to be 
heard in court. Doing so would not only allow their views to be heard, but would further allow 
                                                          
504 Hoffmann, Revenge or Mercy, supra note 346, at 540-41. See also Joseph L. Hoffmann, Where’s the Buck?-
Juror Misperception of Sentencing Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L.J. 1137, 1157-58 (1995) 
(“[The trial judge should have] “a positive duty to try to impress upon death penalty jurors the responsibility they 
bear for the sentencing decision.”)  
505 Bibas, supra note 372, at 333. 
506 479 U.S. 538 (1987). 




them to remind the prosecutors and sentencers that behind the state’s case are real people--
people who suffered the most from the murder.  
Contrary to the minor role that capital murder survivors play in the United States 
justice system, victims’ families under Islamic law control the decision making in murder 
cases. Part III examines the family members’ participation in sentencing under Islamic law. It 





III. THE VICTIMS’ FAMILIES CONTROL THE OUTCOME OF 
CAPITAL MURDER CASES UNDER ISLAMIC LAW 
Islamic law is a religious law based on the Qur’an and the teachings of the Prophet of 
Islam, Muhammad ibn Abdullah508 Peace Be Upon Him (PBUH).509 Under Islamic law, 
homicide is a private claim between the victim’s heirs and the offender. Under the doctrine of 
qisas (equality in retribution), the family members of the murder victim have the right to 
choose the punishment that is to be imposed. They may choose to have the offender executed. 
Or, they may choose to collect payment of blood money from the convicted person and, in 
some cases, his or her family. They may even forfeit both. Pardon is well encouraged based 
on the Holy Book of Islam.510 Even though the victim’s family may pardon the offender, in 
lieu of diyya or for free, the state maintains an interest in punishing the offender and may 
inflict any penalty other than death as a discretionary punishment.  
The Qisas system of punishment existed in the pre-Islamic period (Jahiliyah (the Days 
of Ignorance)), where it was practiced by the Bedouin tribes on the Arabian Peninsula. 
However, Islam made some significant modifications to the old qisas system.511 First, Islam 
limits qisas to the life of the killer alone and abrogates the prevailing practice in the per-
Islamic era, in which other members of the killer’s tribe were killed by the victim’s tribe 
                                                          
508 SAID RAMADAN, ISLAMIC LAW: ITS SCOPE AND EQUITY, 52, (1970). 
509 Whenever Prophet Muhammad or another prophet is mentioned verbally or in writing, it is traditional for 
Muslims to follow it with the phrase “Peace Be Upon Him,” which is a prayer meaning “May the peace and 
blessing of God be upon him.” Praying for others is encouraged in Islam and, in this his particular prayer, 
Muslims follow the tradition set by God in the Holy Qur’an. Verse 56 of chapter 33 states: “God and His angels 
bless the Prophet– so, you who believe, bless him too and give him greetings of peace.” THE QUR’AN, supra note 
23, 33:56 at 270. 
510 Id. 5:45 at 72; 3:133-34 at 44; 42:40 at 314. 
511 See, e.g., JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 185 (Oxford Univ. Press 1982);  
RAJ BHALA, UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW (Shari’a) 1294-95 (LexisNexis 2011); MARKUS D. DUBBER & 
TATJANA HORNLE, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 258 (Oxford Univ. Press 2014); Safia M. 




which, in turn leads the killer’s tribe to murder members of the victim’s tribe in revenge. In 
other words, killing in tribal feuds was ultimately put to an end by the advent of Islam. As 
stated by one scholar: “The considerable restriction of blood feuds was a great merit of 
Muhammad’s.”512 
 Restricting the penalty of qisas to the murderer only is explicitly underlined by the 
Holy Qur’an where it states: “We [God] prescribed for them a life for a life.”513 In another 
Qur’anic passage, God prohibits the victim’s family from being excessive in qisas; “Do not 
take life, which God has made sacred, except by right: if anyone is killed wrongfully, We 
[God] have given authority to the defender of his rights, but he should not be excessive in 
taking life, for he is already aided [by God].”514 In addition, the principle of personality of 
punishment is well recognized in Islamic law. A criminal is responsible for his crime and his 
relatives or other people cannot be punished in his place. Verse 164 of chapter 6 provides that: 
“Each soul is responsible for its own actions; no soul will bear the burden of another.”515 
Similarly, it was reported that the Prophet (PBUH) said: “No person will be punished because 
of another’s crime.”516  
Second, prior to Islam, the Arab society did not observe equality in retribution--a 
stronger tribe would demand retribution in a form that it deemed more valuable, such as a 
man’s life for a woman’s, a free man’s life for a slave’s, or several poor men’s lives for the 
life of one wealthy, high-born, or powerful man. On the contrary, Shari’a abolished such 
                                                          
512 SCHACHT, supra note 511, at 185. 
513 THE QUR’AN, supra note 23, 5:45 at 72 (emphasis added). 
514 Id. 17:33, at 177 (emphasis added). See also id. 16:126 at 174 (“If you [believers] have to respond to an 
attack, make your response proportionate, but it is best to stand fast.”)  
515 Id. 6:164 at 93. 
516 IMAM MUHAMMAD BIN YAZEED IBN MAJAH AL-QAZWINI, ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF SUNAN IBN MAJAH, 
vol. 3, hadith no. 2672, at 533 (Nasiruddin Al-Khattab trans., Riyadh: Darussalam 2007), 
http://www.kalamullah.com/ibn-majah.html [hereinafter SUNAN IBN MAJAH]. 
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discrimination and insisted on equality. Verse 178 of chapter 2 from the Holy Qur’an reads: 
“You who believe, fair retribution [qisas] is prescribed for you in cases of murder: the free 
man for the free man, the slave for the slave, the female for the female.”517 Note, it should not 
be understood from this Qur’anic passage that a free man would not be killed for murdering a 
slave, nor that a man would not be punished for murdering a woman (or vice-versa). In order 
to appreciate the concept of qisas in Islamic law, all murder-related verses must be read 
together because they explain and complete each other. The Qur’an emphasizes that the soul 
of the human being is absolutely sacred in verse 151 of chapter 6, which states, “do not take 
the life God has made sacred, except by right.”518 Another passage from the Holy Qur’an 
provides that: “if anyone kills a person– unless in retribution for murder or spreading 
corruption in the land– it is as if he kills all mankind, while if any saves a life it is as if he 
saves the lives of all mankind.”519 Islam considers all lives to be equal, and whoever 
wrongfully takes the life of another person will be subject to a qisas punishment, based on 
verse 45 of chapter 5 which says: “We [God] prescribed for them a life for a life.”520  
The third improvement Islam made on the pre-Islamic version of qisas was 
introducing the concept of pardon (afw).521 The family of the murder victim may pardon the 
perpetrator by renouncing their right of qisas and take payment of blood money instead, or 
they may forgo both retributions.522 Based on verse 178 of chapter 2, qisas punishment could 
                                                          
517 THE QUR’AN, supra note 23, 2:178 at 20 (emphasis added). 
518 Id. 6:151 at 92. 
519 Id. 5:32 at 71. 
520 Id. 5:45 at 72 (emphasis added).  
521 See discussion infra Part III.C.  
522 The victim’s family is entitled to give the killer total forgiveness which includes remitting the right to blood 




be mitigated to blood money when a pardon is granted which represents alleviation and mercy 
from God to humanity. It sates: 
You who believe, fair retribution [qisas] is prescribed for you in cases of murder: 
the free man for the free man, the slave for the slave, the female for the female. But 
if the culprit is pardoned by his aggrieved brother, this shall be adhered to fairly, 
and the culprit shall pay what is due in a good way. This is alleviation from your 
Lord and an act of mercy. If anyone then exceeds these limits, grievous suffering 
awaits him.523 
 
Another Qur’anic passage indicates that forgiveness is better than demanding qisas, by 
providing that: 
We [God] prescribed for them a life for a life, an eye for an eye, a nose for a 
nose, an ear for an ear, a tooth for a tooth, an equal wound for a wound: if anyone 
forgoes this out of charity, it will serve as atonement for his bad deeds. Those who 
do not judge according to what God has revealed are doing grave wrong.524  
 
Also, as one commentator expresses, these “verses carry the spirit of reconciliation 
between the parties involved as opposed to the then prevailing custom in which everything, 
after the occurrence of murder, was calculated to escalate the enmity between the families 
involved.”525 
Finally, qisas was applicable to all homicide cases before the advent of Islam, which 
means it made no difference whether the victim had been murdered intentionally or by 
mistake. The Shari’a introduced the Arabians to the distinction between murder and 
manslaughter by establishing the element of intent (niyya).526 Qisas in the light of Islam is 
only implemented on intentional killers; cases of unintentional homicide are sanctioned with 
blood money. The verse 92 of chapter 4 reads: “Never should a believer kill another believer, 
                                                          
523 THE QUR’AN, supra note 23, 2:178 at 20 (emphasis added). 
524 Id. 5:45 at 72 (emphasis added). 
525 EL-SHEIKH, supra note 21, at 97. 
526 See BHALA, supra note 511, at 1291 (noting that since Islamic law recognizes the distinction between 
deliberate murder and intentional killing, the levels of criminal culpability, by no means, were developed first in 
the United Kingdom or the United States).  
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except by mistake. If anyone kills a believer by mistake he must . . . pay compensation [diyya] 
to the victim’s relatives, unless they charitably forgo it.”527  
 In addition to classical Islamic law, this study uses the application of qisas in the state 
of Libya to emphasize that qisas is not a mere theory of the past.528 Libya is a great example 
of a modern state that codifies and implements the law of qisas even though its legal system is 
largely influenced by Western legal concepts. The Libyan criminal justice system is mix of 
civil and religious legal systems.529 Specifically, it is based on Italian, and Islamic Law.530 
The Libyan Penal Code531 and Libyan Code of Criminal Procedure532 were drafted based on 
Italian codes and issued in 1953. Islamic law was not adopted for homicide crimes until 1994, 
when Law No. (6) of 1994 on the Rules of Qisas and Diyya (Libyan Law of Qisas and Diyya) 
was enacted.533 
 Under the Libyan Law of Qisas and Diyya, intentional homicide (first degree murder) is 
punishable by death unless it is waived by the heirs of the victim, in which case the penalty is 
blood money and life imprisonment.534 As for unintentional homicide (involuntary 
                                                          
527 THE QUR’AN, supra note 23, 4:92 at 59 (emphasis added). 
528 There are several contemporary countries that do not regard Shari’a as something of the past and formally 
incorporate Islamic criminal law into their legal systems such as Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the U.A.E., Libya, 
Sudan, Pakistan, Iran, Qatar, Somalia, and Northern Nigeria. RUDOLPH PETERS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN 
ISLAMIC LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE FROM THE SIXTEENTH TO THE TWENTY–FIRST CENTURY ix-x 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2005). 
529 See generally John L. S. Simpkins, Libya’s Legal System and Legal Research, HAUSER GLOBAL LAW 
SCHOOL PROGRAM, NEW YORK UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAW (Jan. 2008), 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Libya.html#_Legislation_(Codes,_Cases. 
530 Libya was an Italian colony from 1911 until 1943. Libya gained its independence on December 24, 1951. See 
Id.  
531 LIBYAN PENAL CODE (1953), 
https://www.unodc.org/res/cld/document/lby/1953/penal_code_html/Libyan_Penal_Code_Excerpts.pdf. 
532 LIBYAN CODE OF CRIM. PROC. (1953), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1444332.pdf. 
533 LAW NO. (6) OF 1994 ON THE RULES OF QISAS AND DIYYA, OFFICIAL JOURNAL, vol. 5/1994 at 118, 
amended by LAW NO. (7) OF 2000 ON REVISING SOME RULES OF LAW NO. (6) OF 1994 ON THE RULES OF 
QISAS AND DIYYA, OFFICIAL JOURNAL, vol. 15/2000 at 513. 
534 LAW NO. (7) OF 2000 ON REVISING SOME RULES OF LAW NO. (6) OF 1994 ON THE RULES OF QISAS AND 
DIYYA, art. 1. 
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manslaughter), the punishment is blood money.535 It is worth nothing that the Law of Qisas 
and Diyya repealed only Penal Code provisions that dealt with the punishment of two forms 
of killing mentioned above. Quasi-intentional homicide (second degree murder) is still 
covered by the Penal Code, for which the penalty is imprisonment for term not exceeding ten 
years.536 The Penal Code is also the binding authority regarding legal concepts such as self-
defense,537 attempt,538 and complicity.539 Further, the Penal Code’s classifications of murder 
as a felony and of involuntary manslaughter as a misdemeanor are still in effect.540 Finally, 
the Law of Qisas and Diyya constitutes solely substantive rules. Courts interpret these rules 
by following regular procedures that are proscribed in the Libyan Code of Criminal 
Procedure.  
 Since this Dissertation examines the role of the victim’s family in the punishment 
process, exploring the law of qisas in both Islamic and Libyan legal systems will not address 
aspects of the law that relate to criminalization It will concentrate, rather, on the punishment 
aspect of the law. 
 This Part starts with a main outline of Islamic law as an essential background to 
comprehend the qisas system of punishment. It will then explore the choice of qisas, in which 
the family of the murdered person wants the offender to be executed. The final portion of the 
Part will discuss pardon as the other option available to the victim’s relatives, which they may 
exercise if they wish to save the offender’s life. Each choice will be covered according to the 
                                                          
535 LAW NO. (6) OF 1994 ON THE RULES OF QISAS AND DIYYA, art. 3. 
536 LIBYAN PENAL CODE, art. 374; Al-Mahkamah Al-Uliya [Supreme Court], Criminal Appeal No. 1268/44 
(Dec. 8, 1998) (unreported) (Libya); Al-Mahkamah Al-Uliya [Supreme Court], Criminal Appeal No. 786/44 
(Dec. 1, 1998) (unreported) (Libya). See discussion infra notes 801-07.  
537 LIBYAN PENAL CODE, art. 70-73. 
538 Id.at art. 59-60. 
539 Id.at art. 99-104. 




rules of Shari’a and the provisions of Libyan Law of Qisas and Diyya along with the Libyan 
Supreme Court’s related rulings. 
 An Overview of Islamic Law (Shari’a)  
 The literal meaning of the word “Shari’a” is “a way to the watering-place or a path 
apparently to seek felicity and salvation.”541 By the advent of Islam, “Shari’a” has come to 
mean the way of life set by Allah (God) as the Qur’an itself indicates in an address to the 
Prophet Muhammad (PBUH): “Now We [God] have set you [Muhammad] on a clear 
religious path [Shari’a], so follow it. Do not follow the desires of those who lack [true] 
knowledge.”542 The Islamic Shari’a (Al-Shari’a Al-Islamiyah) refers to the divine law that is 
found in the verses of the Holy Qur’an and in the traditions (Sunnah) of the Prophet of Islam, 
Muhammad (PBUH).543 Islamic law is often used as a synonym for Shari’a.544 Yet, Islamic 
law is wider than Shari’a because, in addition to the Qur’an and Sunnah, Islamic law also 
encompass Islamic jurisprudence (figh), which consists of sets of guidelines, rules and 
regulations based on the Qur’an and Sunnah, made by successive generations of learned 
jurists, through interpretation, analogy, consensus, and disciplined research.545 In the interest 
of simplicity, both terms will be used synonymously.  
                                                          
541 MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, SHARI’AH LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 14 (Oneworld Publications 2008). 
542 THE QUR’AN, supra note 23, 45:18 at 325. See also KAMALI, SHARI’AH LAW. supra note 541, at 14 (“In its 
common usage, Shari’ah refers to commands, prohibitions, guidance and principles that God has addressed to 
mankind pertaining to their conduct in this world and salvation in the next.”).  
543 See, e.g., RAMADAN, supra note 508 at 52; KAMALI, SHARI’AH LAW, supra note 541, at 16. 
544 See, e.g., Michael J.T. McMillen, International Legal Developments in Review: 2007 — Islamic law Forum, 
42 THE INT’ LAW. 1017-32 (Summer 2008), quoted in (BHALA, supra note 511, at xix n. 8 (“[T]he Shari’a “is 
what commonly referred to as Islamic Law.”). 
545 See, e.g., Hascall, Shari’ah and Choice, supra note 372, at 56 (“The term Islamic law is broader than the term 
Shari’ah. Islamic law incorporates other sources of jurisprudence that include the works of the scholars 
interpreting the Shari’ah. This man-made gloss on the Shari’ah, is known as the Fiqh, or Islamic 
jurisprudence.”); Irshad Abdal-Haqq, Islamic Law: An Overview of Its Origin and Elements, 7 J. ISLAMIC L. & 




 To appreciate the mechanism of Islamic system and criminal law, specifically, four 
aspects will be discussed in the following sections: the sources of Islamic law, the Islamic Legal 
Schools of jurisprudence, the categories of offenses, and homicides.  
 Sources of Islamic Law  
 There are four sources of Islamic law. The first two form the primary sources which are 
the Quran546 and the Sunnah (the traditions of the Prophet (PBUH)).547 The Qur’an is the 
highest authority in Shari’a and, as such, it comes before the Prophet’s (PBUH) Sunnah. The 
secondary sources include Ijma (consensus of opinion)548 and Qiyas (analogical reasoning).549 
These supplementary sources derive from the Holy Qur’an and Sunnah and cover issues that 
are not explicitly regulated by the primary sources. 
a. The Qur’an 
 The Qur’an is the Holy Book of Islam.550 To Muslims, the Qur’an is the actual Word of 
Allah (God) as revealed directly by the Angel Gabriel to Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) over a 
period of twenty-two years from 610 A.D., when he was forty years old, until 632 A.D., when 
he passed away.551 The Qur’an was revealed in pure and clear Arabic language, as testified by 
                                                          
546 The Holy Book of Islam conveyed to the Prophet Muhammad PBUH from Allah (God) through the angel 
Gabriel. See discussion infra pp. 98-99. 
547 The Sunnah is what the Prophet (PBUH) said, did, approved, or disapproved of. See discussion infra pp. 99-
103. 
548 Ijma is an Arabic term referring to the consensus of the Muslim community on any matter. See discussion 
infra pp. 103-04. 
549 Qiyas is the deduction of rules by analogical reasoning. See discussion infra pp. 105-06. 
550 The term “qur’an” in Arabic is a noun which came from the verb “qara’a” which means “to read.” So, the 
word “qur’an” refers to the concept of reading or recitation. See BHALA, supra note 511, at 292. 
551 About the staged revelation of the Qur’an, Professor Raj Bhala wrote: 
Why did Allah reveal the message to Muhammad in stages over the last 22 years of the life of 
Muhammad? Why not transmit it all at once? The human mind cannot possibly know the purpose 
of Allah for the progressive revelation, but one possible explanation may be Allah sent the 
revelations in bits to allow mankind to comprehend it rather than overwhelming everyone all at 
once.  
BHALA, supra note 511, at 76. 
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Allah in the Qur’an where He said: “We [God] have made it a Qur’an in Arabic so that you 
[people] may understand.”552 Since the Qur’an is regarded as God’s revelation, it is superior to 
all other sources of Islamic law, and it can never be altered or overruled. The Qur’an contains 
114 suar (chapters) of unequal length and each chapter is composed of a number of ayat 
(verses). The Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) was illiterate, so prior to his death, he had every 
revealed portion of the Qur’an immediately recorded in writing by his Companions (Sahabah) 
who served as scribes.553 Muslims believe that the current text of the Qur’an is what was 
revealed to Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) without any change based on following verse from 
the Holy Qur’an itself: “We [God] have sent down the Qur’an Ourself, and We Ourself will 
guard it.”554 To Muslims, the Qur’an is a timeless code of life.555 Further, many Qur’anic 
passages are devoted to legal rules which cover various areas of law such as property, contract, 
family (including marriage, divorce, maintenance, and inheritance), and criminal law. 
b. The Sunnah 
 The Sunnah denotes to the method or tradition of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).556 
Specifically, it encompasses his sayings, actions, approvals, and disapprovals.557 The term 
“Hadith”558 refers to the narration of what the Prophet (PBUH) said or did, or his reaction or 
                                                          
552 THE QUR’AN, supra note 23, 45:3 at 316. 
553 See Abdal-Haqq, supra note 545, at 45; BHALA, supra note 511, at 80. 
554 THE QUR’AN, supra note 23, 15:9 at 162. 
555 See BHALA, supra note 511, at 78. 
556 In Arabic, the word “sunnah” means a path that people follow. See BHALA, supra note 511, at 302. 
557 There are three types of Sunnah. The first, Sunnah Qawliyyah (verbal tradition), which refers to the Prophet’s 
(PBUH) statements. The second, Sunnah Fiiliyyah (practical tradition), denotes the practices, habits, and deeds 
of the Prophet (PBUH). The third, Sunnah Taqririyyah, comprises the approvals (or disapprovals) of Prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH) regarding the actions of the Companions, by remaining silent or appreciating them. See 
Mohamad K. Yusuff, Introduction to the Development of Hadith Literature, (March 19, 2004), 
http://www.forpeoplewhothink.org/Topics/Introduction_to_Hadith_Literature.html. 
558 The Arabic word “hadith” means speech or report. See BHALA, supra note 511, at 302. 
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silence to something said or done by others in his presence.559 The Sunnah and Hadith are 
sometimes used interchangeably.560 However, the term “Hadith” is technically narrower than 
“Sunnah.” A Hadith is merely the recorded body of the Sunnah. Thus, every Hadith could be 
called Sunnah,561 but following the method of life by which the Prophet (PBUH) lived can be 
called only Sunnah.562 
 The Sunnah constitutes the second primary source of Islamic law after the Qur’an.563 
The idea that the Prophet’s (PBUH) tradition is a source of the Shari’a is supported by the 
Qur’an in several places. For instance, the verse 7 of chapter 59 states: “[S]o accept whatever 
the Messenger [Muhammad (PBUH)] gives you, and abstain from whatever he forbids you. 
Be mindful of God: God is severe in punishment.”564 Another Qur’anic passage shows the 
binding authority of the Sunnah, as it reads: “You who believe, obey God and the Messenger 
[Muhammad (PBUH)], and those in authority among you. If you are in dispute over any 
matter, refer it to God and the Messenger . . . .”565 It should also be mentioned that 
the Sunnah has come to supplement the Holy Qur’an as a source of Islamic law, based on the 
fact that the Prophet (PBUH) had the authority to interpret and explain the text of the Qur’an. 
                                                          
559 See, e.g., Abdal-Haqq, supra note 545, at 46; BHALA, supra note 511, at 302-03; Amin Ahsan Islahi, 
Difference between Hadith and Sunnah, http://www.renaissance.com.pk/jafelif986.html (last visited March 27, 
2016); Yusuff, supra note 557.  
560 See, e.g., EL-SHEIKH, supra note 21, at 32 (stating that Sunnah is synonymous with Hadith). 
561 The term “Sunnah” is used more to refers to the actions and practices of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and 
“Hadith” to point out to the Prophet’s (PBUH) sayings.  See BHALA, supra note 511, at 302-03. 
562 See Islahi, supra note 559 (“[T]he Sunnah of the Prophet [(PBUH)] . . . means the way of life which the 
Prophet [(PBUH)] taught the people in theory and practice and for which, in his capacity as a teacher of Shari’ah 
(Islamic Law) he laid down ideal standards leading to a life which one should meet to earn Allah’s approval 
through complete submission to His Commandments.”). 
563 EL-SHEIKH, supra note 21, at 31 (“Due to the characteristics of the Qur’an in terms of setting out general 
principles, many of its rules ought to be read in conjunction with the Sunnah in order to be put in their legal 
perspective.”). 
564 THE QUR’AN, supra note 23, 59:7 at 366. See also id. 4:80 at 58 (“Whoever obeys the Messenger 
[Muhammad (PBUH)] obeys God.”). 
565 Id. 4:59 at 56. See also id. 24:54 at 224 (“Say, ‘Obey God; obey the Messenger. If you turn away, [know that] 
he is responsible for the duty placed upon him, and you are responsible for the duty placed upon you. If you obey 




Such authority is established by the Qur’an itself, where it states: “We [God] have sent down 
the message [the Qur’an] to you too [Prophet], so that you can explain to people what was 
sent for them, so that they may reflect.”566 In other words, the Sunnah clarifies what the 
Qur’an leaves vague and further addresses some matters that are not mentioned in.567 
Nevertheless, the Sunnah cannot repeal or change a Qur’anic rule as explicitly stated by verse 
15 of chapter 10 as follows:  
When Our clear revelations are recited to them, those who do not expect to meet 
with Us say, “‘Bring [us] a different Qur’an, or change it.’” [Prophet], say, “‘It is 
not for me to change it of my own accord; I only follow what is revealed to me, for 
I fear the torment of an awesome Day, if I were to disobey my Lord.’”568 
 
 The process of reducing the Prophet’s (PBUH) Sunnah to writing did not take place 
until after his death.569 To avoid the possibility of confusing the Qur’anic verses with his 
Prophetic traditions, Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) precluded his companions from writing 
down his teachings.570 It was reported that the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) said: “Do not 
write down what I say, and whoever has written down anything from me other than the 
                                                          
566 Id. 16:44 at 168. 
567 See e.g., Kamali explains that: 
As a source of Shari’ah, the Sunnah enacts its rulings in the following three capacities. . . .  Firstly, 
it may simply reiterate and corroborate a ruling which originates in the Qur’an . . . . Secondly, the 
Sunnah may consist of an explanation or clarification of the Qur’an: it may clarify the ambivalent 
(mujmal), qualify the absolute (mutlaq), or specify the general (‘amm) of the Qur’an . . . . Thirdly, 
the Sunnah may consist of rulings on which the Qur’an is silent, in which case the ruling in question 
originates in the Sunnah itself.  
KAMALI, SHARI’AH LAW, supra note 541, at 24-25;  EL-SHEIKH, supra note 21, at 33 (stating that Sunnah 
supplements the Qur’an in two ways; either by explaining an exciting Qur’anic passage, or establishing a new 
rule for an issue about which the Qur’an was silent). 
568 THE QUR’AN, supra note 23, 10:15 at 129. 




Qur’an, let him erase it.”571 The complete collection of the Hadith was written two centuries 
after the death of the Prophet (PBUH).572 
To establish the authenticity of a particular Hadith, each one had to be linked to the 
Prophet through a chain of transmitters.573 The chain of transmission accompanying each 
Hadith is called “Isnad.”574 Hadiths are ranked according to their degree of authenticity, 
which is based on several factors, such as how many transmitters were involved in reporting 
the Hadith, their accuracy, and the level of consistency in the wording of the Hadith in 
various narrations.575 Several collations of the Hadith were formed-- the most famous books 
compiled by recognized scholars are: Sahih Al-Bukhari,576 Sahih Muslim,577 Sunan Abu 
                                                          
571 IMAM ABUL HUSSAIN MUSLIM BIN AL-HAJJAJ, ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF SAHIH MUSLIM, vol. 7, bk. 53, 
hadith no. 7510, at 400 (Nasiruddin Al-Khattab trans., Riyadh: Darussalam 2007), 
http://www.kalamullah.com/sahih-muslim.html [hereinafter SAHIH MUSLIM]. 
572 The History of Hadith, TRUE ISLAM, http://www.quran 
islam.org/articles/part_1/history_hadith_1_(P1148).html (last visited March 27, 2016). 
573 BHALA, supra note 511, at 308. 
574 Id. 
575 Id. There are four ranks of Hadith: 
The highest rating for a hadith, “mutawatir,” means that particular hadith is reported by many 
different sources. “Mutawatir” signifies the highest level of authenticity a Hadith can have. In effect, 
this denomination signifies the hadith has been highly corroborated. Thus, a hadith that is 
“mutawatir” also is known as “sahih,” which means reliable. In contrast, “hasan” is good, and 
“da’if” is weak. “Hasan” connotes the second highest level of authenticity that a hadith can have, 
meaning that the hadith has been corroborated, but not as extensively as is the case with a hadith 
that is “sahih,” and there are some discrepancies in the wording of the versions of the hadith. The 
third highest levels of authenticity, da’if, signifies a hadith that is weak. Such a hadith is not widely 
corroborated, and contains some uncertainty or flaw, such as an interruption in the chain of 
transmission (isnad) or a transmitter in it (rawi) is unknown. Finally, a hadith considered “mawdua” 
is fabricated. 
Id. at 308-09. 
576 THE TRANSLATION OF THE MEANINGS OF SAHIH AL-BUKHARI (Muhammad Muhsin Khan trans., Riyadh: 
Darussalam 1997), http://www.kalamullah.com/sahih-bukhari.html [hereinafter SAHIH AL-BUKHARI]. 




Dawood,578 Sunan Ibn Majah,579 Jami’ At-Tirmidhi,580 and Sunan An-Nasa’I.581 The first two 
compilations (Sahih Al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim), though, are acknowledged by all Muslim 
scholars as the most accurate, authentic and reliable Hadith collections.582  
c. The Ijma (Consensus of Opinion) 
 The fact that not all questions are answered in the Qur’an and the Sunnah raised the 
need for another source of Islamic law to face novel legal issues that arise over time. Ijma was 
developed to be the new secondary authority of the Shari’a.583 The literal meaning of “Ijma” 
in Arabic is “unanimous agreement” or “consensus”.584 In the context of Islamic law, Ijma 
refers to the consensus  of the Muslim community, specifically Muslim jurists on any Islamic 
principle.585 When Muslim scholars reach a unanimous agreement on a matter, it becomes a 
                                                          
578 IMAM HAFIZ ABU DAWUD SULAIMAN BIN ASH’ATH, ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF SUNAN ABU DAWUD 
(Nasiruddin al-Khattab trans., Riyadh: Darussalam 2008), http://www.kalamullah.com/sunan-abu-dawood.html 
[hereinafter, SUNAN ABU DAWUD]. 
579 SUNAN IBN MAJAH, supra note 516. 
580 IMAM HAFIZ ABU EISA MOHAMMAD IBN EISA AT-TIRMIDHI, ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF JAMI’ AT-TIRMIDHI 
(Abu Khaliyl trans., Riyadh: Darussalam 2007), http://www.kalamullah.com/jami-at-tirmidhi.html [hereinafter, 
JAMI’ AT-TIRMIDHI]. 
581 IMIM HIFIZ ABO ABDUR RAHMIN AHMAD BIN SHU’AIB BIN ALI AN-NASA’I, ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF 
SUNAN AN-NASA’I (Nasiruddin Al-Khattab trans., Riyadh: Darussalam 2007), 
http://www.kalamullah.com/sunan-an-nasai.html [hereinafter, SUNAN AN-NASA’I]. 
582See An Introduction To The Science Of Hadith, The Classification Of Hadith: According To The Reliability 
And Memory Of Reporters, ISLAMIC AWARENESS, http://www.islamic-awareness.org/Hadith/Ulum/asb7.html 
(last visited March 27, 2016) (explaining that, among all of the Hadith’s collectors, Imams Al-Bukhari and 
Muslim were highly admired because of their effort not to add anything other than the sahih (sound or reliable) 
Hadith to their collections). 
583 See e.g., MATTHEW LIPPMAN, SEAN MCCONVILLE & MORDECHAI YERUSHALMI, ISLAMIC CRIMINAL LAW 
AND PROCEDURE: AN INTRODUCTION 32 (1988) (asserting that Ijma is a very good source of law which makes it 
possible to apply Shari’a to contemporary situations); John Makdisi, Islamic Law Bibliography, 78 L. LIBR. J., 
103, 106 (1986) (“[I]jma became a device for confirming a point of law not explicitly stated in the Koran and 
sunna.”). See generally AHMAD HASAN, THE DOCTRINE OF IJMA’: A STUDY OF THE JURIDICAL PRINCIPLE OF 
CONSENSUS (New Delhi, Kitab Bhaban 2003); Mohammad Omar Farooq, The Doctrine of Ijma: Is there a 
consensus? (2006); Ahmad Shafaat, The Meaning of Ijma’, ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVES (1984), 
http://www.islamicperspectives.com/meaningofijma.htm (last visited March 28, 2016). 
584 The word “ijma” is a noun derived from the verb “ajma’a,” which has two meanings: to determine and to 
agree upon. Shah Abdul Hannan, Ijma (Consensus Of Opinion), ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE, 
http://www.muslimtents.com/aminahsworld/islamic_jurisprudence_ijma.html (last visited March 27, 2016). 
585 See e.g., MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 231 (Cambridge, The 
Islamic Text Society, 2003) (“[Ijma is] the unanimous agreement of the mujtahidun [highly educated individuals 
who are qualified to exercise ijtihad  (independent reasoning) to interpret Islamic law in practical contexts] of the 
Muslim community of any period following the demise of the Prophet Muhammad [PBUH] on any matter.”); 
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binding law after the Qur’an and the Sunnah. It should be noted that Ijma existed only after 
the demise of the Prophet (PBUH) because before that, the Prophet (PBUH) himself resolved 
any cases that required interpretation of God’s Will.586 Although Ijma is based on human 
analysis rather than divine revelation, it should be supported by the Quran or the Sunnah, or at 
least consistent with them. The legal precedents that are formed through Ijma must never 
violate rulings provided by the primary sources of the Shari’a.  
 Muslim jurists find basis for the Doctrine of Ijma in Qur’anic passages and Prophetic 
tradition. The Holy Qur’an, verse 110 of chapter 3, for instance, states: “[Believers], you are 
the best community singled out for people: you order what is right, forbid what is wrong, and 
believe in God.”587 Another Qur’anic verse provides: “Far better and more lasting is what God 
will give to those who . . .  conduct their affairs by mutual consultation . . . .”588 The Prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH) is also reported to have said: “My nation will not unite on misguidance 
[wrong or error.]”589 Finally, as one commentator said:  
[I]jma’ can be hard to pin-point, and even once it is identified, hard to find. Ijma’ 
is not a statute that is codified in a library in Medina [the second-holiest city 
in Islam after Mecca which both are located in Saudi Arabia], it is the practice and 
the common, consistent application of Islamic norms to problems. Evidence of 
[I]jma’ is found in rulings and possibly rationales of some courts, much like 
American case law.590  
                                                          
Makdisi, supra note 583, at 106 (“Although theoretically consensus was taken from the community of Muslims, 
it eventually devolved on the legal scholars to form the consensus.”). 
586 BHALA, supra note 511, at 317. 
587 THE QUR’AN, supra note 23, 3: 110 at 42. 
588 Id. 42:37-38 at 314 (emphasis added). 
589 JAMI’ AT-TIRMIDHI, supra note 580, vol. 5, bk. 36, hadith no. 3950, at 174-75. 
590 BHALA, supra note 511, at 319. 
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d. The Qiyas (Analogical Reasoning) 
 The forth source of Islamic law is Qiyas.591 Like Ijma, Qiyas was adopted after the 
death of the Prophet (PBUH) to meet the rising needs of modern Islamic society, where there 
was no clear guidance available in the primary authorities of Shari’a. Qiyas is “the deduction 
of legal prescriptions from the Quran or Sunnah by analogic reasoning.”592 Expressed 
differently, Qiyas is a process of applying an established ruling from the Qur’an or Sunnah to 
a new problem that was not addressed by the revealed law, provided that the precedent and 
the new problem share the same legal reason called (illa).593 The illa is legal rationale behind 
creating the rule.594 A common example for illa and for the use of Qiyas is the expansion of 
the express Qur’anic prohibition against alcohol to narcotics.595 Alcohol is banned because it 
intoxicates the mind and impairs the user’s control of his or her actions. Since narcotic 
substances affect the human mind in the same way--thus, narcotics are also prohibited by the 
use of analogy. Technically, the method of Qiyas does not create law; it merely extends the 
existing textual ruling to the emerging cases. At least one Prophetic tradition has been 
invoked to support the use of analogical reasoning. It was narrated that: 
                                                          
591 Qiyas in Arabic is literally translated as measurement. Id. at 319. See generally TAJUDEEN MUHAMMED B. 
ADIGUN, THE RELEVANCE OF QIYAS (ANALOGICAL DEDUCTION) AS A SOURCE OF ISLAMIC LAW IN 
CONTEMPORARY TIME (Zaria, Ahmadu Bello Univ. 2004), 
http://kubanni.abu.edu.ng:8080/jspui/bitstream/123456789/3931/1/Relevance%20of%20Qiyas%20in%20Islamic
%20Law%20in%20the%20Contemporary%20World.pdf; Mohammad Omar Farooq, Qiyas (Analogical 
Reasoning) and Some Problematic Issues in Islamic law (2006). 
592 Qiyas, OXFORD ISLAMIC STUDIES ONLINE, 
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1936?_hi=0&_pos=4943 (last visited March 30, 2016). 
See also BHALA, supra note 511, at 319 (“[Qiyas is] the practice of ‘measuring’ a rule given in the Qur’an or 
Sunnah and applying it analogically to new, yet similar, set of facts.”). 
593 See also MUHAMMAD MUSLEHUDDIN, PHILOSOPHY OF ISLAMIC LAW AND THE ORIENTALISTS: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ISLAMIC LEGAL SYSTEM 135 (Lahore, Pakistan, Kazi Publications 1985) (“The 
function of qiyas is to discover the cause or illa[] of the revealed law so as to extend it to similar cases.”). 
594 See also Qiyas, OXFORD ISLAMIC STUDIES ONLINE, supra note 592 (“The illa is the specific set of 
circumstances that trigger a certain law into action.”). 
595 See THE QUR’AN, supra note 23, 5: 90 at 76 (“You who believe, intoxicants and gambling . . . are repugnant 
acts– Satan’s doing– shun them so that you may prosper.”). 
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A man came to the Prophet [(PBUH)] and said: “Messenger of Allah, my mother 
has died and she owed one month’s fasting. Shall I make it up on her behalf?” He 
said: “Don’t you think that if your mother owed a debt, you would pay it off on her 
behalf?” He said: “Yes.” He said: “The debt owed to Allah is more deserving of 
being paid off.”596 
 
 By using analogical deduction, the Prophet (PBUH) in the Hadith quoted above 
extended the obligation of paying a debt that was owed to a human to that owed to Allah 
(fasting). The Doctrine of Qiyas can be also supported by rational reasoning. As one scholar 
explained:  
The express textual injunctions in the Qur’an and the Sunnah are limited in number, 
while the incidents and problems of life are unlimited and unending. Hence, it 
would be illogical to assert that all the problems and exigencies of life will be 
covered by the textual injunctions. Reason demands that rules of law should be 
derived from the fundamental sources by means of exercising reason and individual 
opinion. Qiyas therefore is a mode of reasoning to legislate for novel questions, to 
reveal the divine rule of law, and to harmonize between divine legislation and 
human interests.597 
 
 Different understandings and analyzations of Shari’a sources by Muslim jurists have 
formed the body of Islamic jurisprudence. The next section provides a brief look at the major 
Islamic schools of jurisprudence. 
 The Islamic Schools of Jurisprudence 
 Not all revealed rules are clear and definite. The varying interpretations of the imprecise 
injunctions in the sources of Shari’a led to the development of Islamic jurisprudence, or in 
Arabic, “fiqh.” Islamic jurisprudence can be defined as “the body of rules and decisions 
deduced from the sources of the Shari’a by the jurists concerning matters of a complex 
nature.”598  
                                                          
596 SAHIH MUSLIM, supra note 571, vol. 3, bk. 13, hadith no. 2694, at 216. 
597 ADIGUN, supra note 591, at 127.            




 Islamic jurisprudence is formed through several legal Schools of thought called 
“madhahib.” A legal School or madhhab can be defined as: 
[A] body of doctrine taught by a leader, or imam, and followed by the members of 
that school. The imam must be a leading mujtahid, one who is capable of exercising 
independent judgment. In his teaching, the imam must apply original methods and 
principles which are peculiar to his own school, independent of others. A madhhab 
must also have followers who assist their leader in the elaboration and 
dissemination of his teachings. A madhhab does not imply, however, a definite 
organization, formal teaching, or an official status, nor is there a strict uniformity 
of doctrine within each madhhab.599 
 
 These Schools agree on the principles of Islamic law, but they differ in the way they 
apply them in reaching their decisions. Accordingly, each School has ended up with different 
rules and regulations. Muslims are free to follow the interpretations of any School.600 Further, 
Muslim people may either stick to the teachings of only one School, or embrace different 
Schools for different issues. There are four major Sunnite Schools of thought established by 
four Muslim jurists who lived in the first three centuries of Islam:601  
 Hanafi School, which was formed by Abu Hanifa Al-No’man (Imam Abu 
Hanifa) (699-787 A.D.);602 
 Maliki School, which was founded by Malik ibn Anas Al-Asbahi (Imam Malik) 
(710-795 A.D.);603 
                                                          
599 KAMALI, SHARI’AH LAW, supra note 541, at 68. 
600 See BHALA, supra note 511, at 391 (noting that Muslim people are entitled to follow the opinions of any 
School among the Four Schools, even if the school they choose was not adopted School by the jurisdiction in 
which they live). 
601 See generally KAMALI, SHARI’AH LAW, supra note 541, at 68-87; BHALA, supra note 511, at 388- 407; 
Abdal-Haqq, supra note 545, at 69-74; Safwat, supra note 511, at 149-53. 
602 BHALA, supra note 511, at 389, tbl. 16-1. The Hanafi School is predominant amongst the people of 
Afghanistan, Guyana, India, Iraq, Pakistan, Suriname, Syria, Trinidad, and Turkey. Abdal-Haqq, supra note 545, 
at 69.  
603 BHALA, supra note 511, at 389, tbl. 16-1. Followers of the Maliki School are found principally in Libya, 
Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Chad, Mali, Nigeria, Kuwait, and Qatar. Abdal-Haqq, supra note 545, at 70-71. 
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 Shafi‘i School, which was established by Muhammad ibn Idris ibn Al-Abbas ibn 
Uthman ibn Al-Shafi’i (Imam Al-Shafi’i) (768- 820 A.D.)604 and; 
 Hanbali School, which was created by Ahmad ibn Hanbal (Imam Ibn Hanbal) 
(780- 855 A.D.).605 
 According to Muslim jurists, there are three types of criminal acts: the hudud, qisas, and 
ta’zir. The following section will briefly examine the taxonomy of offense in Islamic criminal 
law. 
 Classification of Crimes in Islamic Law 
 Under Islamic penal law, offenses are classified based on the applicable punishments. 
Shari’a recognizes three kinds of penalties: hudud, qisas, and ta’zir.606 Therefore, crimes are 
divided into three categories known by the same terms.607 
a. Hudud Crimes 
 Hudud crimes are those with fixed penalties as set forth in either the Qur’an or 
Sunnah.608 The term “hadd” (the singular form of hudud) means “limit” which in the context 
of Islamic law refers to the limit set by the leveled law.609 The hudud crimes are considered to 
be the most serious. They are perceived to be offenses that not only harm people and the 
public order, but more significantly, crimes against God, and punishing the offender is 
                                                          
604 BHALA, supra note 511, at 389, tbl. 16-1. The adherents of this School are predominantly in Egypt, Indonesia, 
Kenya, Malaysia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Yemen. Abdal-Haqq, supra note 545, at, 71. 
605 BHALA, supra note 511, at 389, tbl.16-1. The Hanbali School is followed in Saudi Arabia. Abdal-Haqq, supra 
note 545, at 72. 
606 See generally NAGATY SANAD, THE THEORY OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN ISLAMIC LAW: 
SHARI’A 50-57 (Office of International Criminal Justice, Univ. of Illinois 1991); Matthew Lippman, Islamic 
Criminal Law and Procedure: Religious Fundamentalism v. Modern Law, 12 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 29, 
38-45 (1989). 
607 “Hudud,” for example, is uses to refer to “crimes” and “punishments.” The same applies to “qisas” and 
ta’zir.” 
608 See generally PETERS, supra note 528, at 53-65; Robert Postawko, Towards an Islamic Critique of Capital 
Punishment, 1 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 269, 286-300 (2002). 
609 See BHALA, supra note 511, at 1175. 
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deemed as the claim of God, or “haqq Allah.”610 As such, the punishment proscribed for these 
acts cannot be amended, altered, commuted, substituted, or pardoned.611 There are seven 
Hudud offences: adultery or unlawful sexual intercourse (zina), false accusation of unlawful 
sexual intercourse (qadhf), consuming alcohol (shrub al-khamr), theft (sariqah), highway 
robbery (qat’ al-tariq or hirabah), apostasy (riddah), and rebellion (Baghi).612 In the hudud 
crimes, if one or more of the requirements for imposing the fixed punishment are not fulfilled, 
the state may punish the offender with a ta’zir (discretionary) sanction.613 
b. Qisas Crimes 
 The Qisas category encompasses offenses that have sanctions specified in the Qur’an 
and Sunnah, but are considered claims of man (privet claims)--known in Arabic as haqq 
adami-- rather than God’s claims.614 The penalties for such crimes are similar to hudud 
penalties, in the sense of being restricted in the reveled law, meaning that they cannot be 
changed. Yet, what distinguishes a qisas penalty from a hudud penalty is that it may be 
waived by the rightful claimant. Qisas are crimes against the individual, and include homicide 
and bodily injury.615 After hudud, the category of qisas contains the most severe crimes; 
                                                          
610 See PETERS, supra note 528, at 54 (“Since the objective of hadd penalties is to protect public interest, they are 
labeled as claims of God.”). 
611 As El-Awa wrote: 
In the penal context, a punishment which is classified as haqq Allah embodies three main aspects. 
The first is that this punishment is prescribed in the public interest; the second is that it cannot be 
lightened nor made heavier; and the third is that, after being reported to the judge, it is not to be 
pardoned either by him, by the political authority, or by the victim of the offense.  
MOHAMED SALEM EL-AWA, PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 1 (Indianapolis, American 
Trust Publications 1981). 
612 Safwat, supra note 511, at 154.    
613 See DUBBER & HORNLE, supra note 511, at 262. See infra text accompanying note 624. 
614 The word “qisas” in Arabic literally means “equivalence” or “equality.” See generally Postawko, supra note 
608, at 300-05; Lippman, supra note 606, at 43-44.   
615 Islamic law recognizes various types of homicide. See discussion infra pp. 111-14. 
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especially, murder, which is explicitly classified as a capital offense by the Holy Qur’an.616 
Qisas crimes harm the victims along with the community. Thus, in case of pardon by the 
victim (or their family), the state is entitled to execute a discretionary punishment (ta’zir) in 
the interest of maintaining public order.617 
c. Ta’zir Crimes 
 The last category of crimes is ta’zir.618 This category involves conducts that are not 
included under hudud or qisas.619 The ta’zir offenses are wrongs against persons or society for 
which no penalty is set in the Qur’an or Sunnah; rather, it is left to the discretion of the state. 
Most crimes that Shari’a recognizes are ta’zir offenses.620 At the present time, ta’zir crimes 
and punishments are regulated in a criminal code in nearly all Islamic countries.621 Ta’zir 
offenses are generally forbidden by either the Qur’an or the Sunnah, such as perjury, sodomy, 
gambling, and bribery.622 Further, transgressions that are not described in the Qur’an or 
Sunnah, yet have harmful effects on the community might also classified as ta’zir offenses.623 
Note that ta’zir, in the sense of discretionary punishment, can be inflicted for hudud and qisas 
crimes in certain situations, which means that there are four cases where a punishment of 
ta’zir may be imposed:   
                                                          
616 See THE QUR’AN, supra note 23, 5:32 at 71 (emphasis added) (“[I]f anyone kills a person– unless in 
retribution for murder or spreading corruption in the land– it is as if he kills all mankind, while if any saves a life 
it is as if he saves the lives of all mankind.”).  
617 See Safwat, supra note 511, at 171-72. See also infra text accompanying notes 624, 834-35. 
 
618 The word “ta’zir” means disgracing the offender for their shameful conduct. See generally Postawko, supra 
note 608, at 300-308; Lippman, supra note 606, at 44-45. 
619 See DUBBER & HORNLE, supra note 511, at 262 (“Offenses which are punished neither with hadd nor with 
qisas and diya can only be punished with a ta’zir punishment.”). 
620 Elizabeth Peiffer, The Death Penalty in Traditional Islamic Law and As Interpreted in Saudi Arabia and 
Nigeria, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 507, 519 (2005). 
621 DUBBER & HORNLE, supra note 511, at 262. 
622 See SANAD, supra note 606, at 64 (providing some criminal acts that fall into the category of ta’zir crimes). 
623 Hascall, Restorative Justice in Islam, supra note 22, at 55. See also DUBBER & HORNLE, supra note 511, at 
262 (“[Ta’zir] deals with conduct that is forbidden in the Quran but for which no punishment is provided as well 
as for conduct that contradicts general principles of Islam.”). 
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[(1)][A]cts that do not meet the technical requirements for hudud or qisas, such as 
attempted adultery; [(2)] offenses generally punished by hudud but involving 
extenuating circumstances or doubt; [(3)] acts condemned in the Qur’an or Sunnah 
or contrary to public welfare, but not subject to hudud or qisas, such as false 
testimony; and [(4)] acts which violate social norms, such as obscenity.624 
 
Ta’zir sanctions in Islamic law typically takes the form of fines, imprisonment, or a 
combination of both.625 Unlike hudud and qisas penalties, discretionary punishments are 
subject to wide judicial discretion. In deciding a ta’zir case, the judge may take into 
considering the circumstances relating to the offense and the offender, along with the interest 
of society.626 
 One category of crimes that the system of qisas governs is homicide. The following 
section deals with the varying degrees of homicide under the Islamic legal system. 
4. Types of Homicide in Islamic Law 
 According to the Islamic penal system, not all killings are alike. Based on the intent of 
the killer, homicides are divided into three types: intentional, quasi-intentional, and 
unintentional.627  
a. Intentional Homicide (Al-Qatl Al-Amd) 
The most severe form of killing is al-qatl al-amd or intentional homicide (murder).628 It 
exists when the perpetrator intends the act that leads to the death of another, and has the 
intention of killing.629 The element of intent may be inferred from using a weapon that usually 
kills.630 It is important to note that the concept of amd (intent to kill) in the Shari’a 
                                                          
624 Peiffer, supra note 620, at 518-19. See also Lippman, supra note 606, at 45. 
625 BHALA, supra note 511, at 1177. See Postawko, supra note 608, at 307 (noting that there is a disagreement 
among Muslim scholars about whether death penalty can be inflicted as a discretionary punishment). 
626 Peiffer, supra note 620, at 518. 
627 See generally BHALA, supra note 511, at 1291-1300; Lippman, supra note 606, at 43-44. 
628 Whenever the term “murder” is used, it refers to the intentional homicide. 




does not necessarily mean that the killer planned or premeditated the killing. It refers to a 
level of intent which separates intentional homicides from other homicides, where there is no 
intention of killing whatsoever.  
 Intentional homicide is punishable by qisas. However, the penalty of death can be 
remitted. The victim’s family is given a choice to demand execution of the murderer, pardon 
him and accept blood money (diyya)  for their loss, or go even with outright forgiveness.631 
Once the qisas is waived, the murderer becomes subject to a discretionary punishment known 
as “ta’zir.”632 The authority of qisas in intentional killing stems from following verse: “You 
who believe, fair retribution [qisas] is prescribed for you in cases of murder.”633 Also, it was 
narrated that the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) stated that “whoever is killed deliberately, then 
it is [qisas.]”634 
b. Quasi-Intentional Homicide (Al-Qatl Shibh Al-Amd) 
 In quasi-intentional killing, or al-qatl shibh al-amd, the offender has a quasi-intentional 
intent (shibh al-amd), which means that he or she intended the act, but not the result 
(death).635 Thus, quasi-intentional homicide embodies actions that resulted in the death of the 
victim when the intention of the offender was merely to cause harm. A killing that occurs 
without using a deadly instrument, such as punching the victim or hitting him with a stick, 
may prove the existence of quasi- intentional intent.636  
 According to the opinion of the Hanafi, Shafi’i, and Hanbali Schools, the quasi-
intentional killer is not subject to the penalty of qisas and the primary punishment is the 
                                                          
631 See discussion infra Part III.B-C. 
632 See discussion infra Part III.C.3. 
633 THE QUR’AN, supra note 23, 2:178 at 20. 
634 SUNAN ABU DAWUD, supra note 578, vol. 5, bk. 38, hadith no. 4539, at 126. 
635 PETERS, supra note 528, at 43. 
636 BHALA, supra note 511, at 1297. 
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payment of blood money (diyya).637 These Schools formed their view in accordance with the 
saying of the Prophet (PBUH) that provides:638 “The [diyya] for killing that resembles 
intentional (killing) [quasi-intentional homicide] is severe like that for deliberate killing, but 
the perpetrator is not to be executed.”639 The jurists also argued that it would be totally unfair 
to punish a quasi-intentional killer with the same penalty (death) an intentional killer receives 
when the quasi-intentional killer did mean to take the victim’s life.640 One scholar has 
attempted to explain the majority’s approach regarding the penalty of quasi-intentional 
homicide by stating that: 
[i]t is remarkable that this point of view was adopted by the majority of Muslim 
jurists, possibly because of their desire to minimize the amount of death penalty in 
the society and to save as many as possible from the gallows. If one were to look at 
the ultimate goal of these jurists one would agree that the objectives of the Islamic 
legal system are exclusively directed toward saving people’s lives.641 
 
 From the prospective of Imam Malik, on the other hand, there is no distinction between 
intentional (al-qatl al-amd) and quasi-intentional (al-qatl shibh al-amd) killings; rather both 
of them fall into the category of intentional homicide,642 and thus, are punishable by qisas and 
alternatively, by blood money (diyya) in the case of forgiveness.643 The argument introduced 
by the Maliki School is that only intentional and unintentional killings were mentioned by the 
Holy Qur’an.644 
                                                          
637 MAWAFFAQ AL-DIN ABDULLAH IBN AHMAD IBN QUDAMAH AL-MAQDISI (IBN-QUDAMAH), AL-MUGHNI, 
vol. 9, 337-38 (Beirut, Dar Al-Kilab Al-Arabi) [hereinafter, AL-MUGHNI]. 
638 Id. 
639 SUNAN ABU DAWUD, supra note 578, vol. 5, bk. 38, hadith no. 4565, at 140 (emphasis added). 
640 See ABD AL-QADIR AWDAH, AL-TASHRI AL-JINAI AL-ISLAMI MUQARANAN BI-AL-QANUN AL-WADI 
[ISLAMIC CRIMINAL LAW COMPARED WITH POSITIVE LAW], vol. 2, 93 (Cairo: Dar Al-Turath 1985). 
641 EL-SHEIKH, supra note 21, at 145. 
642 See BHALA, supra note 511, at 1297. 
643 See AL-MUGHNI, supra note 637, at 337- 38. 
644 EL-SHEIKH, supra note 21, at 148. See also THE QUR’AN, supra note 23, 4:93 at 59 (“If anyone kills a believer 
deliberately . . . .”); id. 4:92 at 59. (“If anyone kills a believer by mistake . . . .”).  
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c. Unintentional Homicide (Al-Qatl Al-Khata) 
 Unintentional homicide or “al-qatl al-khata” in Arabic, refers to killing by mistake. It 
occurs if the perpetrator had no intention of harm, but his conduct ended up killing another 
human being.645  The mistake (khata) in this kind of homicide could be made in either the act 
or the intention.646 A mistaken action occurs, for instance, when someone shoots at a target, 
yet he mistakenly kills a human. Error in intention occurs when a person shoots at another 
person thinking them to be an animal.647 
 Qisas is not applicable to unintentional homicide; rather, it is punishable by blood 
money (diyya).648 The amount of blood money that is set for this type of homicide is less than 
what must be paid for quasi-intentional killing.649 The family of the deceased person may 
pardon the killer as in all types of homicide.650 The authority of diyya as the original 
punishment in cases of unintentional homicide originated from the Holy Qur’an, where it 
states: “Never should a believer kill another believer, except by mistake. If anyone kills a 
believer by mistake he must . . . pay compensation [diyya] to the victim’s relatives, unless 
they charitably forgo it.”651  
 Since the scope of this Dissertation covers death penalty cases, the focus will be mainly 
on intentional homicide (murder) where qisas is permissible. Because murder is a qisas crime, 
or a crime against individuals, the victims’ families have the ultimate power to decide whether 
                                                          
645 PETERS, supra note 528, at 44. See also BHALA, supra note 511, at 1297 (stating that in homicide by error, the 
killer does not act with clear, deliberate intent). 
646 Lippman, supra note 606, at 43.  
647 Id. 
648 See BHALA, supra note 511, at 1297. 
649 Id. See supra text accompanying notes 786-87. 
650 Lippman, supra note 606, at 44.  
651 THE QUR’AN, supra note 23, 4:92 at 59. 
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the offender will be given the qisas (death) penalty. The following part will delve into the 
details of the right to demand qisas in Islamic law. 
 Qisas 
 The term “qisas” in Arabic literally means “equivalence” or “equality” in general and 
also “equality in retribution.”652 In its technical sense, qisas means “legal” retribution by the 
infliction of equivalent harm. In other words, in a qisas crime, the punishment of the 
perpetrator corresponds in kind and degree to the injury he or she caused to the victim. Thus, 
in murder offenses, qisas punishment refers to death penalty. Qisas is ordained by the Holy 
Qur’an. Verse 178 of chapter 2 of the Qur’an reads: “You who believe, fair retribution [qisas] 
is prescribed for you in cases of murder.”653 The very next verse of the same chapter 
emphasizes that implementing such a severe penalty serves as deterrent to murder, stating that 
“[f]air retribution [qisas] saves life for you, people of understanding, so that you may guard 
yourselves against what is wrong.654  
Additionally, several traditions of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) determined qisas as the 
punishment for murder offense. For example, the Prophet (PBUH) said: “if somebody is 
killed, his closest relative has the right to choose one of two things, i.e., either the [b]lood 
money or [qisas] by having the killer killed.”655 In another Hadith, he stated that “whoever is 
killed deliberately, then it is [qisas.]”656 
 Exploring qisas as an option for victims’ families in capital murder cases raises three 
issues; (1) who has the right to demand qisas, (2) must a demand for qisas be unanimous, and 
                                                          
652 See supra note 21. 
653 THE QUR’AN, supra note 23, 2:178 at 20. 
654 Id. 2:179 at 20. 
655 SAHIH AL-BUKHARI, supra note 576, vol. 9, bk. 87, hadith no. 6880, at 21. 
656 SUNAN ABU DAWUD, supra note 578, vol. 5, bk. 38, hadith no. 4539, at 126. 
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(3) what is the procedural framework of imposing the penalty of qisas. Each issue will to be 
discussed in detail, first under classical Islamic law, then Libyan law.  
 Who May Demand Qisas  
 The person who has the right to demand qisas or offer pardon is called wali al-dam 
which means “guardian of blood”. The Qur’an, in chapter 17, verse 33, says: “Do not take 
life, which God has made sacred, except by right: if anyone is killed wrongfully, We [God] 
have given authority to the defender of his rights, but he should not be excessive in taking life, 
for he is already aided [by God].”657 The authority that God has granted through this verse is 
the authority to demand qisas or forgive. According to the majority of Islamic Schools, the 
heirs of the murdered person are the exclusive holders of this power regardless of their sex,658 
on the basis that they are supposedly the closest people to the victim.659 Generally, the heirs in 
Islam include the spouse, parents, children, grandparents, grandchildren, and siblings.660  
 In addition to being the victim’s heirs, these individuals must be adult who are mentally 
capable of exercising the right of demanding qisas.661 Therefore, if some heirs of the 
murdered person were minors or mentally ill, then only the competent adult heirs would be 
entitled to call for qisas. The proper timing for meeting the requirements of coming of age and 
                                                          
657 THE QUR’AN, supra note 23, 17:33, at 177. 
658 AL-MUGHNI, supra note 637, vol. 9, at 464. See also PETERS, supra note 528, at 44-45.  
659 See ABDEL GHAFFAR IBRAHIM SALEH, AL-QISAS FI AL-NUFS FI AL-FIGH AL-ISLAMI [QISAS IN MURDER 
UNDER ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE]: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 221 (2d ed. 1998).  
660 Under the Islamic system of succession, there are three classes of heirs: (1) Qur’anic heirs, who are relatives 
identified in the Qur’an (4:11-12,176) and to include the following: husband, wife, father, mother, grandfather, 
grandmother, daughter, son’s daughter, full sister, half sister, and half brother (born of the same mother but a 
different father); (2) agnatic heirs, who are male relatives and include the son, grandson, brother, nephew 
(brother’s son), paternal uncle, and cousin (uncle’s son); (3) uterine heirs, who are other blood female and male 
relatives such as daughter’s son and aunt. See Zainab Chaudhry, The Myth of Misogyny: A Reanalysis of 
Women’s Inheritance in Islamic Law, 61 ALB. L. REV. 511, 529-31 (1997). 
661 This is the opinion of the Maliki and Hanafi Schools. AWDAH, supra note 640, vol. 2, at 146. Eighteen is the 
age of majority according to Imams Malik and Abu Hanifa. See id. vol. 1, at 602. 
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competence is when the penalty process commences, not when the crime is committed.662 For 
example, an adult heir is entitled to elect the murderer’s punishment even if he or she was a 
minor at the time of the murder.  
 If the deceased person left behind only minor or mentally ill heirs, this or her guardian 
(usually the parent) would be the person with the authority to determine the killer’s penalty.663 
However, the guardian may not forfeit qisas without blood money (diyya), to avoid any harm 
to the heir’s interest.664   
 In the case where the victim leaves either no heirs or heirs that could not be reached, the 
authority to execute or pardon the offender belongs to the head of the state, based on the 
following Hadith:665 “the ruler is the guardian [wali] of the one who does not have a guardian 
[wali].”666 The same rule applies if the victim was murdered by his only “heir.”667 
Technically, the victim in such a case dies without heirs because the Prophet Muhammad 
(PBUH) said: “the murderer will not inherit [from their victim.]”668  
 In Libya, the Law of Qisas and Diyya does not identify wali al-dam, but the Libyan 
Supreme Court has specified the deceased’s heirs as the ones who have the right to choose 
                                                          
662 OSAMA ADLI, DIYYA AL-QATL [BLOOD MONEY IN HOMICIDE] 16 (Cairo, Dar Al-Nahda Al-Arabia 1985). 
663 This is according to one approach in Shari’a. Other jurists provide that qisas is a right which belongs to the 
heirs only. Thus, the judge cannot award death until the minor heir has reached majority and the ill heir becomes 
well. AL-MUGHNI, supra note 637, vol. 9, at 460. 
664 Id. at 475. Diyya in murder cases is paid to the heirs of the victim. See infra text accompanying notes 727-74. 
665 AWDAH, supra note 640, vol. 2, at 142. 
666 SUNAN IBN MAJAH, supra note 516, vol. 3, bk. 9, hadith no. 1879, at 78. 
667 ADLI, supra note 662, at 11. 
668 JAMI’ AT-TIRMIDHI, supra note 580, vol. 4, bk. 27, hadith no. 2109, at 172. With regard to this Hadith, 
Muslim jurists unanimously provide that the intentional killer of his testator would be deprived from the 
inheritance. Further, the vast majority of scholars believe that this rule is applicable to manslaughter cases as 
well. Id.  
This law compels the killer to ponder over various aspects of murder. A) He will not get the share 
of the inheritance. B) There is a possibility of the punishment of death. C) If he escapes the sentence, 
he will have to pay his share of blood money. In this way he will be in a state of loss. Therefore, he 
may avoid committing the crime. 
SUNAN IBN MAJAH, supra note 516 vol. 3, at 522. 
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between the death penalty and forgiveness.669 The law expressly states that the right to qisas 
vests in mentally capable and adult relatives of the victim.670 The Libyan legislature did not 
make any provisions for cases involving only minor or mentally incompetent heirs in the Law 
of Qisas and Diyya, but the last article of the law indicates that “the rules of Islamic law 
(shari’a) which are most appropriate to this Law will be applied in the absence of a text.”671 
Thus, in compliance with the Shari’a, the legal guardian may speak for minor or mentally 
incompetent heirs. According to the Libyan legal system, the guardian of a minor (or mentally 
disabled person) is the parent, then one of the minor’s relatives based on their ranking in the 
inheritance and kinship, and, if he or she has no relatives, the court will appoint one for him or 
her.672  
 Finally, the Libyan Law of Qisas and Diyya provides that the right to qisas and pardon 
vests in the state in cases of no heirs and equivalent cases.673 An equivalent case encompasses 
situations where the murder is committed by the victim’s only “heir.” According to several 
appellate courts’ rulings, the public prosecution represents the state in exercising the right of 
demanding death or offering forgiveness.674 Such an approach also can be supported by the 
Libyan criminal procedure law, which states that the public prosecution shall represent a 
crime victim if he or she has no one else to do so.675 
                                                          
669 See, e.g., Al-Mahkamah Al-Uliya [Supreme Court], Criminal Appeal No. 376/44 (Feb. 6, 2003), (unreported) 
(Libya). The Supreme Court, In the Libyan court system, “[t]he legal principles adopted by the Supreme Court in 
its rulings shall be binding for all courts . . . .” LAW NO. (6) OF 1982 ON REORGANIZING THE SUPREME COURT, 
art. 31, OFFICIAL JOURNAL, vol. 22/1982 at 754, http://www.security-legislation.ly/node/31947. 
670 LAW NO. (6) OF 1994 ON THE RULES OF QISAS AND DIYYA, art. 2. The age of majority under Libyan law is 
eighteen. LAW NO. (17) OF 1992 ON ORGANIZING THE AFFAIRS OF MINORS AND EQUIVALENTS, art. 9, 
OFFICIAL JOURNAL, vol. 30/1992. 
671 LAW NO. (6) OF 1994 ON THE RULES OF QISAS AND DIYYA, art. 7. 
672 See LAW NO. (17) OF 1992 ON ORGANIZING THE AFFAIRS OF MINORS AND THEIR EQUIVALENTS, art. 32. 
673 LAW NO. (6) OF 1994 ON THE RULES OF QISAS AND DIYYA, art. 2. 
674 See, e.g., Mahkmat Istinaf Trablous [Tripoli Court of Appeal], Criminal Chamber (Oct. 2, 1997) (unreported) 
(Libya); id. (Jan. 7, 1997) (unreported) (Libya); id. (Jan. 10, 1996) (unreported) (Libya). 
675 LIBYAN CODE OF CRIM. PROC., art. 6.  
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 It is possible that not all of a murdered person ‘s heirs would want the offender to be 
sentenced to death. The case of heirs’ disagreements as to the appropriate punishment is 
discussed next.  
 Conflicting Views  
 The views of the victim’s heirs regarding the perpetrator’s punishment are not always 
identical. In other words, it is imaginable that some could be against capital punishment and 
vote for pardon. According to the four Islamic Schools, demanding qisas must be unanimous 
in order to impose the penalty of death.676 Thus, a pardon offered by one heir is sufficient to 
make the punishment of qisas inapplicable. The theory behind this rule is that the right to 
qisas is a joint right which cannot be divided, meaning that if one heir waives the qisas 
punishment by pardoning the murderer, his waiver applies to the rest of the deceased’s heirs 
as well.677 The unanimity requirement serves to reduce the implementation of death penalty in 
murder cases.  
 However, in the case of multiple victims murdered by the same killer, qisas does not 
have to be demanded by the heirs of all victims.678 If the heirs of even one victim agreed on 
qisas, the offender would be put to death despite that fact that some or all heirs of the other 
victims decided to forgive the murderer.679 Contrary to a one-victim crime where the 
murderer is subject to one qisas, the killer of two (or more) victims deserves two penalties of 
death.680 Accordingly, the heirs of two murdered people have two separate rights of 
demanding qisas, and if one victim’s heirs chose to pardon the offender, the heirs of the 
                                                          
676 AL-MUGHNI, supra note 637, vol. 9, at 464. 
677 AWDAH, supra note 640, vol. 2, at 160. 
678 AL-MUGHNI, supra note 637, vol. 9, at 405. 
679 Id. 
680 AWDAH, supra note 640, vol. 2, at 163. 
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second victim would still be entitled to qisas.681 In such a case, Islamic jurisprudence is 
divided over whether qisas which is demanded by one victim’s heirs is the only punishment 
the killer should receive, or whether the other victim’s heirs who express forgiveness may ask 
for blood money as well. In one approach, implementing capital punishment takes away the 
entitlement to diyya.682 Otherwise, the offender will be over-punished by imposing double 
retribution upon him.683 To other jurists, qisas and diyya may be combined as an exception in 
multi-victim cases since the murderer committed more than one crime.684  
 The heirs of the victim may also have conflicting views when the murder involves 
multiple perpetrators. The heirs in such cases have the full authority to elect either death for 
all criminals, or death for one criminal and pardons for the others.685 Nevertheless, unlike 
qisas, the vast majority of Islamic jurists accept that, when the murder is committed by two or 
more people, the victim’s heirs--in a case of pardon--are permitted to take only one diyya 
from the two (or more) of them combined.686 Thus, if the victim’s heirs renounce qisas for 
one perpetrator and decide to take blood money instead, those heirs will be entitled to only 
half of the amount of blood money. The justification for this rule is that while qisas is 
considered a punishment, such that it may be imposed on each perpetrator separately, diyya is 
an amount of money paid to the heirs in exchange for the victim’s life, regardless if it was 
taken by one or several killers.687  
                                                          
681 Id. 
682 AL-MUGHNI, supra note 637, vol. 9, at 405. 
683 Id. 
684 Id. 
685 Id. at 473. 




 In Libya, the law explicitly states that “if one of the victim’s heirs grants a pardon, qisas 
is not applicable.”688 The lawmakers, however, did not address cases involving multiple 
victims or offenders in which where the heirs’ opinions are divided between qisas and 
pardon.689 Although the law of Qisas and Diyya, in Article (7), provides that the rules of 
Shari’a “which are most appropriate to this Law” shall be applied in the absence of text,690 
this provision does not resolve the issue. The Supreme Court held that, in compliance with 
Article (1) of the Libyan Penal Code which states “[n]o crime or punishment without law,” 
Article (7) of the Law of Qisas and Diyya shall not govern criminalization and punishment 
matters.691 Accordingly, since the issue of multiple victims or offenders involves penalties of 
qisas and diyya; it must be determined by a specific and explicit rule within the law of Qisas 
and Diyya. 
 The next section will shed some light on the process of imposing the penalty of qisas in 
both Islamic and Libyan systems. 
 Procedural Framework  
a. In Islamic Law 
 Under Islamic law, homicide is a private claim between two parties; the victim’s heirs 
and the offender.692 During the early time of the Islamic state, there was no public prosecution 
representing the victims or the public in qisas offenses.693 The heirs of the murdered person 
were the ones who brought the case to the qadi (judge) and even executed the judgment of 
                                                          
688 LAW NO. (6) OF 1994 ON THE RULES OF QISAS AND DIYYA, art. 2. 
689 The only related issue addressed by the Law of Qisas and Diyya is the penalty of blood money in multi-victim 
crimes. It provides that diyya “is multiplied by the number of victims LAW NO. (6) OF 1994 ON THE RULES OF 
QISAS AND DIYYA, art. 4(1). 
690 LAW NO. (6) OF 1994 ON THE RULES OF QISAS AND DIYYA, art. 7. 
691 Al-Mahkamah Al-Uliya [Supreme Court], Criminal Appeal No. 1249/42 (Jan. 2, 2002 (unreported) (Libya). 
692 See supra text accompanying note 614. 
693 ADLI, supra note 662, at 5. 
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qisas themselves where no pardon was granted.694 Muslim jurists held that the perpetrator 
must be executed by the sword,695 supported by the Hadith of the Prophet (PBUH): “There is 
no [qisas] except with the sword.”696 However, qisas penalty was later carried out by a new 
institution called Shurtah (police), representing both the public and the government.697 El-
Sheikh clarified this development by stating that:  
[T]he lifetime of the Prophet was a period of outlining principles and settling the 
frontiers of the legal framework within which coming generations could enact what 
suited their needs according to their circumstances of place and time. That is why 
when the fully Islamic state was established during the during the time of the second 
Caliph, Umar [Ibn] [A]l Khattab, such private vengeance was almost abolished 
and turned over to the hands of the official institution called Shurtah (police).698 
 
Contemporary Muslim scholars have provided several bases to support the notion that 
nowadays the heirs’ right of demanding the death penalty does not encompass the right to 
execute it. For instance, a contemporary scholar, Abd Al-Qadir Awdah, based his view on a 
Hadith that states:699 “Allah has prescribed Al-Ihsan (proficiency) in all things. So if you kill, 
then kill well, and if you slaughter, then slaughter well. Let one of you sharpen his blade and 
spare suffering to the animal he slaughters.”700 Awdah has noted that the heirs were entitled to 
carry out the execution by sword, considering the fact that the sword was the most quick and 
                                                          
694 Id. at 6. 
695 This is the approach of Hanafi and Hanbali Schools. AWDAH, supra note 640, vol. 1, at 758. 
696 SUNAN IBN MAJAH, supra note 516, vol. 3, bk. 21, hadith no. 2667, at 532. 
697 EL-SHEIKH, supra note 21, at 107.  
 Umar Ibn Al-Khattab was appointed as a Caliph by the first Caliph, Abu Bakr, who led the Muslim community 
after the death of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) in 632 A.D. Umar served as Caliph from 634-644 A.D. See 
BHALA, supra note 511, at 122. 
698 EL-SHEIKH, supra note 21, at 107. Also, in the wake of the Abbasid Caliphate (750-1258 A.D.), a “chief of 
police” was created to control the investigating process along with the executing of the judgments due. ABD AR 
RAHMAN BIN MUHAMMED IBN KHALDUN, THE MUQADDIMAH, vol. III, 323 (Franz Rosenthal trans.), 
https://asadullahali.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/ibn_khaldun-al_muqaddimah.pdf.   
699 See AWDAH, supra note 640, vol. 2, at 154. 
700 SUNAN IBN MAJAH, supra note 516, vol. 4, bk. 27, hadith no. 3170 at 278. “If Islam could command its 
adherents to show such great compassion to even animals when they are being lawfully slaughtered, one could 




efficient tool for taking life during the early time of Islam where almost everybody carried 
this weapon and knew how to use.701 He argued that since this is not the case anymore in 
modern times, and since qisas must be executed without causing any torture to the killer, 
pursuant to the Prophetic saying quoted above, heirs of the murdered person should be 
precluded from executing the judgment of qisas, leaving such task to the government.702 
 According to another commentator, Mohamad El-Sheikh, in order to ensure the equality 
between the offense and its retribution in qisas crimes, an execution should be carried out by a 
third party (public authority) who is not influenced by the loss of a loved one.703 Regarding 
the verse 33 of chapter 17: “if anyone is killed wrongfully, We have given authority to the 
defender of his rights, but he should not be excessive in taking life, for he is already aided [by 
God],”704 El-Sheikh argued that this verse grants the heirs of the victim the entitlement to 
demand qisas, which is different from the right to execute it.705 He concluded that “although 
in principle jurists continued to state that the injured party must execute [q]isas, in practice 
the right to execute vengeance became the right merely to request the public authority to do 
so.”706 
 In qisas, exceeding the limit in the matter of taking life is forbidden by God which 
means that only the killer should be executed.707 For example, pregnant women cannot be 
executed before giving birth.708 Further, their execution is postponed until they nurse their 
                                                          
701 See AWDAH, supra note 640, vol. 2, at 155. 
702 See Id. at 154-55. The government could use any other effective methods of capital punishment such as 
hanging or the electric chair. Id. at 155.  
703 EL-SHEIKH, supra note 21, at 108. 
704 THE QUR’AN, supra note 23, 17:33, at 177. 
705 EL-SHEIKH, supra note 21, at 108. 
706 Id. 
707 “[I]f anyone is killed wrongfully, We [God] have given authority to the defender of his rights, but he should 
not be excessive in taking life.” THE QUR’AN, supra note 23, 17:33, at 177 (emphasis added). 
708 AWDAH, supra note 640, vol. 2, at 149-50. 
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infants sufficiently to keeps them alive, or at least find someone who can do so.709 This rule 
reflects how preserving innocent souls takes priority over administering punishments. It also 
ensures that the penalty of qisas does not take a life in addition to the murderer’s.710 
b. In Libyan Law 
 The parties to a criminal trial under the Libyan legal system are the public prosecutor 
and the defendant. Qisas trials are not an exception. Even after the Law of Qisas and Diyya 
was issued in 1994, the lawmakers did not make any changes with regard to the parties of 
qisas cases. In other words, the heirs of a murder victim are not parties to the defendant’s 
criminal case even though the decision of whether the offender should live or die lies in their 
hands.711 
 The power to bring the criminal case in a qisas crime belongs to the prosecution which 
represents the government, not the victims or their families.712 Prosecutors have broad 
discretion in determining whether to prosecute a criminal defendant, and the heirs’ right of 
demanding or renouncing qisas does not restrict that discretion in any way.713 A prosecutor 
does not need the heirs to demand qisas in order to file charges, nor does the prosecutor need 
the heirs to pardon the murderer in order for him or her to drop the case. Simply put, the 
victim’s heirs have no role until the trial stage of the proceeding.  
                                                          
709 Id. 
710 See PETERS, supra note 528, at 48. 
711 In case of pardon, the government will be in charge of punishing the defendant with a discretionary sanction 
in the form of life imprisonment. See infra text accompanying notes 836-38. 
712 LIBYAN CODE OF CRIM. PROC., art. 1 (“Only a public prosecutor shall file criminal charges . . . .”). 
713 See Al-Mahkamah Al-Uliya [Supreme Court], Criminal Appeal No. 1002/46 (June 26, 2002) (unreported) 
(Libya) (noting that in qisas crimes, the public prosecution has complete power to prosecute a charge and decide 
whether or not to pursue the case). 
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 Due to an amendment to the Law of Qisas and Diyya,714 the mechanism of exercising 
the authority to demand the death penalty in court has changed. Originally, Article (1) 
provided: “Is punished with death whoever kills a person with intent, if the heirs [of the 
victim] demand it. Qisas is not applied if pardon is granted . . . .”715 In compliance with the 
provision stating “if the heirs [of the victim] demand it,” courts had to receive an explicit 
written statement calling for qisas from all of the victim’s heirs in order to sentence the 
defendant to death. Several years later, the provision was omitted in the revised version of 
Article (1), which currently reads: “Is punished by death whoever kills a person with intent. If 
pardon is granted, the penalty is imprisonment for life and diyya.”716 The Supreme Court 
interpreted this amendment to mean that the written demand for qisas by the heirs is no longer 
required to impose the death penalty.717 Therefore, once the defendant’s guilt is proven, he or 
she would receive a death sentence even with no demand for qisas made, as long as no heir 
had offered a statement of forgiveness.  
 Actually, in a qisas trial, courts face one of three scenarios. First, when the heirs of the 
victim do not communicate their choice either for qisas or for pardon to the trial court, a death 
sentence is imposed. Here, the heirs’ silence is translated into a desire for the accused to be 
executed; otherwise they would have invoked their right of leniency before the court. Second, 
if all heirs express their qisas choice in a written statement before sentencing, the defendant 
will be put to death. Yet, such statement has no legal weight since the trial court could impose 
                                                          
714 Law no. (6) of 1994 on the Rules of Qisas and Diyya was amended by Law no. (7) Of 2000 on Revising 
Some Rules of Law no. (6) of 1994 on the Rules of Qisas and Diyya. 
715 LAW NO. (6) OF 1994 ON THE RULES OF QISAS AND DIYYA, art. 1, amended by LAW NO. (7) OF 2000 ON 
REVISING SOME RULES OF LAW NO. (6) OF 1994 ON THE RULES OF QISAS AND DIYYA (emphasis added). 
716 LAW NO. (7) OF 2000 ON REVISING SOME RULES OF LAW NO. (6) OF 1994 ON THE RULES OF QISAS AND 
DIYYA, art. 1. 




the same judgment even if they were silent as to their desired outcome. The third scenario is 
one in which one or more heirs waive their right to qisas and grant the accused a pardon 
instead. The penalty of death will be inapplicable in such case, and the defendant will be 
punished with a life sentence and diyya.718 Thus, the heirs of the murder victim still control 
the outcome of the qisas case. They do so either by staying silent if they seek qisas, or by 
renouncing their right of qisas-in writing-to save the defendant’s life. 
 The Shari’a jurisprudence considers qisas a private right of the victim’s family which 
cannot be altered or overruled by the decision of a judge or any other authority. Accordingly, 
the judge under the Libyan system has no right to change the penalty of qisas, which creates 
an exception to the general rule on judicial discretion that authorizes courts to award reduced 
sentences in the presence of mitigating circumstances.719 Based on the same grounds, the law 
that permits amnesty or commutation,720 which may be issued by the Supreme Judicial 
Council (the Supreme Council of Judicial Bodies),721 does not apply to qisas punishment.  
Death sentences for intentional homicide cases can only be commuted upon the pardon of the 
victim’s family. 
 Death sentences are executed by shooting the convicted to death, and such executions 
are carried out by the government.722 Executions are not public.723 The law specifies the 
                                                          
718 Note that the victim’s heirs may waive diyya as well. See infra note 813 and accompanying text. 
719 The Libyan Penal Code, article 29 reads: 
[In the presence of mitigating circumstances,] the judge may substitute or reduce the sentence as 
follows: 
Imprisonment for life instead of death; 
Imprisonment instead of imprisonment for life; 
Detention for no less than six months instead of imprisonment; 
…, [generally in the presence of mitigating circumstances it,] the judge may reduce the sentence in 
the [case] of felonies and misdemeanors to half the minimum limit prescribed by law. 
LIBYAN PENAL CODE, art. 29. 
720 Id. art. 124-25. 
721 LAW NO. (6) OF 2006 ON THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM, art. 4(3), http://www.security-legislation.ly/node/31538. 
722 LIBYAN PENAL CODE, art. 19 (“Any person sentenced to death shall be shot to death as legally prescribed.”). 
723 LIBYAN CODE OF CRIM. PROC., art. 433(“Death is to be executed inside the prison . . . .”). 
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following individuals to be present during the execution: a prosecutor, the prison warden, the 
prison doctor, and the defense counsel (if he or she so requests).724 Finally, pregnant women 
cannot be executed until two months after they have given birth.725 
 The punishment of qisas is waived in the case of pardon. The choice to pardon a 
murderer will be explored next. 
 Pardon (Afw)  
 Afw, in murder cases, means renouncing qisas either for free or for payment of blood 
money.726 Sparing the murderer from death and accepting the blood money qualifies as a 
pardon. The heirs of the victim are entitled to for forgo qisas based on the following verse 
from the Holy Qur’an:   
You who believe, fair retribution [qisas] is prescribed for you in cases of murder: 
the free man for the free man, the slave for the slave, the female for the female. But 
if the culprit is pardoned by his aggrieved brother, this shall be adhered to fairly, 
and the culprit shall pay what is due in a good way. This is alleviation from your 
Lord and an act of mercy.727 
 
In spite of the fact that this Qur’anic passage deals with qisas, by referring to the injured party 
(victim’s relative) as a “brother” of “the culprit,” this verse promotes a spirit of reconciliation 
and creates a good environment for the choice of mercy. Afw, in the context of qisas crimes is 
permissible based on Sunnah as well. It was reported that the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) 
stated that “for whomever (one of his relatives) was killed, then he has two options to choose 
from: Either to pardon or that he be killed.”728 Further, some argue that giving the heirs the 
                                                          
724 Id. art. 434. 
725 Id. art. 436. 
726 Afw is defined as such by Shafi’i and Hanbali Schools. AWDAH, supra note 640, vol. 2, at 157. According to 
Imams Malik and Abu Hanifa, waving qisas for free is called pardon (afw), but if the heirs waive it in lieu of 
accepting diyya; it is called settlement (sulh). Id. at 158. 
727 THE QUR’AN, supra note 23, 2:178 at 20 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
728 JAMI’ AT-TIRMIDHI, supra note 580, vol. 3, bk. 14, hadith no. 1405, at 191. 
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power to demand qisas reduces the desire for revenge and enhances the prospect of 
leniency.729 From a psychological point of view, a human being usually tends to forgive or 
renounce his or her right inflict punishment when he already knows that he does not have 
to.730 
 It is worth emphasizing that waiving qisas in Islam is not just an acceptable choice; 
rather, it is encouraged and strongly recommended. The Qur’an in chapter 5, verse 45, implies 
so: 
In the Torah We [God] prescribed for them a life for a life, an eye for an eye, a nose 
for a nose, an ear for an ear, a tooth for a tooth, an equal wound for a wound: if 
anyone forgoes this out of charity, it will serve as atonement for his bad deeds. 
Those who do not judge according to what God has revealed are doing grave 
wrong.731  
 
Pardon is encouraged by a Prophetic tradition as well. It was reported in the Sunnah on 
authority of Anas bin Malik said: “No case requiring [q]isas was ever brought to the 
Messenger of Allah [PBUH], but he would enjoin pardoning.”732 Islam also urges people to 
forgive one another in general and those who do are promised to be rewarded with paradise.  
Verses 133 and 134 of chapter 3 read: “Hurry towards your Lord’s forgiveness and a 
[Paradise] as wide as the heavens and earth prepared for the righteous, who give, both in 
prosperity and adversity, who restrain their anger and pardon people–God loves those who 
do good–.”733 Similarly, another Qur’anic passage says: “Let harm be requited by an equal 
harm, though anyone who forgives and puts things right [makes reconciliation] will have his 
reward from God Himself–He does not like those who do wrong.”734  
                                                          
729 AWDAH, supra note 640, vol. 1, at 549. 
730 Id. 
731 THE QUR’AN, supra note 23, 5:45 at 72 (emphasis added). 
732 SUNAN AN-NASA’I, supra note 581, vol. 5, bk. 45, hadith no. 4788, at 417. 
733 THE QUR’AN, supra note 23, 3:133-34 at 44 (emphasis added). 
734 Id. 42:40 at 314 (emphasis added). 
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 Forgiving someone is a deed of great reward as noted above--which makes pardoning a 
killer preferable to demanding qisas. Thus, it is not against the rules of Shari’a for the 
offender’s family (or counsel, in modern times) to approach the victim’s heirs on behalf of the 
defendant to secure a pardon by persuading them to waive qisas and accept blood money 
instead. In Libya, for example, such practice is very common--which explains the fact that, in 
most cases, the heirs’ statements of forgiveness find their way to court through the defense 
attorney. Yet, a pardon must be offered voluntarily and without duress. Otherwise, it will be 
held inadmissible. 
The right to pardon vests in the one who holds the entitlement to demand qisas.735 If the 
victim had a family, only adult, mentally--capable heirs may forgive the killer. One heir’s 
forgiveness is sufficient to spare the offender’s life.736 If the deceased person left no heirs or 
they could not be reached, the right to waive capital punishment belongs to the head of the 
state.737 
 To provide a better understanding of the choice of pardon, three aspects will be 
examined next, the timing of pardon, the payment of blood money (diyya), and the 
discretionary punishment (ta’zir) as alternative retributions when pardon is granted. The 
discussion of each matter will begin with the rules of Shari’a and will be followed by the 
Libyan approach.  
 Timing of Pardon 
 Once pardon is expressed by at least one heir of the murdered person, capital 
punishment becomes inapplicable. Muslim scholars believe that the victim’s heirs may 
                                                          
735 See supra text accompanying notes 658-60. 
736 See supra text accompanying notes 676-77. 
737 See supra text accompanying notes 665-66. 
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exercise the right of pardon at any point in time from the commission of the crime until just 
before the execution.738 Hence, forgiveness is fully effective regardless of whether it is 
granted before the case is brought to the judge, before the death sentence is imposed, or even 
after sentencing.739 This policy is clearly intended to promote the concept of mercy. 
 Further, because pardon is preferable to qisas, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to 
forgive the murderer even if they initially demanded qisas.740 Forgiveness, however, is final 
and cannot be withdrawn. The heirs may not change their minds about the pardon that once it 
is granted and decide to seek execution instead.741 The victim’s heirs are not allowed to claim 
qisas after renouncing it because once forgiveness is chosen; it permanently “immunizes” the 
killer’s life against a death sentence for the murder in question.742 
 It is worth mentioning that the heirs are entitled to blood money in the case of 
forgiveness even if they elected qisas at first.743 While it is true that the victim’s heirs waive 
their right to claim diyya by demanding the death penalty in the beginning, such right is 
restored at the moment they decide not to pursue qisas and determine to pardon the murderer 
instead.744 Otherwise, the heirs would be discouraged from offering forgiveness.745  
Moreover, since the punishment of death is hasher than the penalty of diyya (blood money), it 
would not be against the offender’s interest to shift from harsh retribution (qisas) to a less 
harsh retribution (diyya).746 
                                                          
738 See, e.g., SALEH, supra note 659, at 293. 
739 Id. 
740 ADLI, supra note 662, at 75. 
741 SALEH, supra note 659, at 293. 
742 Id. 
743 AL-MUGHNI, supra note 637, vol. 9, at 475.  In another approach, by claiming qisas, the heirs waive the right 
to blood money for good. Id.  
744 ADLI, supra note 662, at 77. 
745 Id. 
746 AL-MUGHNI, supra note 637, vol. 9, at 475. 
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 In Libya, the authority to choose between qisas and pardon is exercised at the trial 
phase.747 Therefore, the heirs may grant the defendant a pardon as soon as the trial starts. The 
Law of Qisas and Diyya provides that “[p]ardon that is granted after the death judgment 
becomes final and before the execution shall be submitted to the attorney general.”748 The law 
implies that the heirs may forgive the defendant at any time before his execution; even after 
the death sentence becomes final.  
 The time at which the decision of forgiveness is made will determine the authority to 
which the heirs must submit their decision. Prior to the final sentence, a pardon statement 
must be presented through the defense counsel to the court that is deciding the case. Yet, if the 
heirs did not forgive the accused until his or her death sentence was final, the attorney general 
would be the person to whom the pardon statement would be directed. Then, the attorney 
general would need to send the case back to the court that granted the final judgment.749 
Finally, forgiveness is permitted even when a choice of qisas was made prior, and the heirs 
will be fully entitled to claim blood money in lieu of renouncing the death penalty.750 
 When the heirs of the deceased pardon the perpetrator, they may choose either outright 
forgiveness or the payment of blood money by the perpetrator. The retribution of diyya in 
murder crimes under Shari’a and Libyan law is explored next. 
                                                          
747 See supra text accompanying note 713. 
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 Blood Money (Diyya) 
a. In Islamic Law 
 In homicide offences, diyya is the payment of money to the surviving heirs of the 
victim. Diyya drives its authority from the Holy Qur’an and the Sunnah. Verse 178 of chapter 
2 set forth the proposition that, when the killer is forgiven by the relatives of the deceased 
person, he or she should make payment to the victim’s heirs in a good manner. It reads:  
You who believe, fair retribution [qisas] is prescribed for you in cases of murder: 
the free man for the free man, the slave for the slave, the female for the female. But 
if the culprit is pardoned by his aggrieved brother, this shall be adhered to fairly, 
and the culprit shall pay what is due in a good way. This is alleviation from your 
Lord and an act of mercy.751 
 
 Also, the Prophet (PBUH) said: “if somebody is killed, his closest relative has the right 
to choose one of two things, i.e., either the [b]lood money or [qisas] by having the killer 
killed.”752 
 Diyya is imposed as a substitute retribution for qisas in intentional homicide claims (al-
qatl al-amd) where the victim’s heirs, or some of them, remit their right of qisas. Malik’s 
School does not differentiate between intentional (al-qatl al-amd) and quasi-intentional (al-
qatl shibh al-amd) homicide, considering both of them to be intentional killing, and thus, 
punishable originally by qisas or alternatively by diyya in the case of pardon.753 On the 
contrary, according to the Hanafi, Shafi’i, and Hanbali Schools, blood money is the original 
penalty for quasi-international intentional killing (al-qatl shibh al-amd) where qisas is not 
applicable.754  
                                                          
751 THE QUR’AN, supra note 23, 2:178 at 20 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).  
752 SAHIH AL-BUKHARI, supra note 576, vol. 9, bk. 87, hadith no. 6880, at 21. 
753 See supra text accompanying notes 642-44. 
754 See supra text accompanying notes 637-41. 
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 The liability for blood money in murder (intentional homicide) is incurred by the 
offenders themselves out of their own wealth.755 In a case where the offender was financially 
unable to make the payment of blood money, a contemporary scholar, Abd Al-Qadir Awdah, 
has argued the heirs should not choose to pardon the offender in lieu unless they are sure of 
the offender’s financial ability to pay.756 Otherwise, if the heirs opted for diyya instead of 
qisas and it later came to light that the offender was unable to pay the required amount of 
diyya, they would no longer be able to avail themselves of qisas and would ultimately be 
forced to pardon the offender with no further liability.757  
 The liability for diyya is governed by a different rule when murder is committed by a 
minor or someone who is not of a sound mind. Such persons cannot form the intent (niyya) 
necessary to commit an intentional crime, thus, their act of killing is deemed unintentional--
payment of diyya replaces the penalty of qisas, and the diyya is payable by their aqilah:758  
Aqilah means the near male relatives on the father’s side who are obliged to pay 
the blood money on behalf of any of the clan’s members who kills a person. The 
first responsibility of the payment of blood money is with brothers and nephews, 
after them, the responsibility rests upon their son. Meaning the male members of 
one grandfather. After this, the responsibility goes to the brothers of the 
grandfather. Making blood money the responsibility of the Aqilah is to divide the 
due blood money into many easy shares, to lighten the burden of payment. In this 
way one person or one family is not overburdened. Another reason for collecting 
the blood money from the relatives is that they usually help each other in fights and 
disputes, they also understand that in case of bloodshed, they will have to pay their 
                                                          
Diyya is also the primary punishment for unintentional homicide (al-qatl al-khata). “Never should a believer kill 
another believer, except by mistake. If anyone kills a believer by mistake he must . . . pay compensation to the 
victim’s relatives, unless they charitably forgo it.” THE QUR’AN, supra note 23, 4:92 at 59. 
755 ADLI, supra note 662, at 66.  
756 AWDAH, supra note 640, vol. 1, at 675. 
757 Id. 
758 AL-MUGHNI, supra note 637, vol. 9, at 357. Minor and mentally incompetent murderers are not subject to 
either qisas or diyya based on the Prophet’s Hadith (PBUH) in which he said: “The pen has been lifted from 
three [which means that there are three persons whose actions are not recorded]: from the sleeping person until 
he awakens, from the child until he reaches puberty and from the insane person until he comes to his senses.” 
SUNAN ABU DAWUD, supra note 578, vol. 5, bk. 38, hadith no. 4403, at 44-45. 
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share of blood money, so naturally they will not allow any member of their tribe to 
commit this type of crime, rather they will stop him from doing such a crime.759 
 
 As for quasi-intentional homicide, since it is an intentional killing from the prospective 
of Imam Malik, the murderer is the one who is obligated to pay the blood money.760 However, 
most jurists hold the view that blood money is the aqilah’s responsibility because, although 
the commission of the act was intended, the perpetrator did not mean to kill.761 Those jurists 
have based their opinion on a saying of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).762 The Hadith involves 
two women from the tribe of Hudhail who were engaged in a fight with one another, one of 
whom threw a stone at the other and killed her.763 The dispute was brought to the Messenger 
of Allah (PBUH), who gave judgment that diyya for the deceased woman was to be paid by 
the aqilah (family) of the killer.764 According to the opinion of the majority of the jurists, if 
the aqilah was not able to pay or the killer had no aqilah, the payment of diyya would be 
owed by the state, specifically by an institution called bayt al-mal (the state treasury).765 
Muslim jurists have also addressed the issue of whether diyya is automatically 
applicable to the offender--instead of qisas--if he or she dies before execution. Imam Ibn 
Hanbal and Shafi’i hold that diyya in such a case would be imposed and payable out of the 
                                                          
759 SUNAN IBN MAJAH, supra note 516, vol. 3, at 513. See also DUBBER & HORNLE, supra note 511, at 261 
(“[The obligation of the aqilah of the perpetrator to pay diyya] is not regarded as a violation of the principle of 
personality of punishment but is seen as a consequence of the dual character of blood money as both punishment 
and compensation . . . . In modern times, this construction is sometimes used to establish the liability of 
insurers.”). See generally PETERS, supra note 528, at 49-50.  
760 AWDAH, supra note 640, vol. 2, at 191.  
761 Id. 
762 Id.  
763 SUNAN ABU DAWUD, supra note 578, vol. 5, bk. 38, hadith no. 4576, at 145. 
764 Id.  
765 See AWDAH, supra note 640, vol. 1, at 674; DUBBER & HORNLE, supra note 511, at 261. Bayt al-Mal is 
literally translated as the “House of Money.” It was the financial institution that controlled and managed the 
Islamic state’s revenue and where the public funds kept. Mahmood Namazi, Bayt al-Mal and the Distribution of 
Zakat, AL-ISLAM.ORG, https://www.al-islam.org/message-thaqalayn/vol11-n2-2010/bayt-al-mal-and-
distribution-zakat-mahmood-namazi/bayt-al-mal-and (last visited March 28, 2016). 
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offender’s estate.766 Jurists have argued that it is the same rule that is applied where the heirs 
of the victim waive qisas and select diyya instead, yet the offender dies before making any 
payments.767 Scholars have further argued that a murderer must be subject to either qisas or 
diyya—therefore, if execution was impossible to be carried out due to the death of the killer, 
the other retribution should be imposed.768  
 In multi-victim murders, the offender (or the aqilah) is responsible for a full diyya for 
each victim.769 If someone was murdered by more than one person, the blood money shall be 
divided equally in accordance with the number of killers involved.770 Since the retribution of 
diyya is a payment for an innocent life that was wrongfully taken, only one diyya may be 
imposed per victim.771 
 The payment of blood money is made to the surviving relatives of the murder victim, 
particularly, the heirs, and is distributed among them in accordance with the law of 
succession.772 The Holy Qur’an in verse 92 of chapter 4, provides: “If anyone kills a believer 
by mistake he must . . . pay compensation [diyya] to the victim’s relatives . . . .”773 There is 
also a saying of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) which indicates that: “[t]he [diyya] is something 
to be inherited among the heirs of the slain, according to their relationship . . . .”774 When the 
victim dies without heirs, diyya should be paid to the bayt al-mal (the state treasury).775 
                                                          
766 AWDAH, supra note 640, vol. 2, at 156. 
767 MUHAMMAD ABU ZAHRAH, AL-UQUBAH FI AL-FIQH AL-ISLAMI [PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAW] 473 
(Cairo, Dar Al-Fikr Al-Arabi). 
768 AWDAH, supra note 640, vol. 2, at 156. 
769 ADLI, supra note 662, at 40. 
770 AWDAH, supra note 640, vol. 2, at 179.   
771 See supra text accompanying notes 586-87. 
772 About the Islamic law of succession, see BHALA, supra note 511, at 1127- 63. 
773 THE QUR’AN, supra note 23, 4:92 at 59. 
774 SUNAN ABU DAWUD, supra note 578, vol. 5, bk. 38, hadith no. 4564, at 138. 
775 AWAD AHMAD IDREES, AL-DIYYA BAINA AL-TA’WEED WA AL-UQUBAH FI AL-FIGH AL-ISLAMI AL-
MUQAREN [BLOOD MONEY BETWEEN COMPENSATION AND PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC COMPARATIVE 
JURISPRUDENCE] 614-15 (Cairo Univ., School of Law). 
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Muslim scholars base this rule on the Prophet’s Hadith, in which he said: “I am the heir of the 
one who has no heir, and I will pay the blood money on his behalf and inherit from him . . . 
.”776 The meaning of the Hadith is that the Prophet (PBUH)--in his capacity as the head of the 
state--as he is responsible for the diyya in cases of minor and mentally incompetent 
murderers, or in cases of quasi-intentional killings where the offenders have no aqilah 
(family) to pay on their behalf,777 he holds in return the entitlement to receive the payment of 
blood money where there are no heirs to do so. 
 According to the view of most jurists, diyya for murder must be paid immediately and 
without any delay unless the heirs of the victim agree otherwise.778 The basis for this opinion 
is that, since diyya replaces qisas, diyya should have the same type of immediate effect that 
the original penalty of qisas would have had.779 In addition, the intentional killers should not 
be granted any mitigation in the form of furnishing them with additional time to make the 
payment of blood money to the heirs.780 In quasi-intentional homicide, however, diyya is due 
within three years.781 The majority of jurists provide that the three-year period starts from the 
day of the victim’s death, whereas, according to Imam Abu Hanifa, it begins on the date of 
sentencing.782 
 Diyya is a fixed pecuniary penalty, intended to assure that all lives have an equal value 
and to close the door on claiming an exaggerated amount of blood money as was practiced 
during the pre-Islamic era.783 It is reported that the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) wrote a letter 
                                                          
776 SUNAN IBN MAJAH, supra note 516, vol. 3, bk. 21, hadith no. 2634, at 513-14. 
777 See supra text accompanying notes 758-65. 
778 AWDAH, supra note 640, vol. 2, at 181. 
779 EL-SHEIKH, supra note 21, at 171. 
780 ADLI, supra note 662, at 50. 
781 AWDAH, supra note 640, vol. 2, at 162. 
782 Id. 
783 ADLI, supra note 662, at 52.  
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to the people of Yemen concerning blood money (among other issues), in which he stated that 
“whoever kills a believer for no just reason is to be killed in return, unless the heirs of the 
victim agree to pardon him. For killing a person, the [diyya] is one hundred camels.”784 In 
another Hadith, the Prophet (PBUH) said: “. . .  the [diyya] for a mistaken killing that appears 
purposeful [quasi-intentional homicide] . . . is one hundred camels.785 
 Although the amount of diyya is the same in all types of homicide; diyya may still vary 
in terms of the quality of the camels, which affects their value. Nearly all of the jurists hold 
that while the intentional and quasi-intentional murderer is responsible for “aggravated” blood 
money (diyya mughalladah) which is 100 high-quality camels, the “normal” diyya for 
accidental homicide is 100 regular camels.786 The evidence of this rule is the following Hadith 
where it is reported that the Prophet (PBUH) said: “The [diyya] for killing that resembles 
intentional (killing) [quasi-intentional murder] is severe like that for deliberate killing, but the 
perpetrator is not to be executed.”787 
 In addition to camels, prophetic traditions pointed out to other means in which diyya 
could be paid. In the same message to the people of Yemen about the rules of diyya, the 
Prophet concluded that “[a] man may be killed in return for (killing) a woman, and those who 
deal in gold must pay one thousand Dinars [a dinar is proximally 4.25 g. of gold].”788 In 
another prophetic tradition, Ibn Abbas stated that “[a] man killed another man during the time 
                                                          
784 SUNAN AN-NASA’I, supra note 581, vol. 5, bk. 45, hadith no. 4857, at 447-48. 
785 SUNAN ABU DAWUD, supra note 578, vol. 5, bk. 38, hadith no. 4547 at 130. The same number of camels is 
the penalty for an accidental killing. The Prophet (PBUH) “ruled that if a person was killed accidentally, his 
[diyya] was one hundred camels . . . .” Id. vol. 5, bk. 38, hadith no. 4541, at 127. 
786 See ADLI, supra note 662, at 53; PETERS, supra note 528, at 52. Nevertheless, Imam Malik argued that 
aggravated diyya applies to all categories of killing because “the guilty one has benefited by being granted the 
privilege of paying [diyya] instead of [q]isas, therefore, no more mitigations should be granted to him.” EL-
SHEIKH, supra note 21, at 172. 
787 SUNAN ABU DAWUD, supra note 578, vol. 5, bk. 38, hadith no. 4565, at 140 
788 SUNAN AN-NASA’I, supra note 581, vol. 5, bk. 45, hadith no. 4857, at 447-48. 
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of the Messenger of Allah, and the Prophet [(PBUH)] set the [diyya] at twelve thousand 
dirhams [a dirham is proximally 3.5 g. of sliver].”789  
 Some scholars argued that the assessment of diyya must be based on camels, only 
because diyya cannot be “aggravated or normal” unless it is given in the form of camels.790 
On the other hand, other scholars believed that the original blood money consisted of camels 
simply due to their accessibility to everyone during that period of time, and that it could be 
paid by means other than camels.791 Further, in addition to the two above-quoted prophetic 
traditions, Umar Ibn Al-Khattab, the second Caliph, also indicated various items that could be 
used to make the payment of diyya. 792It was narrated that, in one of his orations, Umar said: 
“‘Camels have become expensive.’ So, Umar imposed the [diyya] for those who owned gold 
as one thousand Dinars, for those who owned silver as twelve thousand Dirhams, for those 
who owned cattle as two hundred cows, for those who owned sheep as two thousand sheep, 
and for those who owned Hullahs [fabric] as two hundred Hullah [dresses].”793  
 Moreover, some scholars argue that the sum of 1,000 dinars or 12,000 dirhams 
stipulated by the Prophet (PBUH) as another form in which diyya could be given, was 
actually the price of camels during that period of time.794 Therefore, especially in modern 
times, diyya may be paid with a fixed quantity of money which represents the prevailing cost 
                                                          
789 Id. vol. 5, bk. 45, hadith no. 4807, at 426. 
790 AL-MUGHNI, supra note 637, vol. 9, at 481. 
791 See EL-SHEIKH, supra note 21, at 173-74. 
792 Id. at 174-75. 
793 SUNAN ABU DAWUD, supra note 578, vol. 5, bk. 38, hadith no. 4542 at 127-28. 
Since there is no evidence from the Qur’an and Sunnah restricting the [diyya] payment on a 
sociological or occupational basis, it should be understood from the said oration that Umar meant 
to facilitate the process of [diyya] payment rather than impose a certain monetary unit on such a 
particular sector of the people. The option to pay [diyya] in whatever kind one chooses should 
remain open to everyone regardless of occupation. 
EL-SHEIKH, supra note 21, at 175. 
794 See SUNAN AN-NASA’I, supra note 581, vol. 5, at 427. 
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of 100 camels at the present time. Also, with this approach, implementing “aggravated” or 
“normal” diyya is totally possible. When the victim’s heirs are entitled to aggravated blood 
money, the offender is forced to pay the price of 100 camels determined to be of high quality, 
whereas the normal blood money would be the value of 100 regular camels.  
 Finally, the heirs of the murder victim may grant the offender a full pardon by forgoing 
both the qisas penalty and diyya.795 The authority to remit blood money is determined by the 
Holy Qur’an itself in verse 92 of chapter 4, which reads: “If anyone kills a believer by 
mistake he must . . . pay compensation [diyya] to the victim’s relatives, unless they charitably 
forgo it.”796 It is important to note that, even with outright forgiveness, the killer would be still 
subject to a discretionary punishment.797 Yet, there is only one exception where blood money 
cannot be remitted. It is the case where the entitlement of choosing between qisas and diyya is 
held by the head of the state, due to the absence of heirs.798 While the head of the state may 
waive the penalty of qisas, he or she may not forgo the payment of diyya, because it belongs 
to the public and remitting it would be against the community’s interest.799 
b. In Libyan Law 
 Diyya is the alternative retribution in murder (intentional homicide) according to the 
Law of Qisas and Diyya in revised Article (1), which reads: “Is punished with death whoever 
kills a person with intent. If pardon is granted, the penalty shall be imprisonment for life and 
diyya.”800 With regard to quasi-intentional homicide, the Law of Qisas and Diyya does not 
                                                          
795 Payment of blood money can be either completely or partially waived. Blood Money in Islam, ABOUT 
RELIGION & SPIRITUALITY, http://islam.about.com/od/law/fl/6/Blood-Money-in-Islam.htm (last visited March 
22, 2016). 
796 THE QUR’AN, supra note 23, 4:92, at 59 (emphasis added). 
797 See discussion infra Part III. C.3. 
798 See supra text accompanying notes 665-66. 
799 AL-MUGHNI, supra note 637, vol. 9, at 476. 
800 LAW NO. (7) OF 2000 ON REVISING SOME RULES OF LAW NO. (6) OF 1994 ON THE RULES OF QISAS AND 
DIYYA, art. 1. 
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address it. Before the Supreme Court addressed the issue of how to address quasi-intentional 
homicide after the issuance of the Law of Qisas and Diyya, courts handled it in three various 
ways. First, following the opinion of the three Islamic Schools of law, an offender with quasi-
intent was treated the same as un unintentional killer who is punished with blood money 
only.801 In the second approach, quasi-intentional killing was considered equivalent to 
intentional homicide, which is subject to either qisas or diyya if pardon was granted, in 
accordance with Imam Malik’s view.802 Both approaches relied on what the Law of Qisas and 
Diyya itself provides in Article (7), where it states that “[t]he principles of Islamic law 
(Shari’a) which are most appropriate to this Law will be applied in the absence of a text.”803 
As a third method, some courts held that the Libyan Penal Code is still applicable to quasi-
intentional homicide, on the grounds that this type of killing was not included by the Law of 
Qisas and Diyya.804 
 Four years after enactment the Law of Qisas and Diyya, the Supreme Court put an end 
to the appellate courts’ conflicting rulings by upholding the last approach stated above.805 The 
Court ruled that, since the Law of Qisas and Diyya addresses only intentional and 
unintentional homicide, it only invalidates only the part of the Penal Code that concerns the 
                                                          
801 See, e.g., Mahkmat Istinaf Misrata [Misrata Court of Appeal], Criminal Chamber (Feb. 25, 1997) (unreported) 
(Libya). The punishment for unintentional killing is specified by the Law of Qisas and Diyya in Article (3) as 
follows: “whoever kills a person or causes his killing without intent is punished by diyya . . . .”). LAW NO. (6) OF 
1994 ON THE RULES OF QISAS AND DIYYA, art. 3. 
802 See, e.g., Mahkmat Istinaf Trablous [Tripoli Court of Appeal], Criminal Chamber (March 16, 1995) 
(unreported) (Libya). In compliance with the Law of Qisas and Diyya, the penalty for murder (intentional 
homicide) is death or blood money and life imprisonment in the case of pardon. LAW NO. (7) OF 2000 ON 
REVISING SOME RULES OF LAW NO. (6) OF 1994 ON THE RULES OF QISAS AND DIYYA, art. 1. 
803 LAW NO. (6) OF 1994 ON THE RULES OF QISAS AND DIYYA, art. 7. 
804 See, e.g., Mahkmat Istinaf Misrata [Misrata Court of Appeal], Criminal Chamber (June 6, 1998) (unreported) 
(Libya). Under the Libyan Penal Code, quasi-intentional murder “shall be punishable by imprisonment not 
exceeding ten years.” LIBYAN PENAL CODE, art. 374. 
805 See, e.g., Al-Mahkamah Al-Uliya [Supreme Court], Criminal Appeal No. 1268/44 (Dec. 8, 1998) (unreported) 




penalty for those two forms of killing, meaning that the portion dealing with quasi-deliberate 
killing is still valid.806 As for Article (7) of the Law of Qisas and Diyya—the section that 
directs the courts to apply the rules of Shari’a when there is no provision within the Qisas 
Law covering the matter--the Court has held that it is only applicable to cases of intentional or 
non-intentional homicide where there is no other provision of law, but is not applicable to 
quasi-intentional homicides.807     
  The Law of Qisas and Diyya contains very few rules for the retribution of diyya. Many 
of the rules the law does contain are identical to the rules about diyya set forth in Islamic law. 
Murder offenders have to pay the diyya themselves out of their own pockets.808 Blood money 
is owed by the aqilah of perpetrator who is a minor or mentally incompetent,809 and if there is 
no aqilah, the state will pay it.810 In the case of multi-victims, diyya shall be multiplied by the 
number of victims.811 Blood money is for the heirs of the murder victim and must be 
distributed according to the rules of succession.812 The Law of Qisas and Diyya did not 
address the full pardon issue as to whether the victim’s heirs may remit both the penalty of 
qisas and the payment of diyya. Yet, outright forgiveness has been granted by the appellate 
courts in many murder cases.813  
                                                          
806 Al-Mahkamah Al-Uliya [Supreme Court], Criminal Appeal No. 1268/44 (Dec. 8, 1998) (unreported) (Libya). 
807 Id.  
808 LAW NO. (6) OF 1994 ON THE RULES OF QISAS AND DIYYA, art. 4(1). The law did not address the issue of 
the defendant’s inability to pay. In reality, a victim’s heirs would rarely face such a problem, because typically 
they do not waive their right to qisas unless they receive the full amount of diyya in advance, or at least upon 
receipt of some proof demonstrating the financial ability of the defendant to pay.  
809 Id. art. 4(2). 
810 Id. art. 5. 
811 Id. art. 4(1). 
812 Id. art. 6. 
813 See, e.g., Mahkmat Istinaf Trablous [Tripoli Court of Appeal], Criminal Chamber (Jan. 7, 1997) (unreported) 
(Libya); Mahkmat Istinaf Trablous [Tripoli Court of Appeal], (Oct. 4, 1994) (unreported) (Libya). 
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 Interestingly, the legislature left the assessment of diyya completely to the heirs,814 
which is inconsistent with the rules of Shari’a in this matter.815 In other words, diyya is not a 
fixed pecuniary retribution under the Libyan qisas system. Rather, it is up to the victim’s heirs 
to determine the amount of blood money for homicide crimes, and the court shall impose the 
penalty as is. In practice, the victim’s heirs take the financial ability of the defendant into 
consideration when they set the amount of diyya they ask for. The above-mentioned approach 
regarding the payment of diyya has been subject to significant criticism by numerous Libyan 
scholars. For instance, prescribing diyya as a non-fixed amount of retribution clearly conflicts 
with the definition of diyya as a fixed pecuniary penalty in Islamic law.816 Such an approach 
also does not comply with the notion of equality of punishment, considering that the Law of 
Qisas and Diyya itself describes diyya as a penalty.817 Further, placing the assessment of diyya 
into the hands of the heirs may lead to an unfair situation on a practical level--there have been 
cases where the amount of diyya for unintentional killing was much greater than what an 
intentional murderer was obligated to pay.818 Fairness requires that a killer that lacks intent 
should not be made to pay a higher penalty than a killer who acts with intent. 
                                                          
814 LAW NO. (7) OF 2000 ON REVISING SOME RULES OF LAW NO. (6) OF 1994 ON THE RULES OF QISAS AND 
DIYYA, art. 3(bis) (“The monetary value of diyya shall be determined by the heirs [of the victim].”). 
815 See supra text accompanying notes 783-84. 
816 See, e.g., Elhadi Abu-Hammra, Al-Mafhum Al-Qanuni lil-Qisas wa Al-Diyya in Al-Tashri Al-Jinai Al-Libi 
[The Legal Concept of Qisas and Diyya in Libyan Criminal Law],15-16 (Feb. 29, 2004). 
 Mahmoud Suliman Al-Barasi, Al-Diyya beina Al-Uqubah wa Al-Ta’weed [Blood Money between Punishment 
and Compensation], MAJALH IDARAT AL-QADAYA, vol. 3, 122 (2003). 
817 See, e.g., Al-Mahdi Abdl-Fatah, Drasah Taqimiyah li-baad Ahkam Qanun Al-Qisas wa Al-Diyya [Evaluation 
Study of Some Rules of Libyan Law of Qisas and Diyya], 7 (2002). 
818 Compare Mahkmat Istinaf Trablous [Tripoli Court of Appeal], Criminal Chamber (March 5, 2003) 
(unreported) (Libya) (regarding an unintentional homicide trial, where the victim’s heirs demanded a sum of 
100,000 Libyan Dinar (approximately $85,000)), with Mahkmat Istinaf Trablous [Tripoli Court of Appeal], 
Criminal Chamber (March 20, 2003) (unreported) (Libya) (in which the victim’s heirs demanded a sum of 
60,000 Libyan Dinar (approximately $45,000) for intentional killing). 
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 Although the retribution of diyya is classified as a penalty, it has the characteristics of 
compensation.819 Therefore, after the Law of Qisas and Diyya was adopted in Libya in 1994, 
a question was raised as to whether a victim’s heirs may combine remedies between the 
payment of diyya through the criminal case and financial compensation on the basis of tort 
liability by filing a civil lawsuit for the same conduct (civil compensation).820 Some appellate 
courts saw the blood money as a punishment solely, thus, held that it was appropriate for the 
victim’s heirs to seek both blood money and civil compensation at the same time and for the 
same act.821 Other courts, refused to grant the heirs of the murdered person financial 
compensation in addition to diyya, deciding that diyya, in fact, was the compensation and that 
the injured party was entitled to make only one compensation claim for the same damages.822  
 The Supreme Court has ruled that neither diyya nor qisas shall be combined with civil 
compensation.823 In other words, the heirs may not seek blood money and civil compensation 
                                                          
819 See, e.g., DUBBER & HORNLE, supra note 511, at 261 (pointing out to the “dual character” of diyya as both 
penalty and compensation); Safwat, supra note 511, at 173 (“[Diyya] or blood-money has two aspects: first, it is 
a punishment inflicted on the offender for his crime. Second, it is a compensation to the victim or his 
representative.”). See also Hascall, Restorative Justice in Islam, supra note 22, at 60 (arguing that blood money 
“can also be seen as restitution”). 
820 Pursuant to Article (163) of the Libyan Civil Code, “every fault, which causes an injury to another, imposes 
an obligation to pay compensation upon the person by whom it is committed.” LIBYAN CIV. CODE (1954), 
https://archive.org/stream/LibyanCivilCode1954/LibyanCivilCode_djvu.txt. Under the Libyan justice system, a 
civil lawsuit for damages resulted from a criminal conduct could be filed in the criminal court that hears the 
criminal case instead of the civil court. LIBYAN CODE OF CRIM. PROC., art. 224. 
821 See, e.g., Mahkmat Istinaf Misrata [Misrata Court of Appeal], Criminal Chamber (March 25, 1997) 
(unreported) (Libya); Mahkmat Istinaf Trablous [Tripoli Court of Appeal], Criminal Chamber (Dec. 17, 1996) 
(unreported) (Libya); Mahkmat Istinaf Trablous [Tripoli Court of Appeal], Criminal Chamber (April 5, 1996) 
(unreported) (Libya). 
822 See, e.g., Mahkmat Istinaf Misrata [Misrata Court of Appeal], Criminal Chamber (Nov. 11, 1997); 
(unreported) (Libya); Mahkmat Istinaf Trablous [Tripoli Court of Appeal], Criminal Chamber (March 28, 1997) 
(unreported) (Libya). 
823 Al-Mahkamah Al-Uliya [Supreme Court], Criminal Appeal No. 1394/43 (Feb. 9, 1999) (unreported) (Libya); 
Al-Mahkamah Al-Uliya [Supreme Court], Criminal Appeal No. 731/44 (June 17, 1998) (unreported) (Libya). 
 See also Al-Mahkamah Al-Uliya [Supreme Court], Criminal Appeal No. 441/44 (March 10, 1999) (unreported) 
(Libya) (holding that the heirs of the murder victim are precluded from seeking qisas and civil compensation for 
the same crime, because it would be no differente than asking the court to impose the death penalty upon the 
defendant and also order the defendant to pay diyya); Al-Mahkamah Al-Uliya [Supreme Court], Criminal Appeal 
No. 661/44 (Dec. 13, 2000) (unreported) (Libya) (the same). 
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together, nor can they cannot demand death and file a claim for compensation for the same 
crime. In a lengthy rationale, the Court noted that diyya is clearly a penalty, but it is also civil 
compensation in the sense of making a payment to the heirs of the victim for their loss and 
suffering.824 Accordingly, the Court found that the legislature, by adopting the retribution of 
blood money in the Law of Qisas and Diyya, made an exception to the general rule that 
governs the compensation system in tort law and, as such, if the heirs in homicide cases want 
to be compensated, they can only achieve that by claiming “diyya” in criminal court.825 
Further, the Court explained, the demand for a qisas penalty may not be combined with a 
claim for civil compensation, because otherwise the heirs could put the defendant to death by 
choosing qisas and also secure payment of “blood money” in the form of civil 
compensation.826 Such situation, the Court concluded, circumvents the Law of Qisas and 
Diyya, and conflicts with the rules of Islamic law.827 
 However, several Libyan scholars disagree with the Supreme Court’s decision, 
suggesting that victim’s heirs should be allowed to seek the payment of diyya along with the 
civil compensation for the same case.828 One argument for this approach is that diyya is not 
                                                          
824 Al-Mahkamah Al-Uliya [Supreme Court], Criminal Appeal No. 731/44 (June 17, 1998) (unreported) (Libya). 
825 Id. It is worth noting that the Supreme Court’s ruling about not combining diyya with civil compensation 
applies only to murder survivors who are the legal heirs of the victim. As for non-inheritors of the victim’s 
family, because they are not entitled to blood money in the first place, they may file claims for civil 
compensation if they suffered any harm from the crime. 
826 Id. 
827 Id. The Supreme Court held that when the victim’s heirs seek execution and file for civil compensation before 
the criminal court, they are considered to be seeking both qisas and diyya. In such case, the trial court shall not 
impose either one until asking the heirs to specify their choice; then the court will sentence the defendant 
accordingly. Al-Mahkamah Al-Uliya [Supreme Court], Criminal Appeal No. 441/44 (March 10, 1999) 
(unreported) (Libya). 
828 See, e.g., Abdl-Fatah, supra note 817, at 13-14; Al-Barasi, supra note 816, at 118-20. Consistently with the 
Court’s approach, others believe that the victim’s heirs should not be compensated in addition to taking blood 
money, to prevent the heirs’ unjust enrichment at the expense of the defendant. Sa’d El-Abbar, Altakeef Al-fighi 
li-Diyya [The Jurisprudential Classification of Blood Money], MAJLAH AL-BUHOTH AL-QANUNIYA, vol. 1, 236 
(2002). Further, the retribution of diyya is closer to a compensation system since the Libyan lawmakers left the 
assessment of blood money to the heirs of the murder victim in Article (3) of the Law of Qisas and Diyya. ABU-




compensation, rather, it is a penalty as explicitly described by of the Law of Qisas and Diyya 
itself in Article (1): “Is punished with death whoever kills a person with intent. If pardon is 
granted, the penalty shall be imprisonment for life and diyya.”829 Moreover, the blood money 
is paid in lieu of the victim’s life, yet it does not compensate victim’s heirs for their physical 
or emotional harm that resulted from the defendant’s action.830 Another commentator has 
argued that diyya is a punishment in the sense that it replaces qisas in the case of pardon as an 
alternative penalty.831  
 Without delving into the diyya’s legal classification, victim’s heirs should not be 
entitled to have both blood money and civil compensation for the same homicide case. Even 
assuming that there were no strong justifications for allowing a victim’s heirs to collect both 
diyya and civil compensation, there are clearly justifications for barring a victim’s heirs from 
combining qisas with civil compensation. In line with the Supreme Court’s observation, if the 
heirs were allowed to seek compensation and elect qisas at the same time, there would not be 
any motivation for them to forgive the offender by renouncing qisas and taking blood money 
instead, which is contrary to the whole concept of qisas system in Islam.832  
 When the heirs of the murder victim choose to forego qisas, either for payment of blood 
money or not, the murderer is also subject to a discretionary punishment called “ta’zir.” The 
following section examines the ta’zir punishments in murder cases. 
 Discretionary Punishment (Ta’zir) 
 The primary punishment for murder offenses is death penalty. However, if the victim’s 
heirs did not demand the death penalty and chose the diyya instead, the head of the state has 
                                                          
829 Al-Barasi, supra note 816, at 118-20. 
830 Id.  
831 Abdl-Fatah, supra note 817, at 13. 
832 See supra notes 823-27 and accompanying text. 
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the power to inflict an appropriate discretionary sanction (ta’zir) against the killer. Literally, 
the term “ta’zir” means disgracing the offender for their shameful conduct. Imam Malik 
believes that an intentional murderer must face a ta’zir punishment in the case where the 
victim’s heirs renounce qisas, whereas, according to the other three Islamic Schools, ta’zir is 
allowable not mandatory.833 The majority of jurists provide that there is no specific ta’zir 
punishment in murder cases; rather, it is to be decided by the ruler of the state or the qadi 
(Islamic judge).834  
 Punishing a murder offender with ta’zir when the original fixed penalty (qisas) is 
remitted is an exception to the general rule that prescribes ta’zir punishments only for 
offenses with no divinely-specified penalties.835 The reason behind this exception is that the 
crime of murder harms the victim’s family and also violates the public order and threatens the 
security of the whole community. Therefore, when the private individuals who are the 
victim’s heirs choose to forgive the offender, their forgiveness does not affect the state 
authority to impose any other penalties in the public interest. Further, the victim’s heirs in 
murder cases pardon the punishment (qisas) and not the crime itself, which legally justifies 
the infliction of a ta’zir sanction upon the killer even after waiving the penalty of qisas. 
 In Libya, an intentional murderer receives a life sentence as a ta’zir punishment in the 
case of forgiveness, pursuant to Article (1) of the Law of Qisas and Diyya, which provides: 
“Is punished with death whoever kills a person with intent. If pardon is granted, the penalty 
shall be imprisonment for life and diyya.”836 It is important to note that the legislature did not 
                                                          
833 AWDAH, supra note 640, vol. 2, at 183-84. 
834 Id. at 184. 
835 See supra text accompanying notes 623-24. 
836 LAW NO. (7) OF 2000 ON REVISING SOME RULES OF LAW NO. (6) OF 1994 ON THE RULES OF QISAS AND 
DIYYA, art. 1. 
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impose any ta’zir punishment in the original version of Article (1) that was enacted in 
1994.837 Six years later, life imprisonment was added to diyya upon realization that, given the 
seriousness of the crime, diyya (which can be even remitted) would not have sufficient 
deterrent effect and would not satisfy these heirs who did not waive their right to qisas, which 
could drive those heirs to take revenge on the defendant.838 Some scholar think, however, that 
the legislature chose a very harsh discretionary punishment so that it would not be much less 
severe than the original penalty.839  
 Unlike qisas punishment, ta’zir is not divinely prescribed and it is left in the hands of 
the government, which raises the issue of whether the penalty of life imprisonment inflicted 
by the Law of Qisas and Diyya could be commuted or changed in compliance with the 
general rules of criminal law.840 For instance, under the Penal Code, the existence of 
mitigating factors permits the trial judge to reduce the sentence of imprisonment for life to 
imprisonment,841 which ranges from a minimum of three years to a maximum of fifteen 
years.842 Also, defendants who receive life sentences are eligible for parole under certain 
conditions after serving twenty years of their prison term.843 The Supreme Court has not 
addressed the issue, yet the Misrata Court of Appeal has ruled, that since the legislature did 
                                                          
837 LAW NO. (6) OF 1994 ON THE RULES OF QISAS AND DIYYA, art. 1, amended by LAW NO. (7) OF 2000 ON 
REVISING SOME RULES OF LAW NO. (6) OF 1994 ON THE RULES OF QISAS AND DIYYA (“Is punished with 
death whoever kills a person with intent, if the heirs [of the victim] demand it. Qisas is not applied if pardon is 
granted, in which case the penalty is the diyya.”). 
838 Unanimous pardon is not required for qisas to be waived. Thus, the majority of the victim’s heirs may 
demand capital punishment, yet the defendant would not be executed if the rest of heirs decide to forgive. See 
supra text accompanying notes 676-77. 
839 Abdl-Fatah, supra note 817, at 22. 
840 See supra note 719 and accompanying text. 
841 LIBYAN PENAL CODE, art. 29. 
842 Id. art. 21. 
843 LIBYAN CODE OF CRIM. PROC., art. 450. 
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not explicitly state otherwise, judicial discretion is not to be exercised with regard to the 
discretionary punishment imposed by the Law of Qisas and Diyya.844  
 Some scholars believe that applying modern rules for mitigating punishments to ta’zir is 
consistent with the Islamic prospective on ta’zir as a non-definite punishment.845 Another 
commentator provides the same rationale for arguing that the general rule of parole eligibility 
for life-sentenced prisoners, as set by the Code of Criminal Procedure should be applicable to 
convicted murderers as well.846 It is reasonable that qisas and diyya cannot be altered or 
commuted because, aside from the fact that they are specified by God, the right to either 
belongs to the heirs of the murder victim. This is not the case with the discretionary 
punishment where the state is the one who holds the entitlement to inflict a ta’zir sanction, 
and it is done in the interest of society. Therefore, as soon as the qisas penalty is waived by 
the heirs, judicial discretion should dictate the discretionary punishment, and life-sentenced 
defendants should not be excluded from the parole system.   
  According to the Islamic criminal law, families of murder victim are given the power to 
control the outcome of the victim’s case by deciding whether death will be executed, without 
denying the government the right to punish the offender with a discretionary punishment for 
threatening the public peace and security. Inspired by the Islamic approach, the following 
chapter proposes a broader involvement for murder survivors in the United States criminal 
justice process by permitting victim opinions concerning the appropriate punishment in a 
capital sentencing proceeding.  
  
                                                          
844 Mahkmat Istinaf Misrata [Misrata Court of Appeal], Criminal Chamber (Oct. 18, 2001) (unreported) (Libya). 
845 See, e.g., ABDL-AZIZ AMER, TA’ZIR FI AL-SHARI’A AL-ISLAMIYA [TA’ZIR IN ISLAMIC SHARI’A] 493 (Cairo, 
Dar Al-Fikr Al-Arabi 5th ed. 1976).  




IV. PROPOSAL FOR ALLOWING VICTIM SENTENCING OPINION IN 
CAPITAL MURDER CASES 
The author does not suggest that United States should adopt the Islamic approach by 
allowing a victim’s family to have the final say in choosing the accused’s punishment in a 
capital murder case. Rather, the Islamic approach could inspire the United States to consider 
the possibility of extending the family’s participation in capital murder sentencing by 
permitting them to advise the sentencing authority of their preferred sentence. In this way, 
victims’ families will not control the sentencing outcome, but at the same time, they will have 
the opportunity to play a significant role in the sentencing process by contributing their 
unique perspectives. However, in order for victim sentencing opinion to be permissible, the 
standard of relevance should be expanded. 
A. Proposal for Applying a Broader Standard of Relevance in 
Capital Murder Sentencing  
 The views of a victim’s family on the proper sentence should be considered relevant 
to the capital sentencing decision, even if they do not relate to the defendant’s moral 
culpability and blameworthiness.847 The mere fact that victim impact statements were found 
to be as relevant evidence in Payne--after they were held otherwise by Booth--is the perfect 
example of how the rules of evidence could be changed and the scope of relevance could be 
extended to permit victim sentencing opinions.848 Evidence demonstrating the impact of the 
murder on the victim’s family became relevant under Payne on the basis that the amount of 
harm done by the defendant’s action has some relevancy to the defendant’s 
                                                          
847 The Supreme Court ruled that imposing death penalty must be based on circumstances that are relevant to the 
defendant’s “personal responsibility and moral guilt.” See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800-01(1982). 
848 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825-27 (1991); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 496 (1987). 
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blameworthiness.849 Yet, evidence of the victim’s personal character is also found relevant, 
even though it has nothing to do with determining the defendant’s moral culpability for the 
crime committed.850 
 The relevance of capital hearing evidence in murder cases should be extended beyond 
the blameworthiness of the defendant without threatening his or her constitutional rights.  
Mercy opinions, for instance, could be viewed as a relevant factor because they provide the 
defendant the prospect of receiving a life sentence instead of death.851 Such an approach 
clearly serves the defendant’s interest and causes no harm to his or her Eighth Amendment’s 
rights. As for family’s opinion that calls for death, a concise statement recommending capital 
punishment for the defendant would not be more prejudicial than probative because, after 
giving emotional impact testimony describing the good character of the victim and the impact 
of the crime on the family, most jurors would assume that the victim’s family wanted the 
defendant to be executed.852 While it  might be true that victim impact evidence is 
constitutionally relevant to the harm caused by the defendant, it is significantly more 
emotional and prejudicial than a simple “irrelevant” death recommendation. Therefore, the 
Supreme Court should reexamine its position in Payne by allowing juries to hear and consider 
victim sentencing opinions in reaching the proper punishment for capital murder.  
 Proposed Framework for Victim Sentencing Opinion 
Victim sentencing opinion should be allowed at the sentencing hearing of capital 
murder cases. State legislatures should redefine victim impact evidence in their sentencing 
                                                          
849 See Payne, 501 U.S. at 825, 827. 
850 See id. at 827. 
851 See discussion supra notes 437-49 and accompanying text. 




statutes to encompass survivors’ opinions regarding the sentence that a defendant should 
receive. States could follow the Oklahoma model, where by victim impact statements are 
defined as “information about the financial, emotional, psychological, and physical effects of 
a violent crime on each victim and members of their immediate family, or person designated 
by the victim or by family members of the victim and includes information about the victim, 
circumstances surrounding the crime, the manner in which the crime was perpetrated, and the 
opinion of the victim of a recommended sentence.”853 A victim’s family should be allowed to 
recommend either a death or life sentence as the proper punishment during sentencing.854 
Victim sentencing opinion should be presented orally or in writing. The law should require 
such recommendation to be given in concise, unemotional legal language, and without 
expressing any reason for it.855 The defendant should still be allowed to ask the court to 
exclude unduly prejudicial sentencing opinion evidence that renders the trial fundamentally 
unfair based on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Finally, sentencing 
opinions, especially those that call for mercy, should be admissible only if they were made 
voluntarily. Thus, the court may determine whether the survivors truly desire a life (or death) 
sentence and whether any form of coercion was involved.   
The victim’s immediately family--his or her spouse, children, mother, father, sister or 
brother--should be the only individuals who are entitled to offer sentencing opinions. 
                                                          
853 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 142A-1(8) (1995) (emphasis added). Note that recently, in Dodd v. Trammell, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the Oklahoma statute allowing victim sentencing 
opinions to be included in victim impact evidence violates the Eighth Amendment. 753 F.3d 971, 994 (10th Cir. 
2013) cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1546 (2014), and 134 S. Ct. 1548 (2014). See supra notes 315-21 and 
accompanying text.  
854 For arguments in favor of death opinions, see supra Part II.B.2.a-c. For arguments in favor of mercy opinions, 
see supra Part II.C.2.a-c. 
855 See, e.g., Ledbetter v. State, 933 P.2d 880, 891 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997) (“[A victim sentencing opinion] 
“should be given as a straightforward, concise response to a question asking what the recommendation is; or a 





Another provision should indicate that if the murder victim has no immediate family, 
members of his or her extended family may offer sentencing opinions, provided that they had 
sufficient contact with the victim. Each of the survivors should be allowed to opine regarding 
the sentence to be imposed during the sentencing phase. Also, family members should be 
allowed to present conflicting views about the appropriate punishment the defendant should 
receive.  
At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial judge should be required to give 
jury instructions to guide the jury’s use of the sentencing opinion evidence and to ensure that 
the jury gives such evidence appropriate consideration. These instructions should explain that 
each survivor’s expressed view on the appropriate sentence for the defendant is simply a 
recommendation, and the jury may take those views into consideration in reaching the final 
sentencing judgment. The instructions should emphasize that, ultimately, the jurors must 
make whatever decision they believe is appropriate regardless of the survivors’ 
recommendations. Importantly, by instructing the jury that sentencing opinions are merely 
recommendations, it would not matter to the jury if all of a victim’s survivors recommended 
the same sentence or expressed differing opinions on the proper punishment that should be 
imposed. In addition to instructing the jury, the trial judge should be also required to inform 
the survivors, before and after they voice their opinions about the sentence, that their 







If the United States consider the family’s involvement under Islamic law, it can at 
least try to allow them to express their opinions as to the proper sentence to be imposed, 
especially when they speak in favor of mercy. The United States legal system recognizes 
murder as a crime against the state and cannot allow a victim’s family to have the final say in 
selecting murderer’s punishment. However, authorizing families of murder victims to voice 
an opinion at the sentencing hearing would not turn the crime of murder into a private wrong, 
nor would it in any way impinge upon the jury’s power to decide whether the defendant 
should be sentenced to death. Although courts have determined that victim sentencing 
opinions are irrelevant at the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial, the rules of evidence 
are not sacred. The standard of relevance can be always reconsidered without violating a 
defendant’s constitutional rights, as the Court did in Payne fifteen years ago.  
Currently, a victim’s family is precluded from voicing an opinion either against or in 
favor of imposing capital punishment. Until two years ago, death recommendations by 
victim’s family were permissible in Oklahoma courts pursuant to a state statute allowing 
sentencing recommendations to be included in victim impact evidence. Nevertheless, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Dodd v. Trammell found that 
Oklahoma statute that allows sentencing recommendations as part of victim impact statement 
violates the defendant’s Eighth Amendment right and held that  the violation was not 
harmless.856 State courts also disallow mercy opinions by following Robison, where the  court 
                                                          
856 753 F.3d 971, 994 (10th Cir. 2013) cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1546 (2014), and 134 S. Ct. 1548 (2014). 
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found that Payne did not extend relevant mitigating evidence to encompass a family’s opinion 
in opposition to the death penalty.857  
It contradicts logic to prohibit family members from making a death recommendation 
at the sentencing hearing after Payne has opened the floodgate of emotions by permitting 
victim impact evidence. A simple statement of one’s preference that the defendant be 
sentenced to death would not prejudice the defendant more than statements describing the 
victim’s good character or the crime’s impact on his or her family, particularly in light of the 
fact that most jurors would expect that the family would want the defendant to be executed. 
Further, victim sentencing recommendations are already admissible in non-capital cases. 
Considering victim sentencing opinion as permissible evidence would demonstrate respect to 
a victim’s family members who suffer the most from the murder and serve the goals of the 
victims’ rights movement. 
As for mercy opinions, they should be allowed based on several grounds. There is no 
constitutional violation in allowing a victim’s family members to ask the jury to spare the 
defendant’s life. Even if the jurors were influenced by a family’s call for leniency, the 
defendant would still be receiving life imprisonment, which is a severe punishment itself. 
Moreover, the criminal justice system unfairly favors pro-death penalty survivors over anti-
death penalty survivors. The permissible use of victim impact statements in sentencing 
proceedings has already provided a family who seeks vengeance with a way to express an 
implicit opinion in favor of a death sentence. In addition, while anti-death penalty survivors 
are being silenced or ignored by the prosecution because they do not serve its agenda, those 
who advocate for capital punishment as the proper penalty will most likely be called to testify 
                                                          
857 Robison v. Maynard, 943 F.2d 1216, 1217 (10th Cir. 1991). 
155 
 
about the victim’s good quality and the harm they suffered from the murder. Furthermore, the 
legal system recognizes pro-death penalty survivors’ need for closure by permitting them to 
witness the murderer’s execution. It should be recognized that not all families find healing in 
vengeance; some may seek closure through forgiveness or at least by refraining from putting 
another human being to death. 
In contrast, under Islamic law, a victim’s heirs have a say in whether the offender 
should live or die, because Islam never overlooked the fact that victim’s family members are 
the ones who have suffered the most from the loss of a loved one. Moreover, Islamic law 
recognizes that while some families want the offender to be executed, others may have a 
desire for mercy and want to spare the offender’s life. Therefore, in addition to granting the 
heirs of the victim the right to demand death (qisas), Islam provides a place for mercy by 
giving the heirs the authority to renounce capital punishment, either in favor of receiving 
blood money or for free. Importantly, Islamic law allows the victim’s family to have a say in a 
matter that directly concerns them, without sacrificing the community’s interests. In Shari’a, 
the classification of murder as a private claim between the offender and the family of the 
victim changes when the penalty of death is waived in lieu of diyya or for free. At that time, a 
free murderer would threaten the whole community, and thus, the state is charged with 
punishing the defendant by any penalty other than death.  
In Islam and in Libya, as a contemporary state that implements the law of qisas 
through the issuance of the Law of Qisas and Diyya in 1994, the heirs of the murdered person 
are the ones who have the exclusive authority to decide whether to execute or forgive the 
offender. In a case where the victim leaves no heirs or they cannot be reached, such authority 
will belong to the state as a representative of the victim. Moreover, in order for the death 
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penalty to be imposed, all heirs must demand qisas. If one heir decides to pardon the offender, 
the punishment of qisas becomes inapplicable. Under classical Islamic law, the claim of 
murder is brought to the judge by the victim’s heirs who execute the judgment of death as 
well. In modern time, the heirs are entitled to merely demand qisas, but the state will be in 
charge of the execution. In Libya, murder is prosecuted by a public attorney who represents 
the state and when the victim’s heirs demand qisas unanimously, execution is carried out by 
the government.  
In Islamic law, the door for pardon stays open until the time of carrying out the 
execution, even if the heirs previously have invoked their right to qisas. Likewise, in Libyan 
law, the heirs of the victim may forgive the defendant even after the death sentence becomes 
final. The victim’s heirs may pardon the defendant in exchange of an amount of diyya fixed at 
100 camels or other objects of the same value. The offender has to pay the diyya himself or 
herself, unless he or she is minor or mentally ill, in which case; it must to be paid by the 
aqilah (family) of the offender. Under the Libyan Law, however, the amount of diyya is 
determined by the heirs of the murder victim. Finally, waiving the qisas penalty by the 
victim’s heirs does not save the murderer from a discretionary punishment called (ta’zir), 
which the state is allowed to inflict on the defendant to reduce crimes and provide a safe 
environment for the community. The Libyan Law of Qisas and Diyya prescribes life 
imprisonment for murder as a ta’zir punishment. 
The recognition that the crime of murder as a public harm in the United States should 
not underestimate the fact that the family members of the victim are the ones most personally 
affected by the grief of a murder. In appreciation of this fact, and inspired by Islamic 
jurisprudence, a victim’s family members should be entitled to play a larger role at the 
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sentencing phase by allowing them to communicate their opinion on the appropriate sentence 










 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  
Codes 
United States 
 ALA. CODE § 15-23-74 (1995). 
 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-752(R) (2012). 
 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1112 (2012). 
 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 2003).  
 COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4.1-302.5 (2012). 
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(c)(1) (2007). 
 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 921.141(7), 921.147 (2004). 
 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-1.2 (2010). 
 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515 (2011). 
 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(e) (2008). 
 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6617(c) (2012). 
 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 421.520, 532.055 (West 2006). 
 LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.2 (2011). 
 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1844 (2000). 
 MISS. CODE. ANN. §§ 99-19-155(b), 99-43-33 (2013). 
 MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.030 (2012). 
159 
 
 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-302(1)(a)(iii) (2003). 
 NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-119(b) (2006). 
 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 176.015 (2013). 
 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-M:8-k, 651:4-a (2010). 
 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-833 (2005). 
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.19, 2947.051 (West 2006). 
 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 142A-1, 142A-8 (1995). 
 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.150 (2011). 
 S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1535 (2012). 
 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23A-27-1.1, 23A-27-1.3 (2014). 
 TENN. CODE. ANN. §§ 40-38-103, 40-38-205 (2010). 
 TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 56.03(b) (West 2010). 
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (West 2010). 
 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-11.0, 19.2-299.1 (2006). 
 WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. §§ 7.69.020(4), 7.69.030 (2011). 
Libya 
 
 LAW NO. (17) OF 1992 ON ORGANIZING THE AFFAIRS OF MINORS AND 
EQUIVALENTS, OFFICIAL JOURNAL, vol. 30/1992. 
 LAW NO. (6) OF 1982 ON REORGANIZING THE SUPREME COURT, OFFICIAL JOURNAL, 
vol. 22/1982 at 754, http://www.security-legislation.ly/node/31947. 




 LAW NO. (7) OF 2000 ON REVISING SOME RULES OF LAW NO. (6) OF 1994 ON THE 
RULES OF QISAS AND DIYYA, OFFICIAL JOURNAL, vol. 15/2000 at 513. 
 LAW NO. (6) OF 1994 ON THE RULES OF QISAS AND DIYYA, OFFICIAL JOURNAL, vol. 
5/1994 at 118. 
 LIBYAN CIV. CODE (1954), 
https://archive.org/stream/LibyanCivilCode1954/LibyanCivilCode_djvu.txt.  
 LIBYAN CODE OF CRIM. PROC. (1953), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1444332.pdf. 




U.S. Supreme Court Opinions 
 Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 496 (1987). 
 California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987).  
 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).  
 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).  
 Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977). 
 Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977). 
 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).  
 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 (1976). 
161 
 
 Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993). 
 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 822 (1991). 
 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
 Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990). 
 South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989). 
Forth Circuit Opinions 
 Bennett v. Angelone, 92 F.3d 1336 (1996). 
 Humphries v. Ozmint, 397 F.3d 206 (2005). 
Seventh Circuit Opinions 
 
 Williams v. Chrans, 945 F.2d 926 (1991). 
Tenth Circuit Opinions 
 Dodd v. Trammell, 753 F.3d 971(2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1546 (2014), and cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 1548, (2014). 
 Hain v. Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224 (2002). 
 Lott v. Trammell, 705 F.3d 1167 (2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 176 (2013).  
 Robison v. Maynard , 829 F. 2d 1501 (1987), overruled on other grounds by Romano v. 
Gibson, 239 F.3d 1156 (2001). 
 Robison v. Maynard, 943 F.2d 1216 (1991). 
 United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (1998), disapproved of by Hooks v. Ward, 
184 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 Welch v. Workman, 639 F.3d 980 (2011). 
162 
 
Eleventh Circuit Opinions 
 
 United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330 (2006). 
Federal Court Opinions 
 Roberts v. Bowersox, 61 F. Supp. 2d 896 (E.D. Mo. 1999).  
 United States v. McVeigh, 944 F. Supp. 1478 (D. Colo. 1996). 
Alabama State Opinions 
 Barbour v. State, 673 So. 2d 461 (1994). 
 Ex parte McWilliams, 640 So. 2d 1015 (1993). 
 Ex parte Washington, 106 So. 3d 441 (2011). 
 Gissendanner v. State, 949 So.2d 956 (2006).  
 Harris v. State, 632 So. 2d 503 (1992). 
 Hyde v. State, 778 So. 2d 199 (1998). 
 Whitehead v. State, 777 So. 2d 781 (1999).  
Arizona State Opinions 
 Lynn v. Reinstein, 68 P.3d 412 (2003). 
 State v. Bocharski, 22 P.3d 43 (2001). 
 State v. Garza, 163 P.3d 1006 (2007). 
 State v. Glassel, 116 P.3d 1193 (2005). 
 State v. Mann, 934 P.2d 784 (1997). 
 State v. Williams, 904 P.2d 437 (1995). 
Arkansas State Opinions 
 Greene v. State, 37 S.W.3d 579 (2001). 
163 
 
 Hicks v. State, 940 S.W.2d 855 (1997).  
 Lee v. State, 942 S.W.2d 231 (1997). 
 Noel v. State, 960 S.W.2d 439 (1998). 
California State Opinions 
 Kelly v. California, 129 S. Ct. 564 (2008). 
 People v. Boyette, 58 P.3d 391 (2002). 
 People v. Brady, 236 P.3d 312 (2010). 
 People v. Bramit, 210 P.3d 1171 (2009). 
 People v. Dykes, 209 P.3d 1 (2009). 
 People v. Edwards, 819 P.2d 436 (1991). 
 People v. Kelly, 171 P.3d 548 (2007). 
 People v. Lancaster 158 P.3d 157 (2007). 
 People v. Mitcham, 824 P.2d 1277 (1992). 
 People v. Montes, 320 P.3d 729 (2014). 
 People v. Nelson, 246 P.3d 301 (2011). 
 People v. Pollock, 89 P.3d 353 (2004). 
 People v. Prince, 156 P.3d 1015 (2007).  
 People v. Smith, 68 P.3d 302 (2003). 
 People v. Taylor, 229 P.3d 12 (2010). 
 People v. Valencia, 180 P.3d 351 (2008). 
 People v. Verdugo, 236 P.3d 1035 (2010). 





Colorado State Opinions 
 People v. Dunlap, 975 P.2d 723 (1999).  
Delaware State Opinions 
 Ortiz v. State, 869 A.2d 285 (2005). 
 Sullivan v. State, 636 A.2d 931 (1994).  
Florida State Opinions 
 Bums v. State, 699 So. 2d 646 (1997).  
 Burns v. State, 609 So. 2d 600 (1992). 
 Campbell v. State, 679 So. 2d 720 (1996). 
 Farina v. State, 680 So. 2d 392 (1996). 
 Farina v. State, 801 So. 2d 44 (2001). 
 Moore v. State, 701 So. 2d 545 (1997).  
 Perez v. State, 919 So. 2d 347 (2005). 
 Rimmer v. State, 825 So. 2d 304 (2002). 
Georgia State Opinions 
 Bryant v. State, 708 S.E.2d 362 (2011). 
 Livingston v. State, 444 S.E.2d 748 (1994). 
 McClain v. State, 477 S.E.2d 814 (1996).  
 Turner v. State, 486 S.E.2d 839 (1997).  
Idaho State Opinions 
 State v. Grant, 297 P.3d 244 (2013). 
165 
 
 State v. Payne, 199 P.3d 123 (2008). 
Indiana State Opinions 
 Smith v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1264 (1997). 
Kansas State Opinions 
 State v. Gideon, 894 P.2d 850 (1995). 
 State v. Parks, 962 P.2d 486 (1998). 
 State v. Scott, 183 P.3d 801 (2008).  
Kentucky State Opinions 
 Bowling v. Commonwealth, 942 S.W.2d 293 (1997). 
 St. Clair v. Commonwealth, 319 S.W.3d 300 (2010). 
 Terry v. Commonwealth, 153 S.W.3d 794 (2005). 
Louisiana State Opinions 
 State v. Bernard, 608 So. 2d 966 (1992). 
 State v. Frost, 727 So. 2d 417 (1998).  
 State v. Scales, 655 So. 2d 1326 (1995). 
 State v. Taylor, 669 So. 2d 364 (1996). 
Mississippi State Opinions 
 Davis v. State, 660 So. 2d 1228 (1995).  
 Havard v. State, 928 So. 2d 771 (2006). 
Missouri State Opinions 
 State v. Basile, 942 S.W.2d 342 (1997). 
 State v. Bucklew, 973 S.W.2d 83 (1998). 
166 
 
 State v. Gray, 887 S.W.2d 369 (1994).  
 State v. Johnson, 284 S.W.3d 561 (2009). 
 State v. Middleton, 995 S.W.2d 443 (1999). 
 State v. Roberts, 948 S.W.2d 577 (1997). 
 State v. Storey, 40 S.W.3d 898 (2001). 
 State v. Storey, 901 S.W.2d 886 (1995).  
 State v. Taylor, 944 S.W.2d 925 (1997).  
 State v. Worthington, 8 S.W.3d 83 (1999). 
Montana State Opinions 
 Kills On Top v. State, 15 P.3d 422 (2000). 
Nebraska State Opinions 
 State v. Galindo, 774 N.W.2d 190 (2009). 
Nevada State Opinions 
 Kaczmarek v. State, 91 P.3d 16 (2004). 
 Rippo v. State, 946 P.2d 1017 (1997). 
 Sherman v. State, 965 P.2d 903 (1998). 
 Summers v. State, 148 P.3d 778 (2006). 
 Wesley v. State 916 P.2d 793 (1996). 
 Witter v. State, 921 P.2d 886 (1996). 
New Jersey State Opinions 
 State v. Koskovich, 776 A.2d 144 (2001). 
North Carolina State Opinions 
167 
 
 State v. Haselden, 577 S.E.2d 594 (2003). 
 State v. Larry, 481 S.E.2d 907 (1997).  
 State v. Reeves, 448 S.E.2d 802 (1994).  
 State v. Robinson, 451 S.E.2d 196 (1994). 
 State v. Smith, 532 S.E.2d 773 (2000).  
Ohio State Opinions 
 State v. Chinn, 709 N.E.2d 1166 (1999). 
 State v. Fautenberry, 650 N.E.2d 878 (1995).  
 State v. Goodwin, 703 N.E.2d 1251 (1999). 
 State v. Hartman, 754 N.E.2d 1150 (2001). 
 State v. Hill, 595 N.E.2d 884 (1992). 
 State v. Wesson, 999 N.E.2d 557 (2013). 
 State v. White, 709 N.E.2d 140 (1999). 
Oklahoma State Opinions 
 Cargle v. State, 909 P.2d 806 (1995). 
 Conover v. State, 933 P.2d 904 (1997). 
 Darks v. State, 954 P.2d 152 (App. 1998). 
 DeLozier v. State, 991 P.2d 22, 31 (. 1998).  
 Gilbert v. State, 951 P.2d 98 (1997).  
 Le v. State, 947 P.2d 535 (1997).  
 Ledbetter v. State, 933 P.2d 880 (1997). 
 Lockett v. State, 53 P.3d 418 (2002).  
168 
 
 Lockhart v. State, 163 So. 3d 1088 (2013). 
 Long v. State, 883 P.2d 167 (1994). 
 Lott v. State, 98 P.3d 318 (2004). 
 Malone v. State, 168 P.3d 185 (2007). 
 Powell v. State, 906 P.2d 765 (1995).  
 Williams v. State, 188 P.3d 208 (2008). 
 Wood v. State, 959 P.2d 1 (1998). 
 Young v. State, 992 P.2d 332 (1998).  
Oregon State Opinions 
 State v. Barone, 969 P.2d 1013 (1998). 
 State v. Hayward, 963 P.2d 667 (1998). 
 State v. Sparks, 83 P.3d 304 (2004). 
Pennsylvania State Opinions 
 Commonwealth v. Means, 773 A.2d 143 (2001). 
 Commonwealth v. Williams, 854 A.2d 440 (2004). 
 Commonwealth. v. Means, 773 A.2d 143 (2001). 
South Carolina State Opinions 
 Hall v. Catoe, 601 S.E.2d 335 (2004). 
 Humphries v. State, 570 S.E.2d 160 (2002).  
 Lucas v. Evatt, 416 S.E.2d 646 (1992).   
 State v. Bixby, 698 S.E.2d 572 (2010). 
 State v. Byram, 485 S.E.2d 360 (1997). 
169 
 
 State v. Rocheville, 425 S.E.2d 32 (1993).  
 State v. Tucker, 478 S.E.2d 260 (1996). 
South Dakota State Opinions 
 State v. Berget, 826 N.W.2d 1 (2013). 
 State v. Rhines, 548 N.W.2d 415 (1996). 
Tennessee State Opinions 
 State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797 (1994). 
 State v. Burns, 979 S.W.2d 276 (1998). 
 State v. McKinney, 74 S.W.3d 291 (2002). 
 State v. Middlebrooks, 995 S.W.2d 550 (1999). 
 State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872 (1998).  
 State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10 (1990).  
Texas State Opinions 
 Cantu v. State, 939 S.W.2d 627 (1997).  
 Griffith v. State, 983 S.W.2d 282 (1998). 
 Jackson v. State, 33 S.W.3d 828 (2000).  
 McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607 (1997). 
 Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249 (1998). 
 Salazar v. State (Salazar), 118 S.W.3d 880 (2003). 
 Salazar v. State (Salazar), 90 S.W.3d 330 (2002) 
 Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356 (2001). 
 Tong v. State, 25 S.W.3d 707 (2000). 
170 
 
 Truehitt v. State, 916 S.W.2d 721 (1996). 
Virginia State Opinions 
 Beck v. Commonwealth, 484 S.E.2d 898 (1997). 
 Juniper v. Commonwealth, 626 S.E.2d 383 (2006). 
 Weeks v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 379 (1994). 
Washington State Opinions 
 State v. Gentry, 888 P.2d 1105 (1995). 
 State v. Gregory, 147 P.3d 1201 (2006). 
 State v. Pirtle, 904 P.2d 245 (1995). 
 State v. Stenson, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997).  
Wyoming State Opinions 
 Armstrong v. State, 826 P.2d 1106 (1992). 
 Barnes v. State, 858 P.2d 522 (1993). 
 Olsen v. State, 67 P.3d 536 (2003). 
Books 
 ABD AR RAHMAN BIN MUHAMMED IBN KHALDUN, THE MUQADDIMAH (Franz 
Rosenthal trans.), https://asadullahali.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/ibn_khaldun-
al_muqaddimah.pdf.   
 AHMAD HASAN, THE DOCTRINE OF IJMA’: A STUDY OF THE JURIDICAL PRINCIPLE 
OF CONSENSUS (New Delhi, Kitab Bhaban 2003). 
171 
 
 IMAM ABUL HUSSAIN MUSLIM BIN AL-HAJJAJ, ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF SAHIH 
MUSLIM (Nasiruddin Al-Khattab trans., Riyadh: Darussalam 2007), 
http://www.kalamullah.com/sahih-muslim.html. 
 IMAM HAFIZ ABU DAWUD SULAIMAN BIN ASH’ATH, ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF 
SUNAN ABU DAWUD (Nasiruddin al-Khattab trans., Riyadh: Darussalam 2008), 
http://www.kalamullah.com/sunan-abu-dawood.html. 
 IMAM HAFIZ ABU EISA MOHAMMAD IBN EISA AT-TIRMIDHI, ENGLISH 
TRANSLATION OF JAMI’ AT-TIRMIDHI (Abu Khaliyl trans., Riyadh: Darussalam 
2007), http://www.kalamullah.com/jami-at-tirmidhi.html. 
 IMAM MUHAMMAD BIN YAZEED IBN MAJAH AL-QAZWINI, ENGLISH TRANSLATION 
OF SUNAN IBN MAJAH (Nasiruddin Al-Khattab trans., Riyadh: Darussalam 2007), 
http://www.kalamullah.com/ibn-majah.html. 
 IMIM HIFIZ ABO ABDUR RAHMIN AHMAD BIN SHU’AIB BIN ALI AN-NASA’I, 
ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF SUNAN AN-NASA’I (Nasiruddin Al-Khattab trans., 
Riyadh: Darussalam 2007), http://www.kalamullah.com/sunan-an-nasai.html. 
 JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW (Oxford Univ. Press 1982).  
 JUDY SHEPARD, THE MEANING OF MATTHEW: MY SON’S MURDER IN LARAMIE, 
AND A WORLD TRANSFORMED (Hudson Street Press 2009). 
 MARKUS D. DUBBER & TATJANA HORNLE, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL 
LAW (Oxford Univ. Press 2014).  
 MATTHEW LIPPMAN, SEAN MCCONVILLE & MORDECHAI YERUSHALMI, ISLAMIC 
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: AN INTRODUCTION (1988). 
172 
 
 MOHAMED SALEM EL-AWA, PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAW: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY (Indianapolis, American Trust Publications 1981). 
 MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 
(Cambridge, The Islamic Text Society, 2003). 
 MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, SHARI’AH LAW: AN INTRODUCTION (Oneworld 
Publications 2008). 
 MUHAMMAD MUSLEHUDDIN, PHILOSOPHY OF ISLAMIC LAW AND THE 
ORIENTALISTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ISLAMIC LEGAL SYSTEM (Lahore, 
Pakistan, Kazi Publications 1985). 
 NAGATY SANAD, THE THEORY OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN 
ISLAMIC LAW: SHARI’A (Office of International Criminal Justice, Univ. of Illinois 
1991). 
 RACHEL KING, DON’T KILL IN OUR NAMES: FAMILIES OF MURDER VICTIMS SPEAK 
OUT AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY (Rutgers University Press 2003). 
 RAJ BHALA, UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW (Shari’a) (LexisNexis 2011). 
 RUDOLPH PETERS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAW: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE FROM THE SIXTEENTH TO THE TWENTY–FIRST CENTURY 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2005). 
 SAID RAMADAN, ISLAMIC LAW: ITS SCOPE AND EQUITY (1970). 
 TAJUDEEN MUHAMMED B. ADIGUN, THE RELEVANCE OF QIYAS (ANALOGICAL 
DEDUCTION) AS A SOURCE OF ISLAMIC LAW IN CONTEMPORARY TIME (Zaria, 





 THE QUR’AN: A NEW TRANSLATION BY M. A. S. ABDEL HALEEM (Oxford Univ. 
Press 2005), https://yassarnalquran.files.wordpress.com/2015/06/the_quran-abdel-
haleem.pdf. 
 THE TRANSLATION OF THE MEANINGS OF SAHIH AL-BUKHARI (Muhammad Muhsin 
Khan trans., Riyadh: Darussalam 1997), http://www.kalamullah.com/sahih-
bukhari.html. 
Dissertations 
 MOHAMAD A. EL-SHEIKH, THE APPLICABILITY OF ISLAMIC PENAL LAW 
(QISAS AND DIYAH) IN THE SUDAN (Proquest Dissertations Pub. 1987).   
Journals 
 Angela P. Harris, The Jurisprudence of Victimhood, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 77  
 Beth E. Sullivan, Harnessing Payne: Controlling the Admission of Victim Impact 
Statements to Safeguard Capital Sentencing Hearings from Passion and Prejudice, 25 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 601 (1998). 
 Brian L. Vander Pol, Relevance and Reconciliation: A Proposal Regarding the 
Admissibility of Mercy Opinions in Capital Sentencing, 88 IOWA L. REV. 707 (2003). 
 Bryan Myers & Edith Greene, The Prejudicial Nature of Victim Impact Statements 




 Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two 
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355 
(1995). 
 Charles F. Baird & Elizabeth E. McGinn, Re-Victimizing the Victim: How 
Prosecutorial and Judicial Discretion Are Being Exercised to Silence Victims Who 
Oppose Capital Punishment, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 447 (2004).  
 Douglas E. Beloof, Constitutional Implications of Crime Victims as Participants, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 282 (2003). 
 Eaton & Tony Christensen, Closure and Its Myths: Victims’ Families, the Death 
Penalty, and the Closure Argument, INT’L REV. OF VICTIMOLOGY, 20(3) (2014). 
 Edna Erez, Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Victim? Victim Impact Statements as Victim 
Empowerment and Enhancement of Justice, CRIM. L. REV. 545 (1999). 
 Elizabeth Peiffer, The Death Penalty in Traditional Islamic Law and As Interpreted in 
Saudi Arabia and Nigeria, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 507 (2005). 
 Governor Mario M. Cuomo, The Crime Victim in a System of Criminal Justice, 8 ST. 
JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 1 (1992).  
 Irshad Abdal-Haqq, Islamic Law: An Overview of Its Origin and Elements, 7 J. 
ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE, 27 (2002). 
 Jeffrey Abramson, Death-Is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the Capital Jury, 
2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 117 (2004).  
 John H. Blume, Ten Years of Payne: Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Cases, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 257 (2003). 
 John Makdisi, Islamic Law Bibliography, 78 L. LIBR. J., 103 (1986). 
175 
 
 Joseph L. Hoffmann, Revenge or Mercy? Some Thoughts About Survivor Opinion 
Evidence in Death Penalty Cases, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 530 (2003). 
 Joseph L. Hoffmann, Where’s the Buck?-Juror Misperception of Sentencing 
Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L.J. 1137 (1995). 
 Joshua D. Greenberg, Is Payne Defensible?: The Constitutionality of Admitting 
Victim-Impact Evidence at Capital Sentencing Hearings, 75 IND. L.J. 1349 (2000). 
 Kathryn E. Bartolo, Payne v. Tennessee: The Future Role of Victim Statements of 
Opinion in Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1217 (1992). 
 Marilyn Peterson Armour & Mark S. Umbreit, The Ultimate Penal Sanction and 
“Closure” for Survivors of Homicide Victims, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 381 (2007). 
 Matthew Lippman, Islamic Criminal Law and Procedure: Religious Fundamentalism 
v. Modern Law, 12 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 29 (1989). 
 Megan A. Mullett, Fulfilling the Promise of Payne: Creating Participatory 
Opportunities for Survivors in Capital Cases, 86 IND. L.J. 1617 (2011). 
 Michael Ira Oberlander, The Payne of Allowing Victim Impact Statements at Capital 
Sentencing Hearings, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1621 (1992).  
 Paige Mcthenia, The Role of Forgiveness in Capital Murder Cases, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 
325 (2000). 
 Patrick M. Fahey, Payne v. Tennessee: An Eye for an Eye and Then Some, 25 CONN. 
L. REV. 205 (1992).  




 Rebecca T. Engel, “An Existential Moment of Moral Perception”: Declarations of 
Life and the Capital Jury Re-Imagined, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 303 (2013). 
 Richard S. Murphy, The Significance of Victim Harm: Booth v. Maryland and the 
Philosophy of Punishment in the Supreme Court, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1303(1988). 
 Robert P. Mosteller, Victim Impact Evidence: Hard to Find the Real Rules, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 543 (2003). 
 Robert Postawko, Towards an Islamic Critique of Capital Punishment, 1 UCLA J. 
ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 269 (2002). 
 Safia M. Safwat, Offences and Penalties in Islamic Law, 26 ISLAMIC QUARTERLY, 
149 (1982). 
 Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal 
Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 655 (1989). 
 Stephanos Bibas, Forgiveness in Criminal Procedure, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 329 
(2007).  
 Susan Bandes, When Victims Seek Closure: Forgiveness, Vengeance and the Role of 
Government, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1599 (2000). 
 Susan C. Hascall, Restorative Justice in Islam: Should Qisas Be Considered a Form of 
Restorative Justice?, 4 BERK. J. MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIC L. 35 (2011). 
 Susan C. Hascall, Shari’ah and Choice: What the United States Should Learn from 
Islamic Law About the Role of Victims' Families in Death Penalty Cases, 44 JOHN 
MARSHALL L. REV.1 (2010). 
 Thomas J. Mowen & Ryan D. Schroeder, Not In My Name: An Investigation of 
Victims’ Family Clemency Movements and Court Appointed Closure, WESTERN 
177 
 
CRIMINOLOGY REV. 12(1) (2011), 
http://www.westerncriminology.org/documents/WCR/v12n1/Mowen.pdf. 
 Vik Kanwar, Capital Punishment As “Closure”: The Limits of A Victim-Centered 
Jurisprudence, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 215 (2002). 
 Wayne A. Logan, Opining on Death: Witness Sentence Recommendations in Capital 
Trials, 41 B.C. L. REV. 517 (2000). 
 Zainab Chaudhry, The Myth of Misogyny: A Reanalysis of Women’s Inheritance in 
Islamic Law, 61 ALB. L. REV. 511 (1997). 
Magazine and Newspaper Articles 
 David Pallister, ‘Spare the Life of My Loved One’s Killer’: Murder Victims’ Families 
Speak Out Against U.S. Death Penalty, THE GUARDIAN, (Oct. 9, 1999), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/oct/09/davidpallister. 
 Michael Janofsky, Wyoming Man Get Life Term in Gay’s Death, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 5, 
1999), http://www.nytimes.com/learning/students/pop/articles/matthew-shepard.html. 
Online Sources 
 Ahmad Shafaat, The Meaning of Ijma’, ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVES (1984), 
http://www.islamicperspectives.com/meaningofijma.htm. 
 Amin Ahsan Islahi, Difference between Hadith and Sunnah, 
http://www.renaissance.com.pk/jafelif986.html. 
 An Introduction To The Science Of Hadith, The Classification Of Hadith: According 




 Blood Money in Islam, ABOUT RELIGION & SPIRITUALITY, 
http://islam.about.com/od/law/fl/6/Blood-Money-in-Islam.htm. 
 Bruce Shapiro, Victims’ Rights-and Wrongs, SALON.COM, (June 13, 1997), 
http://www.salon.com/june97/news/news970613.html. 
 John L. S. Simpkins, Libya’s Legal System and Legal Research, HAUSER GLOBAL 
LAW SCHOOL PROGRAM, NEW YORK UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAW (Jan. 2008), 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Libya.html#_Legislation_(Codes,_Cases. 
 Mahmood Namazi, Bayt al-Mal and the Distribution of Zakat, AL-ISLAM.ORG, 
https://www.al-islam.org/message-thaqalayn/vol11-n2-2010/bayt-al-mal-and-
distribution-zakat-mahmood-namazi/bayt-al-mal-and. 
 Mohamad K. Yusuff, Introduction to the Development of Hadith Literature, (March 
19, 2004), 
http://www.forpeoplewhothink.org/Topics/Introduction_to_Hadith_Literature.html. 
 Mohammad Omar Farooq, Qiyas (Analogical Reasoning) and Some Problematic 
Issues in Islamic law (2006). 
 Mohammad Omar Farooq, The Doctrine of Ijma: Is there a consensus? (2006). 
 Not in Our Name: Murder Victims’ Families Speak Out Against the Death Penalty, 
MURDER VICTIMS’ FAMILIES FOR RECONCILIATION, http://www.mvfr.org/no-not-in-
our-names. 
 President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime, Final Report (1982), 
http://ojp.gov/ovc/publications/presdntstskforcrprt/87299.pdf. 




 Robert Renny Cushing & Susannah Sheffer, Dignity Denied: The Experience of 
Murder Victims’ Family Members Who Oppose the Death Penalty, MURDER 
VICTIMS’ FAMILIES FOR RECONCILIATION (2002). 
 Shah Abdul Hannan, Ijma (Consensus Of Opinion), ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE, 
http://www.muslimtents.com/aminahsworld/islamic_jurisprudence_ijma.html. 
 Some Oklahoma City Bombing Families Fight for McVeigh’s Life, CNN.COM, (May 4, 
2001), http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/05/04/mcveigh.families/index.html. 
 States with and without the Death Penalty as of July 1, 2015, DEATH PENALTY 
INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-
penalty. 
 The Closure Myth, EQUAL JUSTICE USA, http://ejusa.org/learn/victims-families/.  
 THE DEATH PENALTY IN LIBYA (March 20, 2008), 
http://www.deathpenaltylibya.org/. 
 The History of Hadith, TRUE ISLAM, http://www.quran 
islam.org/articles/part_1/history_hadith_1_(P1148).html. 
Foreign Materials 
 ABD AL-QADIR AWDAH, AL-TASHRI AL-JINAI AL-ISLAMI MUQARANAN BI-AL-
QANUN AL-WADI [ISLAMIC CRIMINAL LAW COMPARED WITH POSITIVE LAW] 
(Cairo: Dar Al-Turath 1985). 
 ABDEL GHAFFAR IBRAHIM SALEH, AL-QISAS FI AL-NUFS FI AL-FIGH AL-ISLAMI 
[QISAS IN MURDER UNDER ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE]: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (2d 
ed. 1998).  
180 
 
 ABDL-AZIZ AMER, TA’ZIR FI AL-SHARI’A AL-ISLAMIYA [TA’ZIR IN ISLAMIC 
SHARI’A] (Cairo, Dar Al-Fikr Al-Arabi 5th ed. 1976).  
 ABU-BAKER EL-ANSARI, MOHADHRAT FI MADHIT QANUN AL-UQUBAT 
[LECTURERS IN CRIMINAL LAW] (2004-2005). 
 Al-Mahdi Abdl-Fatah, Drasah Taqimiyah li-baad Ahkam Qanun Al-Qisas wa Al-
Diyya [Evaluation Study of Some Rules of Libyan Law of Qisas and Diyya] (2002). 
 AWAD AHMAD IDREES, AL-DIYYA BAINA AL-TA’WEED WA AL-UQUBAH FI AL-
FIGH AL-ISLAMI AL-MUQAREN [BLOOD MONEY BETWEEN COMPENSATION AND 
PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE] (Cairo Univ., School of 
Law). 
 Elhadi Abu-Hammra, Al-Mafhum Al-Qanuni lil-Qisas wa Al-Diyya in Al-Tashri Al-
Jinai Al-Libi [The Legal Concept of Qisas and Diyya in Libyan Criminal Law] (Feb. 
29, 2004). 
 Mahmoud Suliman Al-Barasi, Al-Diyya beina Al-Uqubah wa Al-Ta’weed [Blood 
Money between Punishment and Compensation], MAJALH IDARAT AL-QADAYA, vol. 
3 (2003). 
 MAWAFFAQ AL-DIN ABDULLAH IBN AHMAD IBN QUDAMAH AL-MAQDISI (IBN-
QUDAMAH), AL-MUGHNI (Beirut, Dar Al-Kilab Al-Arabi). 
 MUHAMMAD ABU ZAHRAH, AL-UQUBAH FI AL-FIQH AL-ISLAMI [PUNISHMENT IN 
ISLAMIC LAW] (Cairo, Dar Al-Fikr Al-Arabi). 
 OSAMA ADLI, DIYYA AL-QATL [BLOOD MONEY IN HOMICIDE] (Cairo, Dar Al-
Nahda Al-Arabia 1985). 
181 
 
 Sa’d El-Abbar, Altakeef Al-fighi li-Diyya [The Jurisprudential Classification of Blood 
Money], MAJLAH AL-BUHOTH AL-QANUNIYA, vol. 1 (2002). 
